794.00/7–750
Summary Report by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)1
The following is a summary account of the various interviews had in Japan by Messrs. Dulles and Allison on their recent trip. It excludes [Page 1231] all mention of the interviews with General MacArthur as they will be treated separately,2 and does not make any attempt to give detailed memoranda of the various conversations, but does attempt to reflect faithfully the various points of view presented. General MacArthur made it clear from the outset that we could talk to anyone and about anything and that there were to be no restrictions either on what we said to our various contacts or what they said to us.
After six days of constant interviews with a great variety of observers, Japanese and foreign, official and non-official, we came away from Japan with the definite impression of a confused and uncertain people. There was little evidence that the Japanese had thought through the significance of their position in the world of today. Prior to the attack by North Korean forces on South Korea, Sunday, June 25, the one thing which could be said with certainty was that the trips to Japan of Secretary Johnson, General Bradley and ourselves brought to a focus strong Japanese expectancy that the United States would take positive action toward expediting a total peace settlement. Failure to have moved in this direction would have caused great disillusionment and resentment. With the North Korean attack and successes and the consequent increasing Communist menace, the Japanese began to see that there is no simple solution of their security problem. During a reception given by the Chief of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP to permit us to meet a large number of Japanese leaders on the afternoon of Monday, June 26, after the North Korean invasion, there was more open admission than had previously been obtained of the continuing need of United States military forces’ remaining in Japan. The Jiji Shimpo said editorially, for example, on June 26, in speaking of the fighting in Korea:
“…3 And if Japan wants herself defended by the United States, she should voluntarily offer the strategic parts of her territory as American military bases.”4
In varying degrees, all Japanese with whom we talked complained of their lack of independence and of the interference of the SCAP bureaucracy in Japanese political and economic life. This criticism seemed to Allison much more vocal and intense than when he was last in Japan during January, 1948.
Prime Minister Yoshida accused junior Japanese officials of using the excuse of SCAP orders to take action contrary to the desires of Cabinet Ministers. He also said that if Japan is to play any significant role in the Free World the spirit and initiative of the Japanese people must not be shackled by too extended an occupation. Mr. [Page 1232] Yoshida was vague as to what exact role he envisioned for Japan and did not commit himself on post-treaty security arrangements. He implied that satisfactory arangements could be concluded, but he could not be tied down as to exactly what he meant. He talked at some length in a rather academic manner about how the nations of the Free World would come to the aid of Japan if Japan would prove it had learned the lesson of the the war and was firmly attached to democratic principles. There was no apparent realization that it would take more than good intentions to protect Japan, and there was a reluctance, in the face of prodding, to admit that Japan would have to contribute its share in some form or another. Mr. Yoshida, in common with most of the Japanese with whom we talked, seemed to be hoping that Japan’s renunciation of war and armed force in her new Constitution would make it possible for Japan to remain apart from the struggles and dangers of the rest of the world.
A slightly different shading of this same point of view was given by Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister at the time of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and at present President of the House of Councillors. Baron Shidehara was emphatic that there should be no revival of militarism in Japan and that any rearmament would be far too expensive. He wanted American forces to remain under some arrangement or other for he said that the Communists had been allowed too much liberty and that if American forces were withdrawn at once the Japanese would not be able to contain possible Communist activity. In lieu of rearmament and a permanent occupation by American forces Baron Shidehara expressed the opinion that the solution of the security problem for Japan lies in passive resistance or non-cooperation with an aggressor. He claimed there was strong sentiment against Russia among the Japanese and that if Japan should be attacked and overrun by the Russians the Soviet occupying forces would find that there would be no cooperation such as the Americans had received and that, although many Japanese might, as a result be killed, nevertheless the Russians could not kill 80 million people and hence in the end their military victory would prove a failure. Baron Shidehara was the only one with whom we talked who expressed this rather extreme view.
Interestingly enough, the only Japanese who expressed a desire to see Japan rearmed was a representative of organized labor. According to this man, the Japanese could never be independent and free as long as they had to depend on others for their protection. Most Japanese seem to think it important for the United States to make clear its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Far East, but with the exception of the labor union man mentioned above they nearly all balked at Japan’s taking any active part. Mr. Horinouchi, former [Page 1233] Japanese Ambassador5 to the United States, did recognize the necessity of Japan’s contributing in some way, and he expressed the opinion that whatever security arrangements were made, they should not be bilateral between the United States and Japan alone, but should, if possible, be tied in, in some manner, with the United Nations. Such Japanese as had given real thought to the security problem and recognized the necessity of some form of Japanese contribution tended to agree with Mr. Horinouchi. Some of the Japanese we interviewed stated that if the United States did not protect Japan, Japan would have to look elsewhere, and there was the clear implication that the only way to look was toward Moscow.
As noted above, it was one of the representatives of organized labor who advocated the rearming of Japan. However, other labor representatives who talked to us at the same time took the opposite point of view and most of them seemed to agree with the general opinion of the other Japanese that Japan should not rearm but should nevertheless continue to be protected by the United States, preferably from long range. One of the more radical labor representatives charged that the United States interest in having a peace treaty with Japan was not due to any interest in the Japanese, but merely because this would serve U.S. interests. The Japanese, this man said, wanted independence for themselves; they wanted to be left alone and they did not like the occupation, particularly the effect of the Dodge policy on the laboring man. They also raised questions about U.S. policy toward trade with Communist China and were quite vociferous in their denunciation of SCAP controls over the Diet and other Government agencies. One of them said specifically that the Japanese Diet was not Japanese but an imposed Diet and pointed out that the Socialist Party had attempted to make amendments to the Constitution but had been prevented by SCAP from submitting such amendments to the Diet. One of the more conservative labor leaders agreed that there was no basis at present for an overall peace and that it would be necessary to go ahead probably without the Soviets. This same man, however, emphasized that whether or not a peace treaty came about it would be necessary to continue U.S. economic help until at least 1955. The labor representatives seemed to agree that it would not be possible to combat Japanese Communists through Government persecution or pressure and they claimed that only democratic means should be used in taking action against the Communists.
In addition to talks with Japanese Government officials and private individuals, we talked with the leaders of the opposition parties. Premier Yoshida had recently made an appeal for non-partisan approach to the problem of the peace treaty and the leaders of both the [Page 1234] Socialist and Democratic Parties stated that they were in favor of this approach, but they were not convinced of the sincerity of Yoshida’s appeal. This was particularly true of Mr. Tomabechi, Chairman of the Democratic Party, who expressed definite doubt as to whether Mr. Yoshida’s move was not a political one. According to Mr. Tomabechi the press accounts of the attitude of the opposition parties to an overall peace treaty had been greatly exaggerated. While it was true that the opposition parties were agreed that an overall peace treaty including the USSR would be the most desirable, nevertheless, at least as far as the Democratic Party is concerned, it would be willing to proceed without the Soviet Union if that should appear to be necessary. According to Mr. Tomabechi, Prime Minister Yoshida went on the theory that only the government in power could be responsible for foreign affairs and that the other parties should automatically agree with what was done. Mr. Dulles took pains to explain to the leaders of the three main parties, Prime Minister Yoshida, Mr. Tomabechi, and Mr. Asanuma of the Socialist Party,6 the importance of a unified approach to foreign policy, and that if the party in power at any one time operated on its own without having sought and obtained the general approval of opposition parties, it would be difficult for any country to place confidence in the foreign policy. Mr. Dulles pointed out that parties can be defeated and if the foreign policy of the country is to be reversed whenever a new party comes into power it makes it almost impossible for other countries to have confidence in the acts of a nation. It is therefore essential that true cooperation in foreign policy be practiced and that the opposition parties be given an opportunity in some manner to participate in foreign policy decisions, Mr. Dulles pointed out that the fact that he, a member of the opposition party in the United States, had been designated to come to Japan and deal with this important problem showed that the United States for its part was making an honest effort to obtain bipartisan cooperation and that Japan in the same way should make such an effort.
Among other points raised by Mr. Tomabechi in connection with a peace treaty and the possible withdrawal of American forces was the fact that there were still not adequate safeguards for peace and order within Japan itself by indigenous organizations. He intimated that the Japanese police was not strong and unified enough to cope adequately with any Communist agitation which might arise and that hence, although the time for general occupation controls to cease had come, the problem of internal peace and order was a real one. This same point of view was expressed by many other Japanese, in particular by Mr. Okazaki, Chief Cabinet Secretary, who spoke to [Page 1235] Allison at the June 26 reception mentioned above, and by an officer of the National Rural Police, who would not wish to be identified, who during a private dinner with us and some other Japanese expressed great concern at the inadequacy of the police organization. This concern over the organization of the Japanese police and its inability to deal with internal troubles without the backing of American armed forces was one which was common in almost all circles in Japan except official SCAP circles. There was only slight evidence in talks with SCAP officials: of a realization that perhaps the decentralization of the Japanese police had gone too far.
Members of the Diplomatic Corps with whom we talked were often as vague as the Japanese. During a long conversation with British Ambassador Gascoigne, no really new thoughts were expressed concerning British policy which were not already known to us and to the Department. The Ambassador reiterated that the security problem could be settled by a bilateral agreement outside the treaty between the United States and Japan and seemed to assume that the whole defense burden would fall upon the United States. The Ambassador attempted to draw us out on specific items of a possible treaty and, though we did not respond, he expounded some of his own ideas. The only one which went further than anything we had had officially so far was his definite statement that the United Kingdom did not insist on a treaty containing limitations on the size and speed of Japanese merchant ships nor apparently on the total tonnage of the Japanese merchant marine. However, he did say specifically that the United Kingdom would oppose Japan’s having any shipbuilding capacity in excess of that required for its own needs. In other words Japan should not be allowed to engage in shipbuilding for foreign account. Most of the members of the Diplomatic Corps believed that an early treaty was necessary and possible, but this view was violently opposed by Australian Ambassador Hodgson who frankly took a position in opposition to that of his Government. He assumed that any treaty would mean either the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which he deemed unwise, or else active Soviet opposition, which would have at least a shade of legal justification.
American missionary leaders, both Protestant and Catholic, with whom we talked agreed that in many respects Japanese customs and history made them more susceptible to Communism than western people. They also seemed to feel that democracy had not taken sufficient root in Japan to justify complete withdrawal of U.S. forces at an early date. One of the missionaries went so far as to say there would be a civil war between the right and left in Japan if the country were left to itself. While other members of the missionary group seemed to agree, they also expressed the opinion that there was inherent contradiction in using a dictatorial political and military occupation [Page 1236] to teach democratic ways and that this contradiction was becoming apparent to the Japanese. The view was strongly expressed that if Japan was to be kept on the side of the Free World it would be necessary for the western nations to adopt much more liberal attitudes toward racial differences and such matters as restrictions on immigration of Japanese to the United States.
A representative group of American businessmen was unanimous in agreeing that occupation controls, except in the most general form, should go. They were also, generally speaking, pessimistic about Japan’s economic prospects unless it could trade with the Asiatic continent. There was but little optimism expressed about the possibility of Japanese increasing exporting of capital goods, mainly because of the poor quality of the Japanese product. This was illustrated by the fact that Korea had recently purchased a cigarette manufacturing machine from the United States rather than from Japan, although the price was almost double, due to the fact that rejects from the Japanese machine were 1 in 20, whereas those from the American machine were only 1 in 10,000. There was some hope expressed that Japan might regain its former rayon trade, but it was pointed out that the Japanese rayon industry now had only 17 plants compared with 47 before the war. The one industry which all agreed should be revived was tourism, but it was pointed out that this would be difficult as long as the United States Army continued to occupy 27 out of the 32 finest hotels in the country. As did Japanese businessmen and the economic officers of SCAP, the Americans stressed the importance of the revival of the Japanese merchant marine. It was claimed that one-third of every export dollar goes to American shippers. However, American businessmen were skeptical about any early favorable results, even if restrictions were removed at once—for Japan would either have to buy or build a new merchant marine—and she would not have the money to do the former and the latter would take many years. An acute shortage of capital funds and excessive interest rates were said to be the chief restrictions on capital developments.
The final interview of importance was had by proxy. On one evenings through the courtesy of an American journalist, we were invited to a dinner with four representative Japanese who were encouraged to speak freely, and who did so, because of the fact that at this meeting as in the case of few other meetings, there were no occupation officials present. Among those present was Marquis Matsudaira of the Imperial Household. As a result of his participation in the meeting, we received a message the afternoon before our departure from Tokyo that Matsudaira had come to our journalist friend and given him an oral message from the Emperor to be conveyed to us. The main point of this message was that, generally speaking, when officials from the United States came to investigate conditions in Japan they only saw [Page 1237] Japanese in the Government or Japanese who had been officially approved by SCAP and that many intelligent Japanese were not available for consultation. According to this message SCAP apparently feared contacts with some of the older Japanese because of their alleged former militaristic outlook; and it was pointed out that the Imperial Household had in the past had considerable experience with the Japanese military and certainly had no desire to see its revival or the revival in Government of people with militaristic and aggressive tendencies. Nevertheless, many of the older people, the majority of whom have been purged, would be able to give most valuable advice and assistance to Americans interested in future relations between our two countries. It was suggested that before any final action with regard to the peace treaty, particularly with regard to the detailed provisions of a peace treaty, be taken there should be set up some form of advisory council of Japanese who would be truly representative of the people in Japan, both official and non-official, and who would be able to be of real aid in helping to obtain a peace settlement which would be lasting and in the interest of both countries. Mr. Dulles agreed that such an advisory council would be of value, but pointed out that obviously the initiative for such action must come from the Japanese as any American attempt to set up such a council of Japanese would defeat the purpose for which it was being formed, that of being a funnel for the expression of true Japanese opinion.
- This report, drafted by Mr. Allison, was distributed to the Secretary and to Messrs. Kennan, Rusk, Jessup, Hamilton, and Fearey.↩
- See the memorandum, supra.↩
- Omission in the source text.↩
- Information on the place of Japan in overall United States strategic planning after the outbreak of the Korean conflict is scheduled for publication in volume i (U.S. national security policy–particularly, documents NSC 73. July 1, and NSC 73/4, August 25).↩
- Kensuke Horinouchi, Ambassador to the United States from 1938 to 1940.↩
- Inejiro Asanuma, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party.↩