795.00/6–953: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State
priority
786. Personal for the Secretary. Re Korea—Chinese Representation.
1. As I have said before, we should make every effort bilaterally, (even going so far as to approach Soviet Government through American Embassy Moscow) to prevent question of seating Chinese Communists from coming up at all. If it does come up we should make every effort to get a substantial majority of members to vote against seating them. Those who feel they cannot vote against should be persuaded at least to abstain. I assume primary diplomatic targets should be UK and India, latter because they other than Communists are most likely to raise question.
It does not seem to me we can afford to wait until Bermuda to achieve high-level agreement with UK comparable to moratorium agreement reached under previous administration. In addition to any high-level approach President and you may have made or contemplate making to Churchill, I should think comparable approach might be made to Nehru. I can follow up any action you take by trying to build up favorable political climate here among various delegates. We must assume adverse climate is being built up systematically by UK and India, possibly others. Adverse climate will become worse upon announcement of armistice.
[Page 662]Even if it is not possible to reach agreement with UK and India before Bermuda, should we not meanwhile try to line up as many commitments to vote against seating Chinese representatives as possible? I think as soon as expedient we should try to get formal commitments. If we can build up majority against seating Chinese Communists, this simple political fact should strengthen President’s hand in dealing with Churchill at Bermuda if latter is still recalcitrant.
2. We should start now developing all different arguments that can be used at various times and places in various ways, public and private, to defeat any attempt to seat Chinese Communists. We should make following points:
- (a)
- This is not procedural question. It is about as substantive as any question can be and we should have all arguments to show that position Acheson and Austin took that it was procedural is fallacious. Has any other nation ever formally gone on record that representation questions are procedural?
- (b)
- Chinese Communists are not peace-loving nation within meaning of UN charter proven by their wanton aggression in Korea and by their abetting aggression in Indochina.
- (c)
- Chou En-Lai frankly states that he is subject to orders of Soviets, therefore not head of a really independent government.
- (d)
- It is emotionally and psychologically impossible to ask a people that has suffered over 130,000 casualties to turn around at once and welcome those who inflicted these terrific wounds on us.
- (e)
- It is long-standing international practice that recognition of an enemy after a war awaits peace treaty and is not granted after armistice. Germany and Japan after eight years still await recognition by UN and some of their former enemies.
- (f)
- It is inconceivable that UN should refuse recognition to ROK and grant it to perpetrator of brutal aggression on ROK.
3. A canvass should be made of all different places and ways in which question can be raised. If it is raised in SC it is, in my judgment, subject to veto but what if it should be raised in ECOSOC, in Trusteeship Council, in GA or in any of committees of GA? Of all GA committees, is not Credentials Committee most likely one in which this question would be raised?
4. If matter comes up in one of Councils, will it not be necessary to expel Chinese Nationalists first and, if so, what argument can be given for expelling them? If we are going to start expelling people, aren’t there some other people that ought to be expelled before Chinese Nationalists are expelled?
5. Information should be made available on casualties which all other nations who fought in Korea suffered so that we can make common cause with these nations.