Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/12–2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and the Acting Chief of Staff Operations (Gilman)¹

secret

[Washington,] December 24, 1953.

• Subject:
• Procedures for Implementing the President’s December 8 Proposals on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Participants:

• The Secretary
• G—Mr. Murphy
• UNA—Mr. Key
• S/P—Mr. Bowie
• S—Mr. Hanes
• UNP—Mr. Bechhoefer
• UNP—Mr. Meyers

The Secretary wondered whether the private conversations with other states, to develop the President’s December 8 proposals, should take place in a United Nations framework or elsewhere. In this connection, he invited suggestions concerning the individuals with whom discussions should be initiated.

Mr. Murphy suggested the Secretary and Molotov should discuss these questions.

The Secretary agreed this was feasible if the Berlin meeting² actually were held on January 4 or thereabouts, but this arrangement might not be practical if the Berlin talks were held later. He asked what states should take part in the substantive discussions.

Mr. Bowie thought that, ideally, the conference should be limited to the United States and the USSR. Mr. Murphy believed that the UK could not be kept out of these discussions, and suggested it might be advisable for a discreet inquiry to be made of Vishinsky to see whether a private reaction could be obtained from him. Meanwhile, it would be perfectly possible to have a motion made in the United Nations Disarmament Commission to postpone the Commission’s deliberations pending further developments in the private diplomatic talks, with assurances to the Commission that it would be kept advised of progress.

Mr. Bowie emphasized that the Secretary and Molotov could only discuss questions of procedure, since neither would have the time to deal with the substance of the issue. A full-time U.S. representative was needed, supported by an adequate staff.

At the Secretary’s request, Mr. Bechhoefer explained the procedures which would be followed in the Disarmament Commission, which would probably meet some time in January under Ambassador Lodge’s chairmanship, to study pursuant to the GA Resolution of November 28, 1953³ the advisability of establishing a subcommittee consisting of “representatives of the powers principally involved”. Under the resolution, the Subcommittee, if established, would seek an acceptable solution and report back to the Commission as soon as possible, so that in turn the Commission could study and report on such solution to the General Assembly and Security Council not later than September 1, 1954. The Commission could establish such a subcommittee, presumably naming the states from among the members of the Commission (the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada). Or, the Commission might merely take note of the fact that private diplomatic conversations were taking place between the U.S. and the USSR and any other combination of states, and decide that this procedure was adequate and that there was no necessity for establishing a specific subcommittee. Mr. Bechhoefer suggested that, whether the private conversations took place within a UN framework or elsewhere, it was desirable at least to have the blessing of the UN through a motion in the Commission which would refer to any diplomatic conversations as in the spirit of the November 28 Resolution, and which could note any assurance that the Commission would be kept apprised of developments.

Mr. Murphy believed that bilateral talks with the Soviets on the substance would be more effective in ascertaining if there were any real possibility of making progress, since otherwise we might go through the usual propaganda routine of the Disarmament Commission with little progress.

The Secretary doubted the Soviets would take the responsibility for this decision, thus enabling the United States to tell the UK and other powers that it was the Soviet Union which had desired that diplomatic conversations be limited to bilateral talks between the U.S. and the USSR. He believed our contacting the USSR on these matters should await a Soviet answer whether or not they would accept January 4 or thereabouts for a meeting in Berlin in response to the Tripartite Notes.⁴ If the Soviets agreed to this date, it would be best for the Secretary to ask Molotov the questions concerning the participants and the meeting place for these private discussions. If the date of the Berlin talks was postponed or there was no Soviet reply by the end of the month, the Secretary suggested it might be desirable for him to talk to Vishinsky in the latter’s capacity as a Deputy Foreign Minister. It could doubtless be arranged for Vishinsky to come to Washington to see the Secretary and pay his respects. In any event, it would probably be necessary to have UN blessing on these talks because of UN interest in the subject. The United States could say that it would keep the Disarmament Commission informed from time to time of the progress of any private diplomatic talks. The Secretary was inclined to think the Disarmament Commission should not set up a subcommittee but should work through diplomatic channels, since he believed it would be better to have a small group in which the U.S. could keep the initiative on the procedures. He touched briefly on the problem of carrying the burden of the substantive talks, noting that this might well take the better part of a year, regardless of the nature and locale of the talks, and that it would be necessary to find an able man, devoting practically all his time to the work, who could be supported by an adequate staff.

1. Of the participants listed below, John W. Hanes, Jr., was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
2. See the editorial note, p. 1355.
3. See the editorial note, p. 1250.
4. Regarding notes exchanged by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers prior to the Berlin Conference, see documentation on preparations for that meeting, volume vii.