600.0012/12–1653
Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
- Subject:
- Implementing the President’s December 8 Speech on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
Participants:
- G—Mr. Murphy
- S/P—Mr. Bowie
- S/AE—Mr. Arneson
- U/OC—Mr. Radius
- UNA—Mr. Phillips
- UNP—Mr. Wainhouse
- UNP—Mr. Bechhoefer
- UNP—Mr. Meyers
- G—Mr. Goodyear
- P—Mr. Huyler
Mr. Bowie explained that Under Secretary Smith had asked him to head the State Department’s Working Group to implement the President’s proposals. Mr. Bowie had discussed with Mr. Duncan of [Page 1298] the AEC the problems which should be examined, and they had tentatively agreed on the following series of studies to be developed as foundations for specific U.S. proposals, if such proposals proved desirable:
- (a)
- The structure, powers and functions of an International Atomic Energy Agency (to be developed by the State Department);
- (b)
- Problems involved in the custody of the fissionable material (AEC responsibility);
- (c)
- Problems raised in utilizing the fissionable material (AEC responsibility);
- (d)
- Question of contributions to the IAE Agency (AEC responsibility);
- (e)
- The effect on the United States, and in particular on U.S. security, of different levels of contributions to the IAE Agency (State–AEC responsibility; probably Defense participation as well);
- (f)
- Problems involved in exchanging information, particularly concerning power reactors and research (AEC responsibility).
Mr. Duncan and Mr. Bowie had agreed to leave untouched for the present the problems of the interrelationship between these studies and other aspects of the U.S. position on disarmament. They further agreed that these studies must be carried out on an urgent basis.
Mr. Arneson raised the question of the forum in which these discussions would take place, after Mr. Bowie had remarked that the President’s speech indicated U.S. willingness to engage in private conversations both in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee or elsewhere on a bilateral basis. He thought that if we engaged in the private talks in the Disarmament Commission framework, as called for by the General Assembly Resolution,1 the Soviets might have better reason to insist that the subcommittee should concern itself with disarmament problems as well as the President’s proposal for utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. If we desired to avoid at present discussing disarmament problems, it might be advisable to engage in these private conversations on a bilateral basis.
Mr. Wainhouse noted that the General Assembly Resolution by its terms did not exclude bilateral discussions. Mr. Murphy thought that the President’s reference to this resolution supported Mr. Wainhouse’s interpretation, since necessary bilateral conversations might well be carried out within the framework of the Disarmament Commission.
Mr. Arneson believed it was useful to think of the topics tentatively agreed upon by Messrs. Bowie and Duncan in terms of (a) what we might do if the Soviets agreed to participate in the operations [Page 1299] of the IAE Agency, (b) what we would do if they would not so cooperate and the U.S. should proceed with these plans in cooperation with other members of the free world. Mr. Bowie agreed with these remarks.
Mr. Bowie then turned to the question of the relationship between the President’s December 8 proposals and other aspects of the United States position on the disarmament program. He suggested that the present U.S. policy of, in general, not initiating major new substantive disarmament proposals was modified by the President’s proposals. He tentatively agreed with the UNP view that if the tactical situation in the Disarmament Commission warranted, the United States might introduce working papers on certain topics, including a control organ paper, proposals limiting the production of strategic materials devoted to military purposes, or a paper correlating the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program. He also agreed that the review of basic disarmament policy established by NSC 112 should continue to be carried out, and the conclusions reached should be subject to revision if required by new views reached by the Special Committee set up by NSC Action 8992 to re-examine disarmament policy with particular attention to atomic energy control. In Mr. Bowie’s opinion, the question of the relationship between the President’s December 8 proposals and the other aspects of a disarmament program should be examined on a priority basis simultaneously with the studies required in order to implement the President’s December 8 proposals.
Howard Meyers explained that the UNP views were based upon the practical consideration that there was not enough time or personnel to enable both jobs to be done simultaneously; that the first priority was to fill out the details of the President’s December 8 proposals; and that we could rely meanwhile in the disarmament field on the rather extensive proposals which had been made in 1952 in the Disarmament Commission, concerning which the Soviets had not really expressed their views. It was this thinking which motivated the UNP suggestions.
Mr. Wainhouse and Mr. Arneson both agreed that the concerned officials in the United States Government would only be able to do a limited amount in the short period of time available before the Disarmament Commission would meet, probably in January 1954, so that it was most feasible to concentrate on developing the President’s December 8 proposals. They believed it would be exceedingly difficult for the U.S. Government to make up its collective mind on the shape of any new disarmament proposals or a review of present disarmament positions within this period.
[Page 1300]The views expressed by Messrs. Meyers, Wainhouse and Arneson were accepted by the other participants in the meeting.
It was agreed also that Messrs. Bechhoefer and Meyers (UNP) and Meeker (L/UNA)3 would form a team to develop a study on the problems involved in establishing an IAE Agency, its structure, powers and functions; that draft proposals might also be framed as part of this study. This study was to be completed by December 23, as the item of first priority.
Mr. Wainhouse returned to the question of the forum for these discussions with the Soviets, asking if it was advisable to use a subcommittee composed of the U.S., USSR, UK, France and possibly Canada (as proposed in a telegram sent to New York requesting the U.S. Delegation to the UN to discuss this suggestion with the British, French and Canadian delegations), or whether the same states should meet outside of the Disarmament Commission context. Mr. Bowie believed that we were really at the mercy of the Soviet Union on this, since the President indicated in his speech that the United States was prepared to carry out these private conversations in almost any way acceptable to the Soviets.
Mr. Murphy decided that it would be advisable to start these conversations in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee and see how the Soviet Union reacted.
Mr. Bechhoefer suggested that, in addition to the control organ paper, another study was needed regarding the broad question of presenting in the UN the United States views on the President’s proposals in relation to the United States positions on disarmament. He proposed, and it was agreed, that he would develop a paper on the subject.
Mr. Arneson suggested, and it was agreed, that technically competent people should be available in New York to support the United States representative in these discussions, particularly from the Atomic Energy Commission and probably also from the State Department.