Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

The Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)

personal
secret

Washington, January 19, 1951.

Dear Bill: This will be a general catch-all letter to bring you up to date on some of the things that have been happening, some of our worries, and to explain to you what may have been a surprise to you, namely my assignment to Tokyo.

[Here follows Mr. Allison’s discussion of his appointment as Deputy to Mr. Dulles.]

We have not said anything about it to the press, and do not intend to until the time comes nearer, but it is our intention at present that Dulles, Stan Babcock and I will go on down to Manila and Canberra after our talks in Tokyo.¹ Bob Fearey is bringing with him not only this letter but many other papers, and you should get him to show you at once the letter of instructions to Mr. Dulles from the President² which will give you the general terms of reference of our Mission. This letter of instructions was approved not only by Secretary Acheson and Secretary Marshall, but also by all of the Joint Chiefs, so it is a pretty solid statement of general policy. It is in connection with that part of the letter which refers to exploring the possibility of a Pacific Ocean security arrangement that we would be going on down to Manila and Australia. Bob will also have with him Mr. Dulles’ draft³ of a possible Pacific Pact. This is all very tentative at present and we, of course, will want to get your ideas about the matters, as well as those of General MacArthur. Assistant Secretary Johnson and General Magruder will not accompany us south, and it is possible that we will ask Bob Fearey to come back directly to Washington and bring back the results of our talks in Japan, although this has not been finally determined.

One of our problems will be keeping the military end of our Mission in line, I am afraid. Stan Babcock is all right in every respect, as I am sure you know, but General Magruder is a stubborn man, and sometimes is very irritating. He is inclined to want to keep a sharp rein on the Japanese and does not always show an appreciation of other people’s sensibilities. He also is not completely sold, I think, on the idea of our pushing ahead with an early peace settlement although he has gone along with us to date. It may be that you will want to consider the possibility of suggesting to General MacArthur that he give a few words of caution to our military colleagues and let them know early in the discussions his general attitude which, as near as I can tell, is much more close to that of the State Department than is General Magruder’s. Mr. Johnson, whom you may not know, is a nice young man, but has literally no experience in Japanese affairs, so I am not sure how much assistance he will be. Any ideas you have as to how to handle this situation will be most gratefully received upon our arrival. Bob Fearey will show you, if you have not already seen it, the draft bilateral agreement prepared by Magruder’s shop and will tell you some of our difficulties on that score. We understand that General MacArthur has approved the latest draft, and in general so have we, but I still think it leaves much to be desired.

Inasmuch as we will have more time than we did last summer, it will probably be possible to space out our various interviews so that there will be adequate opportunity for reflection and discussion among Ourselves between various meetings. Mr. Dulles is very much interested in the economic problems in Japan’s future and I know would welcome interviews with some of the Japanese leaders in the fields of economics and finance. He has been particularly concerned with what could be done to offset the loss of Japan’s normal trading areas in China and Manchuria and the possible loss of Southeast Asian countries to Communism. Your ideas and those of your staff will be most helpful on points such as this.

Another problem which naturally concerns us is internal security in Japan prior to a peace settlement, and in this connection we were most interested in Finn’s report from Hokkaido on the National Police Reserve.⁴ As you may know, the most recent Saturday Evening Post contained a long article with colored illustrations on the Police Reserve. I have not yet had time to read it, but intend to before I leave. I wish something could be done to prevent such articles being printed as I think they do more harm than good, but I know there is little, if anything, that you can do about it. In this general connection, in background talks which we have recently had with the press, Mr. Dulles has attempted to play down the idea that we are going out on a mission to re-arm Japan, and while we have not shrunk from stating that in our opinion Japan will sooner or later have to assume at least part of the burden of its own defense, nevertheless we do not wish this Mission looked upon as a re-armament mission. We are also stressing the fact that this is in truth an exploratory trip, that we do not intend to make any commitments or ask for any final commitments, but rather that we wish to assess the situation again and see how Japan is feeling now about the world situation and their part in it.

[Here follows a discussion of the Dulles Mission’s traveling plans.]

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Allison

1. Mr. Dulles and his party, known collectively as the “Dulles Mission,” left Washington on January 22 and arrived in Tokyo the evening of January 25. Ambassador Dulles, his wife, Mr. Allison, Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and Colonel Babcock left Tokyo for Manila on February 11. (Mr. Fearey had arrived in Japan somewhat in advance of the rest of the Mission, probably on January 23.) Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, John D. Rockefeller III, a Consultant to the Mission, and General Magruder arrived in Tokyo with Mr. Dulles but left Tokyo for Washington on February 10.
2. Of January 10, p. 788.

3. Exactly which draft is here referred to is uncertain. For a draft of January 3, which forms the enclosure to a memorandum of January 4 from Mr. Allison to Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, see p. 133.

   A draft of January 9 forms the enclosure to a memorandum of that day from Mr. Dulles to Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser (neither printed). Revisions in the January 9 draft were largely stylistic. (Lot 54D423)

4. Reference is to Richard B. Finn, Vice Consul at Sapporo, and his despatch No. 48 to Tokyo of December 21, which had been enclosed with Tokyo’s despatch No. 896 of January 4. Neither is printed, but see the partial summary in the memorandum of January 19, infra.