Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the President¹

secret

Washington, December 29, 1953.

Dear Mr. President: This is an updater on your UN atomic proposal.

Although I knew that State, Defense, and AEC had set up a Working Group to iron out some of the practical details which we should have well in mind if we sat down with the Soviets on your proposal,² I had begun to worry because the last impression left in the minds of the public on both sides of the Atlantic was the Soviet reply. And since that reply deliberately attempted to fuzz up the issues, I thought that clarifying action was needed from us soon.

A meeting was arranged for Monday, December 28, for representatives of State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and OCB (working level),³ at which I distributed the attached memorandum.

There was immediate and unquestioned acceptance of the necessity of not allowing the Soviet note to crystallize in people’s minds, and therefore of the necessity for prompt action on our part.

However, a major rhubarb developed between the State representative, Bob Bowie, and the Defense representative, Frank Nash, of which you should be aware not only because it will certainly be brought to your attention on your return, but also because it is rather basic.

Bowie took the position that the language of your speech, plus Foster Dulles’ personal impression in the two speech meetings prior to Bermuda, indicate that the U.S. is prepared to sit down with the Soviets to work out atomic disarmament without reference to total disarmament, including conventional weapons.

Nash took the position that State’s position is not only counter to the consistent U.S. policy over the past seven years, confirmed by various NSC papers, but would amount to defense suicide, since the net result of exclusively atomic disarmament would reduce the U.S. defense position to a definite inferiority ratio in conventional weapons and manpower. Furthermore, it would completely reverse practically all of the current defense planning and expenditure which is calculated gradually to phase us into the new defense posture of genuine reliance on atomic weapons, not only strategically but tactically.

Defense and State had apparently been at each other on this for days, and what I caught at the meeting was simply the almost angry summary of previously taken positions.

I tried to resolve the argument, at least for the immediate future—and the immediate future includes a press conference which Foster will be holding within a half hour⁴—by saying:

(a) It was never your intention to embark on exclusively atomic disarmament, to the exclusion of the overall arms situation.

(b) It was ridiculous to take a single phrase out of your speech and build a whole atomic disarmament thesis on it.

(c) The important thing to state now, and to keep hammering at, was to remind everyone that your proposal was to initiate the pooling of fissionable material for peaceful purposes, no matter how small the beginning. Soviet participation might indicate the beginning of a new spirit on their part on which future arrangements might be built.

The Soviets had taken your simple, understandable, and doable proposal, and had surrounded it with a lot of old disarmament spinach, all of which had been proven unworkable in the past, and we should not allow ourselves to be booby-trapped into allowing the two concepts to be merged.

However, our insistence upon “first things first” did not mean that we would be unwilling to sit down to explore any workable plan of disarmament as we had already done for many months over many years.

I added that it had never been your thought, no matter what conversations were undertaken with the Soviets, to interfere with the planned build-up of our military atomic situation to previously agreed-upon goals.

Everyone seemed to be willing to accept this for the immediate future, but the difference between State and Defense lies very deep, and I do not think it can be satisfactorily or conclusively resolved without your getting them together and personally presenting your point of view.

Meanwhile, several of the positive aspects outlined in the attached memo are moving ahead.

Happy New Year.

Sincerely,

C.D.

P.S. Last week when Roger Makins was seeing Foster on some matters, he brought up the matter of your atomic proposal,⁵ and expressed the hope that if private conversations were to be held on the subject, they would really be private and not handled by the UN Disarmament Committee or Sub-Committee. The Secretary told him that your proposal had deliberately left that point vague, and that no decision had yet been made.

I personally think that Makins was quite right on this point, and that to have something as full of dynamite as this pawed over by several uninformed and emotionally opinionated “foreigners” would tend to confuse rather than clarify. This matter, without specific reference to the British Ambassador, also came up in our meeting, and everyone agreed that “private” should be “private”.

C.D.J.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)

secret

[Washington], December 28, 1953.

The President’s Atomic Proposal Before the UN

1. The Soviet reply has put the ball in our court—whence it should be returned at the earliest possible moment.

2. Returning the ball does not necessarily mean a single smash over the Kremlin wall. It does mean a series of actions—repeat actions—on our part, each one of which may be small, but each one of which should be understandable by people as well as Governments everywhere.

3. I have heard quite a few people in our Government describe the Soviet note as “very clever”—“diabolically clever”—“dangerously smart”—etc. etc. Sure, the note is smart. Why shouldn’t it be? However, its smartness was not revealed by the line they took, but rather by the way they took it. As a matter of fact, the line was exactly the line that we had anticipated weeks if not months ago when the proposal was first being worked on, and furthermore, was just about the only line they could possibly take short of admitting that they had been hopelessly trapped. So for once let us feel that we have led the Soviets along the line anticipated by us, and let us move on from there, instead of granting the Soviets another victory which in fact they did not score.

4. Shouldn’t we concentrate our thinking and acting on not allowing the situation to crystallize in people’s minds the way the Soviets want it to crystallize—namely, by making small potatoes out of the President’s feasible offer and big potatoes out of their global disarmament plan which has already been proved unworkable several times. We must not allow the peaceful image they have attempted to superimpose on ours to become fixed in people’s minds.

5. Following are a few possible courses of action as a starter:

(a) The appropriate American spokesman—maybe Chairman Strauss, maybe Secretary Dulles—should undertake a full-scale half-hour radio and television talk explaining in considerable detail what the President’s proposal was not, what it was, and the sorry history of the Soviet suggestion, winding up with a quick, hard-hitting analysis and warning of the obvious Soviet tactic.

This might be a good place to remind the American people of what the American press has completely overlooked—namely, that the President actually made two proposals, the first being to sit down privately in accordance with the General Assembly’s Resolution “to seek an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race”. The second proposal had to do with the pool of fissionable material, which was designed among other things as a device to give reality and substance to the first proposal.

This speech would be primarily for the American audience, but should be translated and redistributed abroad as widely as possible through the regular channels of State, USIA, etc.

(b) We must quickly find the appropriate United Nations diplomat—not American, and I have a hunch not British either—to take up the cudgels for us on this Soviet tactic of confusion. Speaking as a UN dignitary, he would express his heartfelt appreciation for what the President did before the UN, and he would go from there to an analysis of the Soviet tactic and urge all people to appreciate the American proposal for what it is and the Soviet proposal for what it is.

This speech would be directed primarily toward Western Europe, possibly Asia. If French Ambassador Hoppenot⁶ would be willing to do this, it would be very valuable, and even more valuable if he were in France and the speech could originate there, and thereby guaranty much better Western European press coverage than if it had originated here.

(c) The Secretary of State should announce that Ambassador Bohlen has been instructed to resume conversations with Mr. Molotov and that his instructions are, “Never mind the ambiguities—let’s get down to cases”.

(d) The news that a special task force of State and AEC has been at work on the implementing details of the Eisenhower proposal should be leaked without giving away any of the real details.

(e) The appropriate U.S. legislator—for instance, Senator Hickenlooper—should state publicly that he is asking the Atomic Energy Commission to sit down with him to explore the possibility and advisability of unilateral U.S. action on the proposal. And in fact, such exploration, if it has not already begun, should be undertaken immediately.

(f) If the U.S. Government, private U.S. industry, and the Adenauer Government, could team up to furnish the funds for the installation of a power pile in Berlin at a very early date, the effect would be absolutely electrifying. We would be furnishing power for an area that if cut off by a new blockade, would be unable to get its fuel except via airlift. And we would be matching words with action.

(g) The appropriate British spokesman, and possibly Canadian spokesman, should at a very early date announce publicly that whether or not the Soviets are really prepared to take up this proposal—“and the tone of their note indicates that all they intend to do is stall and haggle over commas”—the British and the Canadians are prepared to join with the Americans to furnish the material and help finance a power pile in a needed area—again Berlin might be the appropriate site.

(h) The appropriate representatives of the Joint Legislative Committee should publicly restate their enthusiastic approval and pledge themselves to the enactment of the proper legislation to make this possible.

(i) All USIA Missions should keep at top pitch their efforts to have the right articles on this subject—and by “this subject” I mean the Soviet tactic against the American proposal—written up by the best available intellectual in the best available intellectual publication.

The above is all off the top of the head, and I am sure that much if not all of it has already occurred to all of you. However, I wanted to get it on paper in order to try to generate the next item of action, which is essential, and very quickly.

1. This letter was addressed to President Eisenhower at Augusta, Georgia.
2. Summaries of working group meetings of Dec. 24 and 27 are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments.”
3. A memorandum for the record summarizing the meeting under reference is in Eisenhower Library, White House Central files, “Wheaties Exploitation”.
4. The Secretary of State’s remarks on this subject at his press conference of Dec. 29 were not issued as a Department of State press release.
5. See the memorandum of conversation, by Merchant, Dec. 22, p. 1305.
6. Henri Hoppenot, French Representative at the United Nations.