795.00/6–2750: Telegram
The Chargé in Viet-Nam (Gullion) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received June 27—4:24 a. m.
513. 1. First word local French had of Korea attack was fragmentary UP message received morning June 25. I delivered news in Seoul’s 925 to Department, June 25, to High Commissariat in afternoon of June 25 which was first confirmation received here. French are not receiving any information directly from Far East sources in any quantity and appreciate all information we can pass to them.
2. French asked if we had any advance warning. I assumed that our authorities may have had but I personally had none. French had no advance intelligence information according to Acting Commander-in-Chief and Acting High Commissioner. Practically all important Vietnamese and French now in France for Inter-State Conference.1 Assume Paris may do cable on their reactions.
[Page 194]3. Following is preliminary report on IC reactions as seen from Saigon:
4. Attack gravely disquieting to Vietnamese already worried about future, constancy of American intentions, and uncertain of their nationhood. Similarities in IC and Korean situation suggest to all levels of population that if Soviet-inspired forces are attacking without regard to UN and US in order “unify” Korea, then Soviets and Chinese may do same in aid of Viet Minh. Complaints are heard about slow arrival US aid to IC.
5. US firmness is regarded under test, especially at least sophisticated elements and natives. They believe if US will not come to aid of Korea where it has invested vastly more prestige and money, then it could not be expected to defend IC in case of invasion. More sophisticated groups and French also see test of US policy but believe any US intervention depends on whether a line can be stabilized. They do not look for troops but consider use we make of our Japan-based and carrier-based air may be token of our possible actions if IC were invaded.
6. The attack demonstrates to more perceptive that where Western troops are withdrawn, or where Soviets have reason to believe US has renounced strategic interest, Reds will not hesitate to move. At same time they are awed at nicety of Soviet calculations and boldness of their risk under guns of US–Japan force.
7. Acting Commander-in-Chief Alessandri not familiar with situation but believes if North Koreans are using Russian type planes and Russian type tanks, South is doomed. An AFP despatch announced “MacArthur sending all assistance,” and considerable speculation heard on its meaning.
8. In propaganda war Viet Minh will bring charges on similarities of situations, and dwell on fate of Asians who allow themselves to be seduced by American capitalist warmongers into fighting their countrymen. Coming unification of Vietnam will be played as theme. Those elements of Viet population who persist in regarding civil war as one between French and Viet Minh from which they stand apart, will be easy target groups for Ho Chi Minh.
9. French and US counter-propaganda may point how presence French Army preserves Vietnam from fate of Korea. (This difficult line since French Army without US air intervention powerless to hold massive Chinese attack; also because question may arise why did not US leave army in Korea.)
10. Some comment heard that action undertaken because Communist world strategists now realize insufficient time left take Formosa before monsoon; so launched surprise attack to hold initiative.
[Page 195]11. Also some speculation whether event may not precipitate US reconsideration Formosa policy and increased aid for Formosa and Chinese Nationalist guerrilla groups.
12. Seen against background of recent Moscow conference,2 coordination Soviet SEA policy, absorption of Manchuria, Korean attack thought by some to be first step in execution of coordinated Soviet continental policy designed to complete Communist domination of Asia. Political counsellor, Bonfils, believes Soviet-inspired attacks will not necessarily be simultaneous since they must be engineered to appear as nationalist risings. Soviet manipulation this policy not difficult since rank and file of Viet Minh, Chinese-Malayan guerrillas, North Koreans and Chinese do not appreciate that Moscow directs their nationalist movements.
13. Consensus local views seems to be that UN will be unavailing, that US will not be able intervene, that collapse South Korea will be defeat for US, that future of Asia will be darkened.
Repeated info Paris 258; Department pass priority Paris.3
- For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.↩
- See section II, paragraph C of the Intelligence Estimate, dated June 25, p. 150.↩
- This telegram was relayed to Paris at 4:30 a. m.↩