330.13/9–1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Cohen)

top secret
  • Subject:
  • Panel of Consultants on Disarmament
  • Participants:
  • Robert Oppenheimer—Disarmament Panel
  • B. V. CohenUNA

Dr. Oppenheimer came to see me to tell me something about the work of the Panel.

Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the Panel had taken their work seriously and had done considerable hard thinking on the subject. He emphasized that the Panel had, he thought, made very considerable progress in educating themselves so that individually and as a group they could be much more helpful than when they first started their work last spring.

While the Panel was working on their report, they did not contemplate making their report until after the turn of the year. Mr. [Page 1014] Oppenheimer stated that the Panel did not think it wise to hurry their report, as it was not likely to be particularly helpful in dealing with the disarmament problem in the setting of the UN Assembly. The report apparently is directed at the problem of armament as well as disarmament and the conditions necessary to make possible serious discussion of disarmament. I gathered that Mr. Oppenheimer and the Panel were of the opinion that until we were on better speaking relations with the Soviet Union there was little advantage in pressing disarmament proposals unduly or trying to elaborate proposals in any great detail. Apparently the Panel thought that there was danger in aggravating fears and tensions by pressing unduly discussions in forums when there was little prospect of reaching agreement.

Mr. Oppenheimer stated that he was aware that we could not drop, and probably should not drop, the disarmament discussion in the UN, but until there was some change in the US-Soviet relations, we could not be hopeful of any success except possibly from a propaganda or public relations point of view. He thought what we had done in the summer in the Disarmament Commission was helpful in revealing a willingness on our part to discuss disarmament and to take a flexible and less rigid approach to some of the problems than we had previously. But he doubted whether we could do much more.

Mr. Oppenheimer also indicated that he and the Panel thought we should give considerable thought to what might be the reactions to the forthcoming atomic tests. He apparently had some discussion with the Secretary on this subject.

B. V. Cohen