Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Natl Sec (civil defense)”

Report to the National Security Council by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 140/1

Washington, May 18, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955

References:

A.

NSC 140²

B.

NSC Action Nos. 687 and 699³

The enclosed memorandum from the Chairman of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council and its attached report on the subject prepared by the Subcommittee pursuant to the directive contained in NSC 140 are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council. The enclosures will be scheduled on the agenda of an early Council meeting.

The principal supporting documents referred to in the first page of the enclosed memorandum are available in this office for study by authorized personnel.

The enclosed report is being referred to the agencies represented on the Subcommittee for comment prior to Council action.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this report and that access to each copy be strictly limited and individually controlled on an absolute need-to-know basis. No additional copies of this report or of any part of it may be made. This report is subject to recall at the direction of the President.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council (Edwards) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret

Washington, May 15, 1953.

• Subject:
• Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States Up to July 1, 1955— Report of Special Evaluation Subcommittee

Enclosure

(1) : Report of Special Evaluation Subcommittee

(2) : Principal Supporting Documents to the Report⁴

1. A National Security Council directive (NSC 140), dated January 19, 1953, constituted a Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the Council to prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States during the period up to July 1, 1955. The directive and a membership list of the Subcommittee and of the agencies represented thereon are appended.⁵ Enclosure (1) is the report of the Subcommittee.

2. As primary sources of information, the Subcommittee obtained reports from each of the agencies represented by its members. Independently of these reports, the Subcommittee also pursued an intensive study of all aspects of the problem. This study involved consultation with, and oral and written reports from, appropriate military and non-military agencies, and reference to many documents and previous studies relating to the subject. The Subcommittee conferred with the commanders and staffs of the Air Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command, with the Joint Air Defense Board, and with responsible officials of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

3. Under the terms of reference as construed by the Subcommittee, the enclosed evaluation is restricted to but one aspect of the global problem, viz., Soviet net capabilities against the continental United States and selected U.S. installations and forces outside the United States of major importance to a U.S. air atomic counteroffensive against the USSR during the initial phases of war. This evaluation does not represent a Subcommittee judgment that the USSR will or will not initiate war with the United States during the period under consideration, or that if it does, it would initiate such a war with atomic attack on the continental United States. It does, however, present, as the basis of its evaluation, a feasible course of action and plan of attack within the estimated capabilities of the USSR, which the Subcommittee believes the Soviet might logically pursue if his primary objectives were to inflict maximum damage on the continental United States and at the same time diminish the weight of the retaliatory air attack which the United States could mount against the USSR.

4. In approaching the problem of assessing damage, the Subcommittee initially planned to analyze, with exactness, the extent of damage accruing from a given number of weapons on precise targets and target systems. However, accurate assessment of damage resulting from attacks against target systems, such as critical industries, industrial complexes and population centers, can be accomplished only by the preparation of studies of the vulnerability of the targets and target systems which take into consideration the many variables affecting the attacks. Fully adequate basic target vulnerability studies were not in existence and could not be produced in the time available. Likewise, a complete war-gaming procedure under varying conditions of attack would have been of great value, but this also was not possible in the relatively short period available. Consequently, the estimates of damage submitted are approximations, valid under one set of conditions, with the war-gaming process introduced only to a limited extent in certain phases of the operation as reflected in the attrition rates applied to the attacking force.

5. The principal supporting documents and studies utilized by the Subcommittee and its schedule of briefings are forwarded herewith as Enclosure (2).^*

6. The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, has requested the Subcommittee to bring to the attention of the National Security Council, the following views of the IIC with respect to its report to the Subcommittee, a copy of which is contained in Enclosure (2):

“This estimate was prepared within the terms of reference determined by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee. The members of the IIC wish to point out that the forces within the United States available to the USSR have the capability of engaging in widespread sabotage either prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to a military attack. The USSR, of course, must weigh the timing and value of the sabotage in relation to their complete plan of attack and its effect upon the capability of the United States to launch a retaliatory military attack.”

7. This report has not been referred to the agencies represented on the Subcommittee for review or comment.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the Subcommittee, who participated throughout in the preparation of the report, neither concurs nor non-concurs in the summary evaluation. His comments are attached as Appendix C.⁶

I. H. Edwards

Lt. Gen., USAF (Ret.)

[Attachment]

Report of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council⁷

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

The Summary Evaluation

the problem

1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States for the period up to July 1, 1955.

scope of the evaluation

2. The evaluation considers Soviet net capabilities against the continental United States, including Alaska, and selected U.S. installations and forces outside the continental United States of major importance to a U.S. air atomic counter-offensive against the USSR during the initial phases of war. With this delineation of the scope of the evaluation, the Subcommittee’s consideration is thus confined to only one aspect of the world-wide problem. Accordingly, the effects on the United States which might occur if the USSR adopted different military objectives are not measured. The evaluation covers all possible types of attack, including direct military, clandestine military, and sabotage, physical and non-physical. The evaluation deals with the initial phases of war, during which it is assumed that a major part of the Soviet atomic stockpile would be expended. The Subcommittee has made two other important assumptions which are considered of reasonable validity: (1) that the USSR would be able to launch large-scale air attacks from Soviet bases without warning, and (2) that the continental United States would receive no warning of an approaching air attack other than that provided by the North American continental radar detection system.

conclusions

3. If, during the period from mid-1953 to mid-1955, the USSR chose to attack the United States with a view of inflicting maximum direct injury on the continental United States, and on selected U.S. installations outside the United States of major importance to a U.S. air atomic counteroffensive during the initial phases of war, the course of action within its capabilities which we believe would most nearly accomplish the desired result is:

a. An attack on bomber bases in the continental United States and on selected forward and staging air bases and air forces outside the United States, combined with

b. The heaviest possible attack with its remaining resources upon major population, industrial and control complexes in the continental United States.

4. If the USSR selected this course of action, it would have the net capability of inflicting direct injury on the United States of the following order:

a. Damage to U.S. Air Counteroffensive Capability

(1) Destruction or major damage to U.S. bombers having an atomic delivery capability, amounting to about 24 percent in 1953, and about 30 percent in 1955.

(2) Such additional damage to U.S. air bases and forces as to reduce the optimum monthly sortie rate by about 50 percent, and to force the Strategic Air Command primarily into intercontinental operations, at least initially.

b. Personnel Casualties in Metropolitan Areas

(1) Optimum bomb placement on population targets could produce a maximum of 9 million casualties in 1953, and 12.5 million in 1955, one-half of which might result in deaths. We believe that actual casualties would be at an indeterminate lower level, possibly as low as 50 percent of the above figures.

c. Damage to Industry

(1) Initial paralysis of all industry, including war-supporting industry, located within the areas attacked. This paralysis would affect one-third of the total U.S. industrial production in 1953 and two-thirds in 1955. Direct damage as the result of random destruction of plants probably would be substantial, but would not destroy a sufficient portion of any industry or industries to prevent attainment of minimum essential levels of production of war material and civilian goods.

d. Damage due to Clandestine Attack and Sabotage

(1) Clandestinely-employed atomic weapons, accurately placed, would result in total destruction of the installations attacked. Any atomic weapons diverted to clandestine attack would have to be subtracted from the total number available for air attack. Therefore, in assessing over-all damage to the United States, we have considered the effect of clandestinely-placed atomic weapons to be broadly equivalent to the effect of the same number of air-dropped weapons.

(2) An undeterminable augmentation of the total damage caused by atomic weapons would result from other types of clandestine attack and sabotage.

e. Psychological Effect

(1) The potentially most serious consequence would be the psychological impact of a large-scale atomic attack. There would be morale and political problems of a magnitude which it is impossible to estimate, or even comprehend, on the basis of any presently available valid data. The capability of the United States to bring the considerable remaining manpower and economic potential into the prosecution of the war, would depend upon the adequacy of advance planning, and upon the resolution and resourcefulness with which government and leadership dealt with the problems of waging the war, including neutralization of the USSR atomic capability, and of providing for the physical and psychological needs of our people as a whole.

f. Over-all Damage to the U.S.

(1) We believe that over-all damage to the U.S. would not be such as to prevent the delivery of a powerful initial retaliatory atomic air attack, the continuation of the air offensive, and the successful prosecution of the war.

5. If, during the period from mid-1953 to mid-1955, the USSR chose to attack any other U.S. target system or combination of targets than that indicated above, we estimate that a lower level of direct injury to the United States would result.

6. Any failure by the USSR to gain the strategic surprise or any substantial increase in the tactical warning received by the United States upon which this evaluation is based, would greatly reduce the damage indicated and would jeopardize the success of the entire operation by alerting the defensive system and counteroffensive forces of the entire Western World.

discussion

i. soviet capabilities

1. On the basis of the latest agreed intelligence estimates, we have made the following evaluations of Soviet capabilities:

A. Mass Destruction Weapons

2. Atomic Weapons: The USSR’s stockpile of atomic weapons is estimated to consist of approximately the following numbers of weapons of about 80 KT power:

Mid-1953	120
Mid-1955	300

The USSR probably can make weapons of smaller or larger yield than those indicated above and in so doing would increase or reduce the number of weapons in stockpile. We believe that the USSR will not have a deliverable thermonuclear weapon or significant quantities of radiological warfare agents during the period under review.

3. Biological Weapons: The USSR will probably possess a capability to produce and disseminate virulent biological agents on a limited scale.

4. Chemical Weapons: The USSR will probably possess the capability to engage in large-scale chemical warfare using World War II-type standard chemical agents. By mid-1955, the USSR will probably possess limited stocks of nerve gas.

B. Capability to Deliver By Aircraft

5. Strength of Long-Range Aviation: In mid-1953, the USSR will probably possess about 1000 medium bombers of the TU–4 type (comparable to the US B–29). By mid-1955, this number may be increased to about 1100. Also, by mid-1955, the USSR may have as many as 180 heavy bombers with a range about twice that of the TU–4. While the TU–4 might be considered an obsolescent aircraft as compared with modern bomber aircraft now operational in the U.S. Air Force, it does have comparative range, load-carrying capacity, and reliability. It also has considerable capability for operations during darkness and under conditions of poor visibility.

6. Ability to Stage against the United States: By utilizing range-extension techniques known to the USSR, the stripped-down TU–4 bomber can reach any target in the United States on a one-way mission. The heavy bomber which may be available in mid-1955 presumably would be able to make a roundtrip attack against any U.S. target by the use of range-extension techniques. Bases for launching large numbers of bombers on one-way missions against the United States are available or could be developed within the period of this estimate.

7. Operational Capabilities: Soviet long-range aviation is handicapped by lack of combat experience and lack of experience in long-distance flying and navigation. Its capabilities for navigation, target identification, and bomb placement, especially under conditions of poor visibility, will be inferior to those of the U.S. Strategic Air Force. Because of these limitations and because of the normal difficulties which would be encountered in carrying out a large-scale bombing operation against the continental United States, we estimate that about 20 per cent of the bombers initially launched would abort and return to base before completing their missions. In such an operation, we estimate that 10 per cent of the bombers which do not abort would be operational losses, i.e., they would fail to complete their missions for reasons other than combat. In attacks upon U.S. overseas installations, we believe these operational losses will be about 5 per cent. We also estimate that about 10 per cent of the bomb drops by such aircraft as reach the target area will be ineffective as a result of gross error and duds.

8. Medium and Light Jet Bomber Strength and Capabilities: The USSR will possess substantial numbers of light jet bombers capable of attacking many U.S. installations in Europe and the Far East. By mid-1955, the USSR may have about 120 medium jet bombers capable of attacking most U.S. installations overseas.

C. Capabilities of Naval and Ground Forces

9. Naval: During the period under review, V–1 and V–2 type guided missiles could be developed for launching from Soviet vessels and presumably could be fitted with atomic warheads. By submarine operations, aerial torpedo attacks, and offensive mining, the USSR could inflict serious initial damage to U.S. overseas communications. Other Soviet naval offensive capabilities are not significant.

[Here follows a one-page “Table of Attrition Factors.”]

10. Ground: The USSR has formidable capabilities for undertaking large-scale ground operations on the Eurasian continent.

11. Amphibious: Soviet capabilities for amphibious attack against the continental United States and against U.S. installations overseas will be negligible, except against Alaska. Against Alaska, the USSR might be able to launch an amphibious assault with up to 6000–8000 troops.

12. Airborne: Soviet capabilities for airborne attack against the continental United States (except Alaska) will be extremely limited. The USSR could, if it chose, drop a small number of specially-trained assault and sabotage forces for attack upon important, but difficult, bombing targets. Against Alaska or against selected U.S. installations overseas the USSR might be able to launch an attack with up to a total of 4000 to 6000 troops.

D. Air Defense Capabilities

13. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of U.S. air attack with weapons of mass destruction by the high priority which they have given to the development of defenses against such attack. Despite progress in building up those defenses, it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capability as adequate to prevent substantial numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR.

E. Sabotage Capabilities

14. The USSR’s capability for sabotage and subversion rests upon (a) the capabilities and freedom of action of the U.S. Communist Party and of other resident Soviet sympathizers, and (b) the USSR’s capability to introduce agents and materials and to procure necessary materials within the United States.

15. The U.S. Communist Party consists of about 25,000 persons. The majority reside in the metropolitan industrial areas of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Great Lakes–Middle West industrial region. The number best equipped by training or employment to commit sabotage is about 6,500. Key industrial facilities employ about 1,500 of this number. Except for atomic weapons and certain other weapons of mass destruction, resident Communists or other saboteurs within the United States could procure locally whatever weapons of sabotage they might require. The gross capabilities of U.S. Communists may be limited to some extent by (a) penetration of Communist organizations by U.S. security agencies, (b) the fact that many would be placed under detention as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities, and (c) casualties among those potential saboteurs residing in metropolitan areas subjected to the Soviet air atomic attack.

16. Saboteurs and weapons, including atomic weapons and their components could be introduced from the outside by a variety of means. This capability is limited only by the degree of risk of detection which the USSR is willing to assume prior to an overt attack and by such intensified security measures as the United States would impose after an attack.

17. Through control of certain U.S. labor organizations, the Communists have the capability to impede war production by strikes and slowdowns. They also could, by propaganda and provocation, increase the magnitude of civil dislocation and panic during and immediately following a Soviet air atomic attack.

F. Limiting Effect of Need to Preserve Security

18. Surprise is the strongest weapon in the Soviet arsenal. Because of this, the USSR would not be able to engage in preparations to carry out certain naval, ground, amphibious, airborne, clandestine, and even air operations which might disclose a positive intent to deliver an attack upon the United States. A single instance of detection might alert the entire defense system of the Western World and the U.S. air atomic counteroffensive forces.

ii. u.s. capabilities

A. Air Defense

19. As of mid-1953 the continental air defense system, consisting of a warning and detection radar screen, supplemented by a partially manned ground observer corps, fighter interceptor squadrons, and local AAA defenses, will have the capability:

a. To provide a minimum warning of approximately 30 minutes for those perimeter targets provided with radar cover, and

b. To “kill,” before bomb-release line, about 7 percent of the attacking bomber force penetrating the defenses under most probable conditions of attack.

20. As of mid-1953, the principal deficiencies of the system will be:

a. Lack of radar coverage on the South Atlantic and southern approaches,

b. Gaps in the existing radar screen,

c. Almost negligible capability of the radar system to detect low flying aircraft (under 5,000 feet),

d. Inadequate fighter forces with an all-weather capability,

e. Inadequate AAA defenses with a very high and very low altitude kill potential,

f. Lack of a quick and positive identification system, especially for the peace-time control of civil aircraft.

21. As of mid-1953, the overseas defenses will in general be less effective than those of the continental United States with respect to warning and defensive fighter and AAA forces and weapons.

22. As of mid-1955, the continental air defenses will have materially increased in effectiveness. The U.S. radar warning net will have been augmented, and coverage extended into southern Canada and the North East Command area. Airborne early warning aircraft and possibly a few picket vessels will provide limited coverage over the seaward and northern approaches. A proposed early warning zone in Canada generally along the 54th parallel may possibly be in operation; however, considering the present status of this project and of the proposed Lincoln line, neither was considered in this evaluation. The fighter-interceptor force will be entirely equipped with all-weather aircraft with improved armament. The AAA defenses will be greatly improved with the deployment of Nike surface-to-air missile battalions. The system will have the capability:

a. To provide additional coverage, with greater assurance of a minimum of 30 minutes warning, and

b. To “kill,” before bomb-release line, about 27 percent of the attacking force penetrating the defenses under the most probable conditions of attack.

23. The principal deficiencies of the system in mid-1955 will be:

a. A low capability of the radar system to detect low flying aircraft,

b. Lack of fighter-interceptor and AAA defense in many potential target areas,

c. An inadequate number of Nike surface-to-air missile battalions,

d. Continued lack of quick and positive identification system, especially for the peace-time control of civil aircraft.

24. The overseas defenses in mid-1955 will continue to be less effective than those of the continental United States.

B. Air Offense

25. During the entire period under review, the U.S. Strategic Air Command supplemented, within their ranges, by atomic aircraft of the naval carrier forces and the overseas tactical air forces will be able to launch very heavy atomic strikes against targets in the USSR with acceptable loss rates and with acceptable bombing accuracy under all-weather conditions. However, so long as the USSR possesses the military initiative, and in view of the time required for the U.S. to launch initial air strikes (3 to 6 days in the case of SAC), these offensive capabilities could not have any significant effect on the Soviet ability to launch an initial surprise attack against the continental United States and U.S. forces and installations overseas.

C. Other Military Defensive Forces

26. Considering Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious operations, local U.S. forces, augmented as necessary by available reserves, can isolate, neutralize, and eventually defeat any assaults of this nature on the continental United States, Alaska, or vital overseas bases.

27. Considering Soviet capabilities for submarine operations and offensive mining, initial damage to shipping might be severe. With full implementation of anti-submarine warfare, however, U.S. counter-measures could reduce this initial damage to acceptable proportions.

D. Defense Against Sabotage

28. The military forces, industrial security and protective forces, and those federal, state and local agencies responsible for the security and protection of installations and facilities necessary to the national defense and the conduct of war, have been alerted to the possibility of sabotage. The degree of protection against conventional types of sabotage either existing or possible is not uniform for all such installations or facilities, nor can it be. Some facilities are vulnerable to conventional sabotage by reason of easy access by potential saboteurs, others by reason of employment within the facility of persons known to be dangerous potential saboteurs.

. . . . . . .

30. In the event of war there have been readied for immediate implementation appropriate programs for apprehension and detention of persons who constitute a threat to the nation’s internal security. If these programs are properly implemented, most of the individuals determined to be potentially or actually dangerous will be neutralized within a short period after Soviet attack. It can be expected, however, that some persons in these categories, including unknown sabotage agents introduced into the United States, may be successful in avoiding immediate arrest, with possible subversive acts resulting.

E. Civil Defense

31. The federal civil defense program, as of mid-1953, is well organized, planned, and partially implemented, but it is not fully manned on a round-the-clock basis. State and local programs throughout the country vary widely in the degree of organization, planning and implementation. Some of the accomplishments to date in many localities include organization and fixing of responsibility, the establishment of primary and alternate control centers with associated communications, education and training, and designation and marking of shelters, the stockpiling and “spotting” of medical supplies and other equipment, and the coordination of medical and fire-fighting personnel. Local accomplishments vary widely from a high state of readiness in certain critical areas to none at all in some other areas.

32. The over-all program, as of mid-1953, is capable of materially reducing deaths and casualties which might result from an atomic attack, the degree of reduction depending on the amount of warning received, and of providing protection to an undeterminable degree against mass hysteria and psychological shock. It has been estimated that in an atomic attack on metropolitan centers, an average of one hour’s warning would reduce casualties by about 50 percent. Adequate early warning is the most important requirement to bring the civil defense program into full effectiveness.

33. Continuation of present over-all programs, with increased emphasis on education of the public in civil defense matters, will result in increased effectiveness by mid-1955.

iii. vulnerability of the united states to atomic attack

34. The target systems of the United States which the USSR would consider for attack are: (a) U.S. air offensive forces and supporting bases, (b) other U.S. forces and supporting installations, (c) the critical war-supporting industries of the United States and (d) the general economic strengths, population, and governmental control centers in the United States.

A. Vulnerability of U.S. Air Offensive Forces and Bases

35. In order to achieve critical damage on U.S. air offensive forces, attack must be accomplished under conditions of almost complete surprise, since a definite threat or notice of attack would permit the Strategic Air Command to disperse its forces. With a warning period of one hour or less, no significant dispersal could be accomplished. However, a two-hour warning period would permit SAC to disperse 65 percent of its atomic carriers; a six-hour warning would permit an 85 percent dispersal. Successful attack upon bases after dispersal would serve to neutralize those bases for initial operations only. The nuclear stockpile, under present conditions of storage, is virtually invulnerable to atomic destruction from the air.

36. The U.S. Strategic Air Command possesses a substantial amount of flexibility and mobility. There are a large number of airfields in the United States and abroad which are equipped, or could be equipped readily, to handle atomic carriers. SAC would retain the capability to carry out intercontinental operations even if its operating and staging bases outside the United States were rendered inoperable. Moreover, even if an initial attack upon SAC overseas forces and bases achieved a considerable degree of success, continued neutralization would require a Soviet capability to re-attack those bases which might be re-occupied.

37. Although the radar detection system can provide only a half-hour warning, many SAC interior installations in the United States would receive up to four hours warning. Because of the probability of such extended warning, and considering the flexibility, mobility, recuperability and over-all aircraft strength of SAC, we believe that a Soviet attack could not reduce SAC’s capability to a level that would inhibit heavy retaliatory attacks on the USSR. This capability could be reduced and delayed, however, by a limited attack upon bomber bases in the United States and upon selected overseas bases.

B. Vulnerability of Other U.S. Forces and Supporting Installations

38. Military installations within the U.S. which are not a part of the air offensive system constitute some of the least profitable targets in the United States for atomic attack. Although the air defense system is an unprofitable objective for air atomic attack, if the USSR anticipates unacceptable losses of atomic weapons as a consequence of the operations of the active defenses, a requirement for neutralization of certain elements of the air defense system by conventional weapons would be established. Radar control stations, which are undefended against low altitude attack, are vital elements of the system and are vulnerable to neutralization by such operations. There are no strictly military installations outside of metropolitan complexes which represent concentrations of personnel and material of such magnitude and importance as to represent profitable targets for atomic attack.

39. Among U.S. forces and installations outside the continental United States not a part of the U.S. air offensive capability, there are some targets worthy of atomic attack. Because these forces and installations would not be brought into action as part of an early U.S. air counteroffensive, we have not evaluated them as targets for atomic attack.

C. Vulnerability of Critical War-Supporting Industries

40. The U.S. has such a great economic potential that the USSR could not destroy it with the number of atomic weapons presently estimated as available to the USSR during the period of this evaluation. The USSR might, however, direct its attack against the most important or most critical sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, because of the substantial U.S. retaliatory capability in being, the impact of such attack on our overall offensive capability would be delayed. Attacks upon fabricating facilities for atomic weapons, air frames, aircraft engines, guided missiles, large-caliber guns and munitions, would be effective only after existing stocks were exhausted. Attacks upon basic materials production would be effective only over a much longer period, and their impact would be reduced as a result of current and planned stockpiling, substitution, recuperation, and expansion of remaining facilities.

41. Successful attacks upon critical industries require a high degree of operational proficiency by the attacking forces. The attacker must possess adequate data regarding the degree of criticality of individual industries and facilities, adequate targeting data to insure determination of optimum aiming points at each facility, and sufficient proficiency to locate the targets and to place the weapons within a minimum circle of error.

42. Even though general industry is concentrated around the two coasts and in the Great Lakes area, most critical war-supporting industry is well dispersed. The steel industry, for example, has some 143 plants, of which the 35 largest are located at various points from Chicago eastward to the coast. Petroleum refining capacity is distributed among 350 installations, the 100 largest of which hold 75 percent of the capacity and are scattered from Texas to Chicago and along the coasts. One of the most vulnerable is the tetraethyl lead industry consisting of three plants, one of which accounts for 50 percent of the total production.

43. Assuming adequate data and sufficient proficiency to insure successful placement, and taking account of estimated losses on route to target, the following are the estimated numbers of weapons which the USSR would be obliged to dispatch against only a small number of critical industries in order to achieve the levels of damage indicated:

	Percent of Damage	Number of Weapons Dispatched
		1953	1955
Atomic Energy Production Capacity	90	17	41
Aircraft Engine Production	90	38	55
Petroleum Refinery Capacity	50	64	90
Steel Capacity	45	53
	40		60
Tetraethyl Lead Production	90	6	9

44. The USSR does not possess a sufficient stockpile of weapons or the necessary operational capabilities to insure elimination of a remunerative proportion of critical industries. Even if the USSR succeeded in eliminating a substantial part of a few vulnerable industries, such destruction would not have a prolonged effect upon U.S. counteroffensive capabilities.

D. Vulnerability of General Economic Strengths, Population, and Governmental Control Complexes

45. There are 169 urban areas in the United States with a population of 50,000 or more. Of these urban areas, 54 are major metropolitan industrial areas or government control centers with a population of about 200,000 or more. These 54 complexes contain 71 percent of the country’s war industry and 35 percent of the country’s population. They also contain the nerve centers of economic and governmental control.

46. In mid-1953, if the USSR launched virtually its entire atomic weapons stockpile against those urban areas in the United States with the greatest population densities, and if it succeeded in attacking without warning and in achieving optimum placement, it has been estimated that casualties as high as 24,000,000 might be inflicted. In mid-1955, the same kind of attack under the same conditions with the larger stockpile might produce personnel casualties as high as 31,000,000. It is estimated that casualties would be reduced by approximately one-half with one hour warning. About one-half of the casualties would result in deaths. In such attacks, designed primarily to produce casualties, there would also be serious industrial damage, widespread dislocation of our highly integrated economic and social systems, loss of morale, panic, defeatism, etc., in amounts and to degrees which it is impossible to measure on the basis of any presently available valid data.

47. These population, industrial, and control centers are largely in the northeastern part of the United States, in the northern Middle West, and in the coastal areas. They are, therefore, on the periphery of the defended area and are of such size in themselves as to offer targets which could most easily and successfully, of all areas in the United States, be brought under attack by the inexperienced Soviet long-range bomber force.

48. While the net effect of a successful attack cannot be estimated with acceptable accuracy, at a minimum, it would disrupt the governmental control system, it would strain the civil defense system far beyond its present capabilities, and it would necessitate a prolonged rehabilitation effort. The U.S. retaliatory force itself, however, would be relatively intact and would be able to carry out its prescribed mission. There would be no physical reason why it could not deliver heavy and devastating retaliatory blows against the USSR.

. . . . . . .

iv. soviet concept of operations and plan of attack

50. During this period, the USSR will not possess a sufficient number of atomic weapons and the net operational capabilities to prevent the U.S. from waging war effectively by attacking any one of the following with atomic weapons or by any other means:

a. The U.S. atomic counteroffensive capability,

b. The U.S. economic potential,

c. Critical U.S. war-supporting industry.

51. If, during this period, the USSR chose to attack the United States with a view to inflicting maximum direct injury on the continental United States and on selected U.S. installations outside the United States of major importance to a U.S. air counteroffensive during the initial phases of war, the course of action within its capabilities which we believe would most nearly accomplish the desired result is:

a. Attack on bomber bases in the continental United States and upon selected forward and staging air bases and air forces outside the United States combined with

b. The heaviest possible attack with its remaining resources upon major population, industrial and control complexes in the continental United States.

52. In implementing this concept of operations, the following allocation of the estimated Soviet atomic weapons stockpile might be made:

a. In mid-1953:

(1) Against the U.S. atomic air offensive capability world-wide, 46.

(2) Against 31 major population, industrial and control complexes in the continental United States, 62.

(3) As a general reserve for all other purposes outside the scope of this evaluation, 12.

b. In mid-1955:

(1) Against the U.S. atomic air offensive capability world-wide, 89.

(2) Against 50 major population, industrial and control complexes in the continental United States, including thermonuclear weapon production facilities, 151.

(3) As a general reserve for all other purposes outside the scope of this evaluation, 60.

A. Air Attack, Mid-1953

53. In order to take advantage of the known deficiencies in the U.S. defense system, the most feasible and effective air attack upon the continental United States could be made at night with the attacking aircraft penetrating the U.S. radar detection network at low altitudes. Attacks upon U.S. forward and staging bases outside the United States would need to be timed to follow attacks upon the continental United States in order to preserve surprise. Attacks upon the continental United States would necessarily be one-way missions with aerial refueling en route in secure areas. Most flights would be launched from the Chukotski and Kola peninsulas and would employ routes designed to give maximum security from early detection by ground observers or ships and planes following normal travel lanes. An operational and attack plan believed to have reasonable chance of success would contain the following elements:

a. The 62 atomic weapons allocated to major U.S. population, industrial and control complexes would be launched in 62 TU–4 aircraft against 31 such complexes with take-off times coordinated in an attempt to obtain simultaneous penetration of the outer radar detection network,

b. Twelve of the atomic weapons allocated to the U.S. air atomic offensive capability would be launched in 12 TU–4 aircraft against heavy bomber bases in the United States. Take-off times would be established in an attempt to bring these aircraft to bomb-release line insofar as possible simultaneously with the penetration of the radar detection network by the 62 aircraft targeted against the U.S. metropolitan complexes. These 12 aircraft would attempt a clandestine attack, employing U.S. markings, taking advantage of weaknesses in the U.S. detection and identification system, using U.S. navigational aids and flying the airways to the target areas,

c. Twenty-four of the atomic weapons allocated to the U.S. air offensive capability would be launched against forward and staging air bases and air forces, in Soviet aircraft and in flight cells most appropriate to the individual targets to be attacked. Their take-off times would be established so that they would reach target areas as soon as possible after the penetration of U.S. radar detection network by the main attack,

d. The ten weapons remaining in the allocation to the U.S. air offensive capabilities would be launched against forward and staging air bases and air forces at a later date, as reconnaissance demonstrated that these bases were re-occupied with profitable numbers of aircraft,

e. All planes carrying atomic weapons which aborted and returned to base would be re-launched against their original allocation at a later date,

f. The atomic air attack on overseas bases would be supplemented, wherever feasible, by continuing attacks with conventional bombs.

B. Air Attack, Mid-1955

54. Because of the improved U.S. early warning system, the USSR would have less chance of achieving surprise. Attack at night would still be the most advantageous to the attacking force. The availability of a heavy bomber with greater range than the TU–4 and the greater number of weapons available would alter both the nature of the attack and its magnitude. The heavy bombers would approach the U.S. at high altitude and maximum speed to avoid interception, while the TU–4’s would approach at low altitude to avoid detection. Bases in the interior of the USSR would be required in order to achieve a high initial sortie, but the greater distances to the United States would be compensated by adjusting locations for refueling and individual targets to the base areas utilized. An operational and attack plan believed to have reasonable chance of success would contain the following elements:

a. The 151 atomic weapons allocated to major U.S. population, industrial and control complexes would be launched against 50 such complexes in flights containing a total of 294 aircraft. As many as 100 of these might be heavy bombers. Those aircraft not carrying atomic weapons would carry electronic counter-measures equipment and possibly fire and high-explosive bombs and BW weapons. Some would be given diversionary missions. All take-off times would be coordinated in an attempt to provide approximately simultaneous penetration of the outer radar detection network.

b. Fourteen atomic weapons would be launched against heavy bomber bases in the United States following the same attack pattern as in 1953. Seven additional weapons would be launched in the main attack against peripheral medium bomber bases in the United States.

c. Thirty-three atomic weapons would be launched initially against forward and staging air bases and air forces as soon as possible after penetration of the radar detection network by the main attack.

d. The 35 weapons remaining in the allocation to the U.S. air offensive capability would be launched at a later date as reconnaissance demonstrated that there were bases operational which contained profitable numbers of aircraft.

e. All planes carrying atomic weapons which aborted and returned to base would be re-launched against their original allocation at a later date.

f. The atomic air attack on overseas bases would be supplemented, wherever feasible, by continuing attacks, with conventional bombs.

C. Other Forms of Military Attack, Mid-1953 and 1955

55. Coordinated and synchronized with the air attack in order to preserve strategic surprise, large-scale land operations would be launched on the Eurasian continent. In addition, submarine attacks would be made on U.S. shipping and harbors.

. . . . . . .

v. estimate of damage to the united states

A. Air Attack

57. A Soviet air attack with the objectives and under the plan described above, carried out under expected conditions of surprise, and degraded by the over-all attrition indicated in the preceding paragraphs, would result in the placement of the following numbers of atomic bombs on target areas:

	1953	1955
U.S. Population, Industrial and Control Complexes, Initial and Follow-Up Attacks	47	91
SAC Bases in the Continental United States, Initial Attack	10	‡15
U.S. Air Atomic Offensive Forces and Installations Outside the United States, Initial and Follow-Up Attacks	28	55

58. Effect Upon US. Atomic Counteroffensive Capability: The attacks upon the bomber bases in the United States and upon the forward and staging bases outside the United States would render those installations temporarily inoperable. Considerable numbers of trained personnel would be killed. Runways and underground fuel storage would suffer relatively little damage. Maintenance facilities, supplies, exposed refueling gear, and communications facilities, would be destroyed or severely damaged. Aircraft caught on base would be destroyed or badly damaged. Of all the aircraft, including naval and tactical, possessing an atomic delivery capability, in 1953 about 24 per cent, and in 1955 about 30 per cent, would be destroyed or severely damaged. Nevertheless, the number of remaining U.S. aircraft having an atomic capability would be much higher in 1955 than in 1953. Such attacks would force the Strategic Air Command primarily into intercontinental operations and reduce the optimum monthly sortie rate by about 50 per cent. This situation would continue as long as the USSR could maintain neutralization of SAC bases overseas.

59. Personnel Casualties: If U.S. metropolitan centers were attacked solely with the object of maximizing personnel losses, casualties as high a figure as 9,000,000 might result in mid-1953 and as high as 12,500,000 in mid-1955, computed on the basis of a minimum of a half-hour, and an average of one hour, warning. One-half of these casualties might result in death. The attacking force, however, would not necessarily select precise aiming points designed purely to maximize personnel casualties, nor would it obtain optimum weapon placement. We believe, therefore, that actual casualties would be at an indeterminate lower level, possibly as low as 50 per cent of the figures given. Moreover, the number of casualties would vary widely with locality according to the amount of warning received, the effectiveness of the civil defense organization, and other unpredictable factors.

60. Effect Upon Industry: There would be initial paralysis of all industry within the areas attacked. In mid-1953, about one-third of total U.S. industry, including war-supporting industry, is located within or near such areas. In mid-1955, because of the wider scope of the attack, this proportion is increased to about two-thirds. Since much of this industry is physically widespread within these areas, the amount of direct damage cannot be accurately estimated. However, the direct and indirect results of the attack would be such as to seriously affect the national economy. It is considered unlikely that area bombing as employed would destroy a critical portion of any important industry, or that it would seriously cripple any critical category of war industry. Scattered damage to plants engaged in the manufacture of components and parts might be more serious than the damage to major end-product manufacturing facilities, and might seriously affect the production of critical war equipment. Considering the entire U.S. industrial plant, including facilities located in areas free from attack, we believe that, with forceful and well-planned measures for rehabilitation, the over-all physical damage would not be of such proportions as to prevent U.S. industry from adequately supporting large-scale and extensive military operations.

B. Military Attack Other Than Air

61. If the USSR should launch a military attack against the continental U.S. with other than air forces, the damage resulting would not significantly add to the damage estimates noted above. Such attacks upon U.S. installations and forces outside the U.S. which are a part of the U.S. air atomic counteroffensive capability likewise would not significantly add to the damage which would result from air attack.

. . . . . . .

D. Psychological Effect

65. The potentially most serious consequence of the Soviet attack would be the psychological impact of a large-scale atomic attack. There would be morale and political problems of a magnitude which it is impossible to estimate, or even comprehend, on the basis of any presently available valid data. The capability of the United States to bring the considerable remaining manpower and economic potential into the prosecution of the war would depend upon the adequacy of advance planning and upon the resolution and resourcefulness with which government and leadership dealt with the problems of waging the war, including neutralization of the USSR atomic capability, and of providing for the physical and psychological needs of our people as a whole.

1. A notation on the source text reads: “Edwards Report” and indicates an additional classification: “Special Security Handling”. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Directors of Defense Mobilization and Central Intelligence; the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. Dated Jan. 19, p. 205.
3. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 687 and 699, see footnote 2, p. 206.
4. Not printed; see footnote * below.
5. For NSC 140, see p. 205. The membership list of the subcommittee and of the agencies represented thereon is not printed. The members of the subcommittee and their agencies were: Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Ret.), Chairman; Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull, USA (Ret.), representing the Central Intelligence Agency; W. Barrett McDonnell, representing the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; Maj. Gen. Robert M. Webster, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Lish Whiston, representing the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.
6. Not attached hereto. Available for study in the office of the Executive Secretary. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Not printed; Maj. Gen. Robert M. Webster, USAF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative, complained in the comments under reference that the Special Evaluation Subcommittee report was prepared “on an entirely different concept of the problem” than was contained in the directive to NSC 140.
7. A short table of contents has been omitted from the beginning of the report.
8. Includes weapons delivered on medium bomber bases. [Footnote in the source text.]