357.AA/10–2050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

secret

586. Re Embtel 581 October 19 repeated 48 Djakarta.1 As Embassy reported heretofore when discussing NNG dispute Netherlands FonOff made evident anxiety issue not arise SC fearful would open gates full scale clash which accomplish little but heighten tension between Netherlands, and Indonesians. At that time Indonesians not attempted invasion selfstyled “independent” Ambon but rumors same had begun.

Embassy also reported one rankling factor after transfer sovereignty has been passivity UNCI which Netherlands point view looked other way when Indonesians clearly made no genuine effort respect [Page 1088] right self-determination. Number officers commented inaction UNCI so much contrast its previous activity which resulted independent RUSI. This attitude so prevalent some officers still regard current UNCI efforts some incredulity. Now UNCI has seen fit act; this rather oddly created relatively small amount press interest here. Obviously SC nonsupport UNCI would be direct contrast SC support given UNCI when it championed worldwide popular cause Indonesians rather than unpopular Netherlands policy Indonesia. Essence Indonesians today rejecting UNCI mediation claiming it “internal” matter thereby almost duplicating Netherlands defense during its “police actions” Indonesia. Great difference is of course before sovereignty UNCI striving for independent state Indonesia whereas today UNCI only wishes Ambon fighting stopped. Netherland FonOff agrees Ambon Part RI and cannot stand alone but immediate problem stop bloodshed which all seem agreed will if not already done so degenerate into Asiatic terrorism.

This brings us reason put forth Ambassador Cochran intel 513 October 132 why Ambon issue should not be debated SC. These reasons also concurred by many Netherlands interests, chiefly business circles and such realists Hirschfeld who convinced such developments head-on collision over NNG or full-scale SC debate over such issues as Ambon will not solve problems involved rather debate would further inflame Indonesian extremist so as jeopardize seriously if not actually bring about jettisoning Netherlands investments Indonesia. This “facts of life” attitude heavily subscribed particularly Amsterdam and by number leading Socialists. FonOff tends continue be more firm yet it too does not wish have full-scale SC debate. This realism makes much sense particularly case Ambon where SC hearing would probably contribute little if anything solution problem. However, Embassy wonders where do we stop?

If Ambon shelved purpose salvaging shaky Natsir Government NNG issue next on timetable and all foregoing applies equally “realistically”, then similar concessions would be made re NNG so as prevent again less extreme RI administration taking over. What is next? It might be RI “purchase” or nationalization certain limited foreign (i.e. Dutch) interests RI. This may begin with KPM and end with virtually all Dutch investments. No one knows, but seems evident if present Indonesian trend continues those investments will be there for asking. No mention being made here fact not impossible RI could go Communist.

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As to Roem’s threat expose Netherlands misdeeds Bandung, Makassar, and Ambon if SC holds debate that sort blackmail seemingly endless and seems be familiar refrain whenever Indonesians unable get own way when Netherlands involved.

While Embassy admittedly unfamiliar with exact procedure how SC hearing Ambon would be handled it wonders if it could be guided such manner as have its immediate goal issuing cease-fire order without digressing field enlarging UNCI authority bringing question Australia’s membership et cetera (see Djakarta’s 513). This guidance however, vital issue because if discussion launches field leading mutual recriminations affording Soviets golden opportunity assume role Indonesian protector principal result be alienation Indonesians and harm all parties concerned.

Would seem to Embassy therefore if discussion be limited time has come support SC hearing order effect (1) cease-fire order (2) encourage RI understand it, too, has certain international obligations, (3) demonstrate clearly UNO will support its agencies in field and have facts.

If discussion can not be so restricted Embassy reluctantly concludes under present circumstances about all we can do is urge SC chairman issue strong statement calling Indonesia and Ambonese cease-fire. Such statement would follow UNCI request its earlier request for SC hearing be withdrawn because of “changed situation”.

Department pass Djakarta. Sent Department 586; repeated information Djakarta 49.

Chapin
  1. Not printed; in it Chapin reported that Boon had said “only reason Dutch want positive SC action [on Ambon] is preserve prestige UNCI which Netherlands Government still thinks serves useful function.” Boon did not want Ambon on the agenda, as that would lead to recriminations and Soviet intrigue, but thought a statement by the President or some official action was necessary. (357.AA/10–1950)
  2. Not printed; in it Cochran stated that debate by the Security Council “would open up veritable Pandora’s box” that might prejudice agreement on New Guinea, open the way for “undesirable extension Indian influence” in Indonesia, and allow recriminations that would result quickly in the “dissolution of union and loss all Dutch major interests in Indonesia.” (357.AA/10–1350)