794.56/8–2550
Memorandum by Mr. Douglas W. Overton of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director (Johnson)
Subject: Tokyo’s Despatch No. 326, August 25, 19501
In this despatch Sebald and Spinks2 review the entire history of Japan’s disarmament and Japanese public opinion on the subject. Their opinion is that notwithstanding official denials and public confusion on the issue, there exists in Japan a large body of opinion which, in the light of the Korean conflict, would be in favor of establishing a Japan defense force.3
Their own conclusion, based on careful consideration of all the factors involved—the change in the world situation, the immediate threats of Communist aggression, the heavy burden placed upon the United States in preserving the peace, and the acknowledged risks involved in entrusting Japan with an armed force, is that Japan must be partially rearmed. This view is shared not only by a large number of Japanese but also by others, including General MacArthur, General Eichelberger,4 Walter Lippmann, and William Courtenay.
Observing that events in Korea have invalidated the entire premise of our policy of disarming and demilitarizing Japan, they believe that only by the political application of military power can Japan’s security be safeguarded, for the USSR cannot be trusted to abide by any guarantee she might give with respect to Japan’s security even if such a guarantee could be negotiated. This leaves two alternatives: either the US assumes the full burden of defending Japan or it must enlist Japan’s assistance in helping to provide such defense. The latter alternative is by far the better, it is more effective from the point of view of morale and it provides a large source of intelligent and courageous manpower with its own supporting industrial complex.
[Page 1306]As for the nature of the armed forces which must be developed, the two officers recommend that consideration be given to expanding the new Police Reserve into a highly mobile ground force trained specially to meet amphibious and air assaults, to creating an armed coast guard to supplement the Maritime Safety Patrol, and to establishing eventually a limited air force of fighter units.
They believe that Japan’s rearmament should be designed to make maximum use of Japan’s large manpower reserve and thereby supplement the heavier ground, naval, and air components which the US and UN could furnish in the event of an attack.
- Not printed.↩
- Charles N. Spinks, First Secretary in the Mission at Tokyo.↩
- In the despatch mentioned Mr. Sebald had said in part: “It is believed that the Japanese are fully aware of the military implications already evident in the new Police Reserve. No serious concern has been expressed except as to the degree to which the Police Reserve will operate as an armed force. It is universally recognized that Japan needs a security force of some kind over and above the present police system. The Korean conflict has left no doubt that a nation without adequate defense is doomed and has destroyed the vision of Japan’s permanent neutrality.”↩
- Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, a former Commander of the Eighth Army in Japan.↩