Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/10–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense

secret

[New York,?] October 19, 1950

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants:	Mr. Doidge, Foreign Minister, New Zealand
	Mr. Mackintosh, Deputy Foreign Minister, New Zealand1
	Sir Carl Berendsen, Ambassador, New Zealand
	Mr. Corner, New Zealand Embassy2
	Mr. Dulles
	Mr. Allison
	Col. Babcock

1. At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ explanation of United States views with regard to a Japanese treaty, and after reading a memorandum³ which outlined the type of treaty desired by the United States, Mr. Doidge said that he appreciated the United States viewpoint and, in fact, entertained considerable sympathy for that point of view. He went on to say, however, that New Zealand was constrained to regard the problem from the standpoint of her own “precarious” security position. New Zealand therefore, before accepting the principle of no military restrictions on Japan, would want to ascertain the United States attitude towards a Pacific Pact or other form of security guarantee.

2. Mr. Dulles replied that an overall Pacific Pact presented difficulties in that it would commit the stronger and more responsible nations to the support of certain highly unstable and irresponsible governments regardless of how they might conduct their affairs. A limited pact would be equally undesirable since the exclusion of any nation might be interpreted by the Communists to mean that they need expect no opposition in that area. He added that the security interests of the United States and its close ties with the English-speaking world were the surest guarantees of our assistance to New Zealand in the event of an emergency and that less responsible nations in the Pacific area should be made to feel that their security was contingent in some degree on their behavior and attitudes.

3. During a later conversation between Mr. Doidge and Colonel Babcock the former again brought up the subject of a security guarantee and pointed out that New Zealand felt that it was committed to go to the assistance of Britain (and hence to assist the nations joined in the Atlantic Pact) and that he thought it unfair that there was no reciprocal guarantee for New Zealand. In reply it was suggested that if there were a legal obligation on New Zealand’s part to assist the Atlantic Pact countries it could probably be made to work both ways, whereas if the obligation were merely moral or based on mutual ties, New Zealand could rest assured that a similar obligation was recognized by both Britain and the United States. Mr. Doidge admitted that New Zealand’s obligation was purely moral and that it was probably illogical to expect anything but a moral obligation in return, but he added that it would be extremely difficult for New Zealand to accept a re-armed Japan without a firm security guarantee from the United States.⁴

1. A. D. Mackintosh was Permanent Head and Secretary of External Affairs.
2. F. Corner, First Secretary of Embassy.
3. Apparently that of September 11, p. 1296.
4. Towards the end of a courtesy call on the Secretary on October 23, Mr. Doidge in part expressed apprehension over a rearmed and vengeful Japan “… if the Treaty were soft enough to permit them any opportunities to rearm.… He made the parallel of Germany after World War I and thought the Peace Treaty must toe very carefully drawn and have adequate safeguards. The Secretary reminded Mr. Doidge of the dilemma we were faced [sic] and the equally great dangers of a power vacuum in Japan or a too weak Japan, and said we must find some way to meet both aspects of the problem.” (memorandum of conversation between the Secretary, Mr. Doidge, and other officials by Livingston Lord Satterthwaite, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Lot 53D444)