794.00/8–950: Telegram
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
351. Redeptel 203, August 4.1 In an informal conversation with Ohta yesterday, I expressed views suggested reftel.
Manifesting some confusion in his attempt to explain the Prime Minister’s position, Ohta said that notwithstanding clearcut statement, it is now his opinion that no change has taken place in Prime Minister’s attitude. He said no Japanese statesman could at this time publicly declare that he is in favor of granting bases or maintaining US troops in Japan subsequent to peace treaty. He also pointed out that questions in Diet were really divided into two parts: (1) Whether a request had been made by any power for military bases and (2) whether Prime Minister would publicly announce that he had no intention whatever lending military bases.
[Page 1271]Ohta said Prime Minister’s reply was cast in light of lengthy and involved questions. As to first, Yoshida replied categorically that no specific request has at any time been received from any power for military bases. Regarding second, the record shows that he said, “To express what is in my mind, I do not want to lend military bases”. This was, however, qualified by further statement to effect that Socialist Party had been spreading propaganda that Prime Minister desires lend bases in return for “separate peace”. Prime Minister said he did not think UN were considering a demand for military bases.
When I reminded Ohta of our previous conversation (mytel 294)2 he replied that obviously without knowledge contents of draft treaty and specifically of security provisions, if any, it would be academic for Japanese Government at this time make any commitments with respect to maintenance of bases or troops in Japan. He felt, however, that if treaty failed contain specific and satisfactory provisions regarding Japan’s security, there is every possibility that Japanese Government would ask US and UN to guarantee Japan’s security, a request which might imply maintaining troops in Japan if necessary to carry out such guarantee.3
Examination of translation verbatim minutes of interpellation and reply by Yoshida indicates obvious intention on part Prime Minister give impression he does not desire military bases. At same time his statement is so hedged with philosophical double talk as to leave way open for later approach on problem of security.
Airmailing translation verbatim relevant interpellation and reply.4
- Not printed.↩
- Of August 1, from Tokyo, not printed.↩
- In his memorandum dated August 7 of the conversation with Mr. Ohta on which telegram 351 is presumably based, Mr. Sebald said in part that in connection with the security question “… Mr. Ohta confided in me that General MacArthur had previously upon several occasions told Mr. Yoshida that the maintenance of bases and troops in Japan proper is unnecessary so long as Okinawa and other islands would remain under the control of the United States. I said that in the light of the Korean situation, it might be possible that General MacArthur has changed his mind in this regard, although I did not, of course, know for certain. Furthermore, it appeared academic to speak of bases per se, when it might be necessary to consider Japan as a whole as a base because of possible external aggression.” (Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty)↩
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A copy of this translation forms the enclosure to Mr. Sebald’s letter to Mr. Allison of August 10, neither printed. (794.00/8–1050)
In a memorandum of August 23 to Mr. Allison, Mr. Fearey stated in part that Prime Minister Yoshida’s statements indicated his government was “… not going to issue a public invitation to us, at our suggestion or otherwise, to retain post-treaty bases, as appeared possible some months ago. While the opposition of the other parties to a separate peace has been crumbling Yoshida’s willingness to appear as an exponent of the almost inevitable corollary of a separate peace, foreign bases, has diminished. The only explanation seems to be that for obvious political reasons he wishes to follow rather than lead on the base question until public opinion can catch up further and until the U.S. has stated its requirements.” (694.001/8–2350)
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