694.001/7–1950
Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State
As soon as there is opportunity I think the President should come to a decision as to what, if anything, to do about Japan and a treaty.
My impression is that the Korean attack mate it more important, rather than less important, to act. The Japanese people have been in somewhat of a postwar stupor. The Korean attack is awakening them and I think that their mood for a long time may be determined by whether we take advantage of this awakening to bring them an insight into the possibilities of the free world and their responsibility as a member of it.
If matters drift because of total preoccupation with the Korean war, we may lose in Japan more than we can gain in Korea.
It has always been a weakness of United States policy that when war breaks out we abandon political aims and concentrate wholly upon [Page 1244] military aims. The Soviet Union continues, even in time of war, to seek to consolidate political gains. It is interesting that, without awaiting the outcome of the Korean battle, they are planning quickly to hold elections in the temporarily conquered territory, with a view to making it a political part of the North Korean regime.
I hope that we can be as alert to press for political objectives even while we are engaged in a difficult war effort.1
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A handwritten marginal note reads: “I agree. Meeting is called for Friday July 21. D[ean] A[cheson].” No minute or other summary of this meeting has been found in State Department files.
Attached to the file copy of this memorandum is a draft dated July 21, not printed, of the security clauses of the prospective Japanese peace treaty. A draft of July 25 is printed, p. 1260.
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