Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”
Memorandum by Alexander Bickel of the Policy Planning Staff to the Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)
Russian Note of April 27
It seems to me that from the point of view of public reaction, the most damaging point made by the Russian note is this: The Russians say in substance that we talked big in public before the U.N., emphasized the perils of the atomic age and suggested that we desired to meet them and were prepared to come forward with a new approach to them, but, when it came to private talks, we revealed our real position which is quite different. Our real position is that we want to continue the atomic armaments race. All our vaunted new approach turned out to be was a piddling proposal for an insignificant international pool. This shows our bad faith.
The line of attack I have just outlined is, unfortunately, supportable by reference to some of the more eloquent passages in the President’s speech of December 8, compared with which the paper we actually handed the Russians looks sick.
The fact that we are open to this damaging line of attack argues that we ought to do everything we can to preserve secrecy about these bilateral dealings. Should we, however, fail, it is imperative that we attempt to make an answer to this point. Our answer might be as follows:
The President’s speech correctly stated this country’s position. We realize the dangers of the atomic period and would like to mitigate them, if this can be done without prejudice to our security. But, experience has taught us the difficulties. We tried to negotiate disarmament before. So we thought perhaps a gradual approach might ease matters. That was the central idea of the President’s speech. We have acted on that idea, and presented the rudiments of a plan to get started. We have no panaceas, no total immediate [Page 1403] solution, and the President promised none. We hoped that if the Russians would in good faith join with us in the small beginning we have proposed, greater things might follow. That requires the Russians to negotiate in good faith. We stand ready to listen. But the Russians are not answering us on the merits.
Our statement should next proceed to answer the Russian proposal on outlawing use of atomic weapons. This should follow the lines of the aide-mémoire we agreed on.