Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 44: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
priority
Washington, October 30, 1951—1:21 p. m.

JCS–85537. From JCS.

1. Reur CX 56073.1 We do not feel that your current offer should be regarded as “final” subject only to “minor changes” and this was not the understanding of the JCS when they approved your proposal nor that of Bradley and Bohlen, during Tokyo discussions.2

2. Our minimum position is maintenance of security of Line Kansas, to include an adequate OPLR. It is the understanding here that UNC concept of demilitarized zone as set forth in Para 1 your C 519813 provides negotiation flexibility without jeopardizing this minimum position. Thus certain adjustments, even in addition to those possible in the Chorwon-Kumwha area, would appear to be practicable. This would seem to be particularly true in view of recent UNC advances.

3. We recognize that it is difficult for Field Cdr to surrender hard-earned ground and do not consider that you should do so unless negotiations seem likely to fail on an issue which does not involve our minimum position.4

  1. Dated October 28, p. 1071.↩
  2. Telegram JCS 85537 was based on a draft prepared in the Department of State and subsequently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following introductory sentence in the State Department draft, however, was not included in this message as it was transmitted: “Our view is that two lines proposed, the UNC and Communist, are now in the range of bargaining possibilities.” (Black Book, Tab 43)↩
  3. Dated October 1, p. 981.↩

  4. The following three concluding sentences contained in the State Department draft were not included in this message as it was transmitted:

    “Reference location on line, JCS and State agree that Ongjin peninsulas in west have little military interest and could not be defended. However, it would be both politically and economically desirable to return these areas to ROK administrative control if that could be done without unacceptable sacrifice of position further east. If some adjustment in line is necessary in central and eastern sectors to obtain agreement, Communist offer of western peninsulas could be accepted; this would improve public acceptability of such minor concessions in central and eastern sectors.” (Black Book, Tab 43)

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