Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.00/8–1450

Unsigned Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 14, 1950.

Japanese Peace Treaty

1. Responsible Officer:
John Foster Dulles, S

2. Interested Offices and Agencies:

Department of State

• S—John Howard
• FE—Maxwell Hamilton, John Allison
• William Sebald, Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo

Department of Defense

• General Burns; Goldthwaite Dorr

3. How Coordinated:
Informally.

4. Status of Coordination:

Our differences with Defense are still unresolved.

[A background section is omitted here.]

6. Recent Action Taken:

a) The Secretary has discussed with the President the desirability of proceeding at once to work out with Defense a plan for a peace treaty. The President agreed that it was important to get on with the matter and approved our suggested procedure. Accordingly, we sent to Defense early in August for study and comment a draft of prospective articles on international peace and security which might be used in a treaty and which are designed to give the US, in a form as inoffensive as possible to the Japanese, the broad power to place military forces wherever in Japan the US may determine to be desirable from the standpoint of the maintenance of international peace and security in the area. The Secretary of Defense has informed us that the draft has been sent to the JCS for study, remarking that the proposal did not appear to carry out the views of the JCS or of General Mac-Arthur. The latter, however, expressed his general agreement with the proposal in his recent conversation with Mr. Harriman.²

b) We have now sent to the NSC with a request for urgent consideration a paper³ which concludes that: 1) the US should now proceed with the steps necessary for a Japanese peace settlement; 2) the Department should be authorized to undertake confidential discussions with Commonwealth countries and other friendly FEC members to ascertain whether they would generally favor the type of settlement desired by the US and how they propose to proceed; 3) we would be authorized in these discussions to propose, without final US commitment, that security provisions in the settlement be along the lines of the draft provisions sent to the Defense Department; 4) a representative of the Department should be sent to Japan to discuss with General MacArthur and the Japanese government the procedures which might be desirable to insure genuine acceptance of the proposed settlement by the Japanese people; 5) we should exploit the political and diplomatic advantages of the decision to proceed with the treaty, making full use of public statements and information releases timed for their maximum effect; 6) upon completion of these steps and prior to any final arrangements, the matter will again be referred to the NSC for consideration.⁴

[Here follow brief sections devoted primarily to procedural matters.]

9. Current Evaluation:

We remain convinced that the early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan is essential, participated in by all nations which declared war on Japan. While there are outstanding points of contention between the US and other nations such as reparations and level of industry, these are well defined and understood and, we believe, will be importantly affected by the type of security arrangements which are finally undertaken. The importance of the nature of these security arrangements has, of course, been highlighted by the present situation in Korea, which Mr. Dulles observed on his recent trip to the Far East had had considerable influence on Japanese thinking with regard to US bases in Japan.

10. Plans for Future Action:

We will continue our efforts to reach an agreed US position so that we may proceed with treaty negotiations.

1. One of several summaries of important problems prepared at this time for the use of the Under Secretary’s office.
2. Mr. Harriman held talks with General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8; see ante, p. 427. In a letter to General MacArthur of August 11, Mr. Dulles had said in part: “Averell Harriman has told me of his satisfactory talks with you I am particularly gratified that you liked the draft of the proposed ‘International Peace and Security’ paragraphs of a prospective peace treaty. I drew these up personally, and made a particular effort to try to reflect the spirit of our talks and of your two memoranda. If I have measurably succeeded, I am gratified.” (694.00/8–1150)
3. This paper, headed “Peace Settlement with Japan,” was forwarded by Ambassador Jessup on August 15 to Mr. Webb, who sent it on to the NSC on the following day. (Lot 63D35: Folder “NSC 60 memoranda”)
4. With regard to the steps summarized here, the paper identified in the preceding footnote read in part: “The informal steps contemplated in this paper may take from five to six months. Upon completion of these informal steps, the matter will again be referred to the National Security Council. If it should then be decided to proceed formally, as much as another nine months might be required for ratification of a treaty. The date of the final act of ratification would be wholly within United States control and, until ratification, the present occupation rights would continue.”