694.001/10–650
Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)1
Subject: Relation of Japanese Peace Treaty to German Problems.
GER has been following with interest the various drafts of a proposed Japanese peace treaty. In view of the stage which this project has now reached, I think it is our duty to record for the Department some of the effects which a treaty of the character now being planned will have with respect to our German policy.
The aspects of the Japanese treaty which are going to cause us trouble are perhaps three in number.
First, there is the fact that the proposed Japanese peace treaty will return full sovereignty to Japan. It is not possible to foresee precisely what effect this will have on the position in Germany because this will depend largely on the timing. Our ultimate goal in Germany is, of course, also full sovereignty and the recent New York decisions2 [Page 1320] represent another significant step forward. If Germany is brought into the integrated defense scheme, we believe that it will be necessary to move forward even more rapidly toward a restoration of sovereignty. It may be, therefore, that Japanese sovereignty will not greatly precede German sovereignty and will not cause any difficult repercussions. If Japan should receive full sovereignty, however, next summer or fall, and Germany should still be many months or even several years away from full sovereignty, I believe that the political repercussions in Germany will be considerable and may be difficult to handle.
Secondly, the Japanese treaty is notable for an absence of security controls. It has, on the other hand, been a consistent part of our policy toward Germany to impose many security controls ranging from the prohibition of an Army through the agreement on PLI, control over civil aviation, to the creation of a Military Security Board. While it is widely recognized that it will not be possible to maintain all of these security safeguards, especially if German units are formed in an integrated defense force, it has been our policy to plan for at least some restrictions of a semi-permanent nature. We believe that it will be difficult to adhere to this policy in the event that the Japanese are freed from all restrictions, as it will be difficult to convince the Germans that they are less trustworthy than the Japanese.
Third, we note that the proposed Japanese treaty contains reciprocal waiver of claims arising out of the war. The settlement of the German claims problem, while under recent intensified study, has not advanced very far, but it is being shaped along lines quite different from that planned for Japan. In the case of Germany, the settlement planned is less palatable and less generous both in its general and specific aspects.
I call these matters to your attention, not because we are seeking to influence the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty. We believe that must go forward on whatever lines are indicated by the general needs of our policy in that part of the world. I do want the higher officers of the Department to be aware, however, of the fact that this Japanese peace settlement is going to set precedents which may make it very difficult for us to adhere to certain well-established aspects of our German policy.
- According to a handwritten, marginal note originating in G, copies of this memorandum were sent for information to Mr. Dulles, FE, and EUR.↩
- Documentation regarding the September meetings of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held in New York, September 12–19, 1950, is scheduled for publication in volume iii.↩