310.2/3–3054
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
Dear Cabot: I have read with interest your memoranda on your recent conversations with Hammarskjold and on the Chinese representation issue generally.2 We are, of course, in complete agreement on the over-riding importance of maintaining our position on the Chinese representation issue. The evidence now at hand indicates that a sufficient number of UN Members continue to agree with this government that it will not serve the interests of world order to bring into the UN a regime which is a convicted aggressor, which has not purged itself from that aggression, and which continues to promote the use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter. The recent statements of both Jebb and Pearson can be interpreted in substantially these terms. Since there is nothing to show that the Chinese Communists are likely to purge themselves of their aggressive policies, it would not appear that there is any immediate danger of the Chinese Communists getting the seat of China in the UN.
I have definitely in mind the necessity of seeking a further agreement with the UK on Chinese representation in advance of the next Assembly. I am not, however, now able to determine just when it would be most advantageous for me to make this approach. I would hope that agreement on this matter would follow naturally from the Geneva discussions.
We must, of course, be ready to deal with the substance of the Chinese representation problem whenever this is necessary. Specific tactics at the Assembly, such as the matter of committee referral, will, of course, have to depend upon the form in which the question is raised, the general tactical situation prevailing at the time and the degree of support for a particular procedure, as ascertained through advance consultations.
[Page 729]Whether we would invoke the two-thirds voting requirement would depend upon the substance of the action proposed. For example, two proposals might be before the Assembly, one providing for the seating of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and the other for the seating of representatives of the Chinese Communist regime. If the Assembly decided that a two-thirds vote were required on this matter, the result could be that no representative would be seated for China. All of these tactical points will need to be carefully studied so that we will be clear as to the precise course we should pursue in various eventualities with a view to keeping the China we recognize in the UN and the Chinese Communists out. Mr. Key will see that this is done.
With respect to the Geneva Conference, in my speech of March 29 before the Overseas Press Club, I made clear to our allies and to our enemies, beyond the possibility of any misunderstanding, that this Government will not trade commitments for promises in respect, in particular, of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and Chinese representation.
As to the embargo against Communist China, as you indicate there can be no question of lifting the embargo so long as the Chinese Communists continue their aggressive policies. In the recent Stassen talks, the UK and France reaffirmed their agreement with us on this point. If the millennium arrives and the Chinese Communists change their ways, we will, of course, have to review our attitude on the embargo in the context of our general Far Eastern policy. However, I doubt that in these circumstances it would be productive to attempt to trade Chinese representation against the lifting of the embargo, since the position of a crucial number of UN Members on both questions pre sumably obtains only so long as the Chinese Communists continue to behave like international bandits.
At the direction of the President the National Security Council conducted last year an intensive review of the policy this Administration inherited on East-West trade. In a nutshell, the Council concluded that the basic policy and objectives of the security trade control program should be maintained, but that the strategic lists should be re-examined with a view to determining, on the basis of stricter criteria, those commodities and services which would not contribute significantly to the war potential of the Soviet bloc, and which, therefore, might be eliminated from control. This review does not include trade with Communist China. The UK also conducted a review of its policy and forwarded proposals to us this past February which revealed a basic difference between us on the criteria to be used in the review of the strategic lists. The recent discussions of Governor Stassen with the British and French have happily resulted in an agreed decision concerning the criteria for an orderly multilateral review of the [Page 730] strategic lists. This review will naturally take a considerable time. It will be conducted solely on the basis of the agreed criteria and purely technical considerations. I am sure that you will agree that in the circumstances it would not have been practicable to have injected any extraneous issue into the negotiations with the UK and the French on East-West trade. Quite apart from this, however, I am most dubious about using Chinese representation as a bargaining point. I have no doubt that if we did so others would quickly turn the tables and try to extract fundamental concessions from us on all kinds of issues, in return for their continued support of our position on Chinese representation.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by Gough of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs and concurred in by the Director of that Office (Popper); cleared with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of European Affairs, and the Economic Defense Staff of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy.↩
- See Lodge’s memoranda, Mar. 25 and 30, 1954, pp. 719 and 720, respectively.↩