330.13/5–2152
The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State
secret
Washington, 21 May 1952.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to a letter from the
Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to Mr. Nash, dated 1 May 1952,1 enclosing for this Department’s consideration, a
draft of a working paper intended for submission in Committee I of the
Disarmament Commission, entitled “Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces”
(RAC (NS) D–4).2
The working paper has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their
comments, in which I am in general agreement, are enclosed herewith.
It is the view of the Department of Defense that the proposal contained in
RAC (NS) D–4, specifying a numerical
limitation of armed forces, does not constitute, in itself, a sound and
comprehensive approach to the problem of the formulation of a plan for the
regulation of conventional armaments and armed forces. The proposal, if
made, should be clearly regarded as a political expedient. It should serve
only as a means of initiating detailed discussions during which all the
complex factors of the problem of disarmament will be considered in order to
arrive at a solution which, in the final stage of negotiations, will be in
treaty form. In any event, it is essential that the proposals contained in
the working paper should be amended in accordance with paragraph 8 of the
comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[Page 942]
Subject to the above comments, I approve RAC
(NS) D–4 for appropriate use by the United States Representative on the
United Nations Disarmament Commission in the light of the urgent political
necessity for a proposal by the United States in this specific field.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
secret
Washington, 20 May 1952.
- Subject:
- Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces—RAC (NS) D–4
- 1.
- In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of 7
May 1952, subject as above,3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
considered the draft paper on the above subject, RAC (NS) D–4, dated 30 April 1952,
prepared in the Department of State.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the proposal by the
Department of State that the United States Representative submit the
subject document to the Working Committee of the Disarmament
Commission as a working paper rather than as a position to which the
United States Government is formally committed. Accordingly, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have confined the expression of their views
contained herein to general remarks addressed to the concept of a
numerical limitation of armed forces. In any event the Joint Chiefs
of Staff assume that they will have opportunity to make detailed
comments on major specific recommendations of the Committee of the
Disarmament Commission prior to formal adoption by the
Commission.
- 3.
- In the Conclusions of the basic paper it is stated, among other
things, that the following formula might be considered as a basis
for discussion in the Committee of the Disarmament Commission:
- “a. The maximum level of armed forces of a state
should not exceed the lower of the following figures:
- “(i) 1% of its population
- “(ii) A fixed numerical ceiling—say between
1,000,000 and 1,500,000.
- “b. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward
would have to be made in some areas to avoid a
disequilibrium of power dangerous to international
peace.
- “c. While states should not be permitted to exceed
maximum levels, they should not be required to raise
their armed forces to such levels.”
- 4.
- A preliminary analysis of the level of armed forces which would
result from the application of such a formula, assuming it is
possible to obtain international agreement thereto, indicates that
there would occur a marked shift in the present global imbalance of
armed force levels. The numerical superiority of forces now existing
within the Iron Curtain countries would be eliminated and this
superiority in the level of armed forces would pass to the United
States and its Allies. This generalized statement describes merely a
numerical transition which does not by itself necessarily bear an
important relation to the effectiveness of armed forces. Further, in
order to view this purely numerical consideration in its proper
perspective, it must be recalled that only three of the Iron Curtain
countries, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, are members of the
United Nations. Unless separate negotiations could be successfully
concluded with those non-member states of the Soviet hegemony
(including Communist China), it is unlikely that any numerical
advantage of substantial degree would accrue to the West.
- 5.
- Even though a numerical advantage to the West (an advantage
perhaps more apparent than real) were to accrue from the application
of the proposed formula, such result must be considered in the light
of numerous and serious disadvantages from the military point of
view. These disadvantages are summarized in the following
subparagraphs:
- a.
- The application of the formula results in a level of armed
forces fixed by a figure which is merely a figure, bearing
no relation to strategic considerations or to the specific
security requirements of any state; consequently the figure
would be unrealistic and impermanent, as would any other
figure chosen at random for this purpose;
- b.
- The proposal fails to recognize the necessity for
achieving at least agreement upon the solution of current
major political issues and a reduction of world tensions
prior to the initiation of any part of the programs for
reducing the level of armed forces;
- c.
- While the proposal is not inconsistent with the framework
of NSC 112 or with
statements made by Secretary Acheson in his speech
before the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations,
disarmament should not be considered out of context in its
relation
[Page 944]
to the
world situation and the United States policies as expressed
in NSC 68/4 and NSC 114/2;4
- d.
- Implementation of the proposal may create such major
regional imbalances of armed strength as seriously to affect
the security of certain of our allies;
- e.
- Merely advancing the proposal will have a serious impact
on United States as well as on world public opinion. It may
so fix the minds of the people in the Western nations upon
relaxation of the armament burden as to have a catastrophic
effect upon the rearmament program and conceivably on the
conduct of present hostilities in Korea; it would probably
delay arms programs; it might even bring about a degree of
disarmament on the side of the West alone, thus imperiling
the gains which have thus far been made only by heavy
sacrifice;
- f.
- Implementation of the proposal would militate against the
conduct of the hostilities in Korea and in Indochina and
against the fulfillment of United States commitments
world-wide;
- g.
- The proposal not only assumes that the USSR can control
the policies, military programs, and the aggressive acts of
all of her satellites, but also that she will agree to do so, and that she will, in
fact, abide by the letter and spirit of such an
agreement;
- h.
- The proposal tends to overemphasize the purely numerical
quality of armed forces and the contribution this quality
makes toward the decision to launch aggression; history is
replete with examples of decisive defeat inflicted upon
numerically superior forces by small, well-equipped, mobile
forces employing sound tactical doctrine;
- i.
- The concept of the proposal seems postulated upon the
theory that reduction in armaments will lessen world
tensions. Actually, a limitation of armed forces which bears
no relation to strategic considerations may prove to be an
invitation to aggression; and
- j.
- The proposal is unlikely to be meaningful unless it has as
a prerequisite the means for demonstrating good faith on the
part of the USSR and its satellites in order that the
enforcement problem may be reduced to manageable
proportions.
- 6.
- On balance, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the
military point of view, are of the opinion that the concept of a
numerical limitation of armed forces set forth in the Department of
State paper is not suitable for submission as a working proposal to
the Committee of the Disarmament Commission; and that its submission
would not be consistent with the security interests of the United
States.
- 7.
- If political considerations are determined, nevertheless, to be so
important as to override the military views set forth in paragraphs
[Page 945]
5 and 6 above, the
proposal contained in the Department of State paper should be
clearly regarded and handled as a political expedient suitable for
use only as a counterproposal to the Soviet proposal to reduce the
existing levels of armed forces by one-third in one year, and not
one suitable for implementation. The proposal, if made, should serve
only as a means of initiating detailed negotiations during which all
the complex factors which contribute to the enormity of the problem
of disarmament will be considered and applied in order to arrive at
an acceptable and realistic solution which, in its final stage of
negotiation, will be in treaty form.
- 8.
- With specific reference to paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of the
Department of State paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned
at the suggestion that an agreed reduction of existing armed forces
might commence upon the determination by an international agency
that an appropriate stage of the disclosure and verification plan
had been completed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reaffirm the
statement made to you in their memorandum of 11 March 1952, subject:
“Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and
Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments,”5 that a program
for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed
forces and armaments must provide for the administration of adequate
safeguards by a competent international authority with appropriate
status, rights, and powers.
- 9.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the
foregoing, and that these views be communicated to the Secretary of
State.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W.G. Lalor
Rear
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)Secretary
