Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

396.1–PA/4–451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret

Washington, April 4, 1951—7 p. m.

5238. For Jessup.¹ To advise you progress here in developing proposals on inspection and verification as well as control, reg and limitation armed forces and armaments, fol is summary situation.

1. Desirability of advancing comprehensive proposals which wld cover armaments as well as such polit questions as problem of Germany has been discussed in State–JCS mtgs and working group composed of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff designees has been formed to study possibility including atomic energy in system of inspection and verification and to attempt develop foundation for comprehensive proposals.

2. Frank Nash is participating in working group. We are presently consulting AEC and intel agencies.

3. Is prelim view of State reps that system census and verification will have real meaning only if it is undertaken on continuing basis and in connection with system of regulation and limitation armed forces and armaments. Also our prelim view that any such program wld require phased implementation in order provide safeguards to participants during substantial prd involved in arriving at reduction armed forces and armaments to agreed levels.

4. It appears that effective program inspection and limitation wld have to cover para-military, security and police forces as well as regular armed forces and State reps believe some percentage of population, together with an absolute ceiling, might provide feasible criterion. Whether former enemy countries wld be subject more stringent limitations wld have to be considered.

5. Dept believes might also need be limitation on percentage of natl production which cld be utilized for mil purposes and limitations on quantity of particular armaments each country permitted to retain. Re control and reg of atomic energy activities, we wld have to insist on UN plan or one no less effective.

6. Settlement particular polit problems such as Ger, wld also be included in comprehensive proposal for reduction of tensions.

7. Is recognized that acceptance of comprehensive program by Sov highly unlikely at this time. Our approach to development of proposals is to assure they wld be acceptable to us if agreed to by Sov and wld provide us propaganda advantage if rejected. Since Sov has repeatedly stated it wld support idea of census and verification if it included atomic energy, we believe we wld derive substantial advantage if we cld now broaden our proposals to include atomic energy and confront Sov with necessity rejecting them or permitting broad inspection behind iron curtain.

8. Plus work described above, we are preparing material for presentation under item “existing levels of armaments.” In prelim view is necessary trace comparative levels of armaments since end of war and we will probably wish to confine presentation to Sov bloc and Western forces in Europe. Here we may have some difficulty because of security classification part of material but believe it possible make comparisons in rounded totals.

9. Rationale of Western position in draft form has been subj consultation with Mosely.² In present view it wld be advisable develop two briefs: one, to be used at CFM opening, wld define principles on which negots and settlements cld be based; and second, to be used in event it becomes apparent mtg will not succeed, wld spell out obstacles to settlement that result from Sov attitudes and intentions.

Acheson

1. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large; United States Deputy at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris.
2. Presumably Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; political adviser on United States delegations to various international conferences concerned with the European peace settlements, 1943–1946.