Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Lot 60D330

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] May 5, 1950.

Subject: Discussion of Japanese Peace Treaty during London Visit

Participants:	Generals Burns and Magruder—Department of Defense
	Captain Murdaugh—Department of Defense
	Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary

Generals Burns and Magruder came in to discuss the latest Defense position on the basis of which the Secretary of State should discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty during his forthcoming visit to Europe. They furnished a copy of their proposed text (Tab A).¹ A copy of the Department of State proposal is contained in Tab B.

The discussion on the differences between the texts developed the following:

(a) The Defense Department did not wish to have the Japanese peace settlement discussed with the French but wished to restrict it to the British. I pointed out that if Mr. Schuman asked Mr. Acheson about the Japanese peace settlement that Mr. Acheson could not simply play the role of the village idiot but would have, in fact, to offer minimum comments. I pointed out that it was desirable that we should keep this discussion with the French to a minimum.

(b) Defense representatives considered that NSC 13/3 had been overtaken by events. I pointed out that the Department of State belived that this paper had been overtaken by events but in the opposite direction from that conceived of by the Defense Department. In any event. NSC 13/3² represented an existing policy decision of the President and that, until changes were made through available machinery, the paper must be considered as approved existing policy.

(c) Defense representatives stated that they wished to delete any reference to the political desirability of an “early” peace treaty, preferring to speak solely of a “peace treaty”.

(d) The Defense representatives returned to their view that we should speak of a “minimum of post-treaty control machinery” rather than “no post-treaty control machinery”. They stated that they wished to leave the door open for such post-treaty control machinery as we might consider desirable after we had made final decisions on the substance of the proposed treaty itself. I pointed out that the other interested governments would probably start out with the view that we should have quite elaborate post-treaty control machinery and that the United States would be expected by them to play a major role in using such machinery to enforce the treaty upon Japan. I felt that in view of this attitude of other governments if we started from the premise that we should have “no” such machinery, we should be in a much better position. Defense representatives stated their understanding that their word “minimum” could be reduced to zero. I also pointed out that post-treaty control machinery was not consistent with our desire to reduce restrictions and special disabilities in such matters as trade, industry and civil government, nor with our desire to leave out of the treaty specific prohibitions on armaments.

(e) Defense representatives stated once again their opposition to the idea of proceeding with a Japanese peace treaty without the USSR and Communist China, although they did say that they would be willing to consider this question later this year. I pointed out that the President had stated views to the NSC in December which clearly envisaged the possibility of a peace treaty without the Soviet Union, that the Secretary of State could not possibly avoid discussing the pros and cons of proceeding without the Soviet Union and that there was very wide disagreement between the Departments of State and Defense on this point. I said Department totally rejected the legal framework of the argument that a treaty without the Soviet Union would greatly improve the legal position of the Soviet Union with respect to Japan and that we should not underestimate the nature of the disagreement on this point.

(f) Defense representatives stated they did not wish to have the continued regime of control mentioned in Alternative Security Arrangement II restricted to matters of security and that the wide range of authority contained in the surrender documents and SCAP directives should be continued and be available for use by SCAP as needed on important and urgent matters.

After reviewing the above differences, I stated that I did not believe that we had the time to resolve these differences and that, in any event, they raised some basic points of policy which we were not trying to decide finally until the review of our policy in June following Mr. Johnson’s return from Tokyo. I suggested that it might be better for the Secretary of State simply to act on the basis of existing approved policy in NSC 13/1 [ NSC 13/3?] and his commitment to Mr. Johnson not to make a final decision in Europe.

General Burns acknowledged that the Secretary of State must have broad authority to discuss matters with other governments but said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered that the Secretaries of State and Defense had agreed not to discuss the Japanese peace settlement in Europe. I stated that I did not know how that impression could have arisen because I was certain that the Secretaries of State and Defense had discussed this point subsequent to the meeting of the Secretary of State which had been attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In any event, it was my understanding that the Secretaries of State and Defense had discussed the matter subsequently³ and that the very effort being made by General Burns and me was based on the assumption that the matter would be discussed. General Burns assented to this view.

General Magruder then said that what they had given us was the “advice” of the Defense Department and that he considered that the Secretary of State should consider this “advice” in the light of the situation in which he finds himself in Europe and conduct the discussions with the British and French on the basis of his own requirements and responsibilities.

I stated that I would indicate to the Secretary the specific points on which the Department of Defense would like changes but that I could not accept them as a basis for an agreed paper.

The meeting adjourned on the understanding that no further exchanges of papers between the two Departments was to be expected prior to the Secretary’s departure.

1. Not printed.
2. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 730.
3. Date uncertain.