3. The memo below is therefore being circulated for your information with
the recommendation that the matter be allowed to lie fallow until NIE–46 is revised or NIE–73 reaches the drafting stage.4 Further news on Mossadeq’s resignation may make a revision of NIE–46 a
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more immediate problem than a vacation-minded
Board and Staff would prefer.
Attachment
Washington, undated.
OIR MEMO
The oversimplification and condensation of OIR’s observations on the significance of the National
Front movement in Section 2 is hardly a fair presentation in that it
is so worded as to present an extreme position, ending with the
statement that we “have assumed that a political and social
revolution has in fact already taken place.” We do believe that such
a revolution is in progress and that, no matter how desirable a
return to the good old days might be, such an event is most
improbable. As the following comments attempt to show, we are not
convinced by the arguments in Sections 3–5 that our position is
untenable.
One of the major weaknesses of the CIA analysis is the assumption that the National Front
group and the “old guard” (traditional ruling aristocracy) are
separate and distinct. The statement is made in Section 4 that “with
the exception of Mosadeq
himself, none of the leaders of the National Front has been a member
of the traditionally ruling aristocracy and few of them had
previously held important government posts.” To mention only a few
of the representatives of the traditional governing group who have
collaborated closely with the National Front, one might pick
Saleh, Amini, Haerizadesh, Busheri, Ram,
Malek Madani, Bayat, or Khosro Qashqai. It is true, as pointed out
in Section 5, that the leadership need not necessarily come from the
“middle class,” but the revolutionary effects can arise just as well
from a liberal aristocrat. It does not seem to be entirely
irrelevant to refer in this connection to Roosevelt and the New Deal. The
traditional governing groups have been split up by the National
Front, not only over the question of the exclusion of the British,
but over internal problems such as electoral reform, more effective
taxation, and social justice. It is true, as pointed out in Section
7, that the urban middle class is not homogeneous, but neither are
the traditional governing groups (the vested interests).
It is inaccurate to say, as in Section 6, that the National Front’s
“sole aim has been to nationalize the oil industry and thereby
eliminate British influence.” Mosadeq, Saleh, Fatami, and Makki, to name just a few, have
preached the need for social and economic reforms to equalize the
tax burden and raise the general standard of living. Fur
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thermore, the socialistic
Iran Party, of which Saleh is
the head and whose membership includes many foreign-educated,
middle-aged Iranians, has clearly defined social, political, and
economic aims. Nor is it accurate to say, as in Section 7, that “the
National Front’s ideas concerning basic reforms and economic
development are even less developed than those of past governments,
and the desire of its leaders for political power as an end in
itself is even more apparent.” The governments of the time were
notable for their cooperation with either the Millspaugh Mission or
the OCI, whereas National Front
officials have apparently been cooperating effectively with Point IV
officials. Qavam was, if
anything, more tenacious than Mosadeq in seeking “political power as an end in
itself.”
Contrary to the conclusion in Section 8, the prestige of the Shah in
the eyes of the Court and the more conservative of the “old guard”
has been weakened during the 14 months of National Front domination.
Whatever influence he has, has certainly not been used either to
strengthen the Throne through autocratic action, as his mother and
Princess Ashraf would
like, or to restore the “old guard” to power, as the more
conservative of the vested interests would like.
As pointed out in Section 9, the vested interests continue to hold a
controlling position in the Senate and Majlis, but, as has been
noted above, the vested interests are neither united nor homogeneous
and, in practice, are likely to continue to contribute to
instability by dividing their support, some of it going to the
National Front. It also, however, appears currently to be the fact
that the National Front group has enough votes in the Majlis to
block legislation. If what is meant by describing the “old guard” as
“more realistic” with respect to the oil controversy, is that they
will accept significant British participation within Iran, there is
no evidence that they have the courage or capability of achieving
that at this time.
In commenting on the conclusions, I would like to refer to the use
throughout the analysis of the expressions “foreign influence” and
“anti-foreign” policies. We have tried to make a distinction between
foreign influence which is welcome, such as Point IV aid, and
foreign interference such as the Iranians oppose and almost
universally believe has been characteristic of British activities in
Iran. The anti-foreign attitudes of the National Front have actually
been directed primarily against the British and only secondarily
against the Russians, who have been regarded as presenting the
lesser threat to Iranian independence at the present time.
The inference in Section 10–a that the development of “clearly
defined social, political, and economic aims” must precede major
changes in Iran’s social and political structure overlooks the fact
that improvisation is a primary characteristic of national life in
Iran and that changes
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are
likely to occur, not according to any set pattern, but as
opportunity or pressure permits. The changes are almost certain to
be piecemeal. These aims have been and are now developing in spite
of the predominance of anti-British (not anti-foreign) policies.
The efforts of the government to conclude barter trade agreements
with the Germans, Italians, Czechs, Poles, Russians, etc., seems to
contradict the alleged anti-foreign feelings referred to in Section
10–c. Furthermore, in direct contradiction to the conclusion in the
same section, we believe that the alleged aimlessness with respect
to internal affairs would be likely, rather than unlikely, to
increase Tudeh influence significantly. The growing frustration
among urban groups in the face of a drafting, direction-less
government would almost certainly result in a turning toward
Tudeh.
In view of the comments in the preceding paragraph, we believe that
Section 10–d is inaccurate and should read “Translated into
political activity, this suggests a continuing uneasy equilibrium
between nationalist elements, advocating complete freedom from
foreign interference and the wider distribution of political power
and the traditional governing group (the vested interests), willing
to accept some degree of foreign interference and striving to
maintain its privileged position.” It is contrary to fact to assert
that only the “traditional ruling class” recognizes the need for
some degree of economic and political stability.
In view of the astonishing rapidity and degree of change in urban
life in Iran during the past five years, there seems little
justification for the conclusion in Section 10–f–2 that the strength
of the urban middle class will probably not increase greatly for
many years. Any policy based upon that assumption would, in our
opinion, be very hazardous.
