Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “Exchange of Notes with USSR”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

[Geneva,] May 1, 1954.

• Participants:
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Molotov
• Mr. Zarubin
• Mr. Troyanovsky

Place: Mr. Molotov’s villa

• Subject:
• Atomic Energy

The Secretary met with Mr. Molotov at 11 a.m. this morning at the former’s request. After a brief exchange of trivialities, the Secretary said that he would read some notes which he had jotted down for the sake of accuracy, but that they did not constitute a formal note. He thereupon handed Mr. Troyanovsky a carbon copy of his statement, which copy was left with the Soviets.

The Secretary then read the attached statement.¹

Mr. Molotov listened attentively and replied that he would have to study our statement and that thereafter, the Soviet Government could give its reply. At the same time, Mr. Molotov said he desired to draw the Secretary’s attention to the fact that the Soviet aide-mémoire of April 27² pointed out that the establishment of an international agency, as proposed by the United States, would not limit the production of hydrogen bombs. Not only would the agency be no obstacle to their use, but it might lead to an increase in the amount of material and bombs. Mr. Molotov went on to say that in the reply of the Soviets of December 21³ to the President’s proposal contained in his speech of December 8, 1953, the Soviet Government had expressed its willingness to discuss the President’s proposal, and it had also suggested that its own proposal be discussed. Since then, Mr. Molotov said, the Soviet Government had three times repeated its proposal concerning unconditional ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons by the Soviet Union, the United States and other governments. This Soviet proposal was advanced on December 21, was referred to in the Soviet declaration of January 30,⁴ and again in the Soviet aide-mémoire of April 27, but the Soviet Union still had no reply by the United States regarding the subject. Mr. Molotov continued that were the United States to give a favorable reply to the suggestion of a ban on nuclear weapons, then of course, the United States proposal for an international agency for the development of atomic energy would have a definite significance, which without the ban, it now lacks. Mr. Molotov concluded by asking when he could hope to have a reply to the Soviet proposal.

The Secretary answered by referring to the statement in his original remarks to the effect that we intended shortly to submit a reply on the Soviet proposal. He went on to say that our failure to respond earlier was not due to lack of interest or discourtesy, but for reasons which he would be glad to mention.

Mr. Molotov nodded interested assent.

The Secretary said that there does not now exist, unhappily, between our two governments a degree of confidence which enables the United States to look on a mere proposal to agree not to use atomic weapons as being in itself fully reliable. It had been the hope of the United States that if we could find an area regarding atomic energy, however small, within which we could cooperate, then there might be created a greater degree of confidence, which in turn, would make it easier to deal with these larger matters. That is the reason, explained the Secretary, why we were anxious to find out whether or not it was possible for our two governments to work together in some phase of the atomic energy field before dealing with the larger aspect contained in the Soviet proposal. The Secretary concluded by saying we will, as desired by the Soviet Government, give our reply to its last note, which reply will of course have to take into account that element of the Soviet note which expressed unwillingness to consider the establishment of an international agency for peaceful use, until after the matter of the ban had been dealt with.

Mr. Molotov said that he believed that not only the Soviet Government, but the United States and others are interested in having the problem of the atomic bomb considered, and thereby contribute to reduce the danger of an atomic and hydrogen war. He then said something to the effect that this danger remains or might even increase as a result of certain proposals.

The Secretary interjected that he did not clearly understand Mr. Molotov’s last words.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had said that the danger of atomic or hydrogen warfare remains and might even increase as a result of measures proposed for the peaceful use of atomic energy and that this would increase apprehension of atomic warfare. If, on the other hand, agreement could be reached not to use these weapons, then of course the proposal for an international agency for peaceful development would have significance which it now lacks. The Secretary said that he was at a loss to understand the suggestion contained in the Soviet memorandum of April 27, which Mr. Molotov had just repeated, to the effect that the establishment of the agency would not in any way increase the amount of atomic material available for military purposes or increase the likelihood of atomic war. In fact, the Secretary said the proposal would decrease the amount of material slightly (depending on agreements on the extent of contributions made to the agency), but that from the standpoint of working relations between the two countries and restoring mutual confidence, it might make a great contribution and that this was what we had in mind. We cannot, said the Secretary, deal in these matters involving the life and death of nations without greater confidence than exists today.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet proposal for a commitment not to employ atomic weapons was intended to create such a degree of confidence as the first stage, and thus permit cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. As to deeply technical and scientific questions regarding the use of atomic energy, Mr. Molotov said he was not competent to speak, but that he clearly understood that parallel with the peaceful use of atomic materials, as in power plants, it was possible concurrently to increase the production of material needed to produce atomic bombs. These, he said, are the scientific facts into which he would not go deeper, but concerning which he knew that experts in the United States would be able to give confirmation.

The Secretary asked Mr. Merchant if this made any sense, to which the latter replied that it didn’t to him and that it was an angle which he had never heard of. Simultaneously, Mr. Molotov and Ambassador Zarubin had a brief exchange in Russian. Mr. Molotov replied carefully that he believed men of science have the necessary data to substantiate this angle.

The Secretary then drew on a piece of paper two boxes for the purpose of explaining the nature of the plan we had in mind. These boxes, he said, could be considered the stockpiles of the United States, the U.S.S.R., with possibly a smaller additional stockpile in the United Kingdom. Under the United States plan, each would take some small part now available for military purposes, and put it into an agency internationally supervised and that, as a result, each of our stockpiles would be reduced, not increased. The Secretary said he could not understand how this would represent an increase in the amount available for military purposes. Perhaps, he said, the point was of such scientific character that he was incapable of understanding it.

Mr. Molotov smiled and replied that he believed it would be difficult for the two of them to go into details, and that he was unable to speak in a scientific language, but that experts have the data to substantiate his point.

The Secretary said that he would seek out a scientist to educate him more fully.

Mr. Molotov again reiterated that there are such scientists.

The Secretary expressed skepticism as to his ability to understand the point and then passed for Mr. Molotov’s reading a proposed innocuous communiqué to be issued after the meeting. Mr. Molotov approved it.⁵

The Secretary then, as he made a move to go, remarked that he was leaving Monday morning.⁶ Mr. Molotov said that there were differing interpretations in the press as to the reasons for his departure, and inquired if the Secretary was returning. The Secretary replied that he had no plans to return, but this was not excluding his return, if the occasion required it. He reminded Mr. Molotov that he had told him in Berlin that it would be impossible for him to remain very long in Geneva. The Secretary added that the fact of his going was not related to happenings at the Conference, but due to a prior decision connected with the necessity of his returning for consultations and exchanges of views with the Congress, before the adjournment, which might come early in June.

Mr. Molotov, who had given the impression of thinking deeply, from the moment that the Secretary indicated he was about to take his leave, then remarked that the Geneva Conference was called to consider two questions, and the Secretary would have participated only in the consideration of the first.

The Secretary replied that he was being replaced by General Bedell Smith, whom Mr. Molotov knew and who could deal with matters with very considerable authority. The United States would continue to be responsibly represented. The Secretary said that he would like to participate personally in the Indo-China discussions and to learn Mr. Molotov’s thinking with regard to it, but he was afraid that time would not permit this. He concluded by saying that he had not disguised to Mr. Molotov his concern over the situation and his fear that unless both parties—indeed all parties directly involved—exercise mutual restraints, the situation could serve to increase rather than diminish international tensions.

Mr. Molotov, after a moment’s thought, produced only the statement that, of course, we should all seek to find a way to peace in Indo-China at Geneva, that all should participate in that effort, and that it was important that attention should be paid to the interests of the two parties.

The Secretary then rose, and as he said goodbye to Mr. Molotov, expressed the hope that his sore throat was better.

Mr. Molotov said it was nearly well.

The Secretary said jocularly it would indeed be a world calamity if Mr. Molotov were to lose his voice, to which Mr. Molotov rejoined he did not have the occasion to speak as frequently as Mr. Dulles, but no foreign minister should ever lose his voice.

The Secretary left at 11:55 a.m.

Mr. Molotov looked somewhat better than he had at the time of his other private talk with the Secretary earlier in the week. His color was still gray, however, and he left the impression of a lowered level of energy.

1. The statement does not accompany the source text. For text, see telegram Dulte 36, infra.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 482–484.
3. For text, see ibid., Jan. 18, 1954, pp. 80–82.
4. For text, see ibid., Jan. 30, 1954, p. 479.
5. The draft communiqué prepared for Dulles and transmitted to him by Bowie on May 1 reads as follows: “Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles today held another in the series of meetings dealing with atomic energy. They discussed the reply of the Soviet Government on April 27 to the United States note of March 19, 1954. This reply will be further considered by the United States in Washington.” (600.0012/5–154)
6. May 3.