357.AA/10–1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State
522. For Lacy from Cochran. Roem went Bandung shortly after interview reported my 519,1 October 14; returning 16th. Have talked with no RI officials since receipt Deptels 404, 408 and 409.2
Appreciate Department’s understanding of situation and assure it that I will not fail to take discreet advantage of any last minute opening toward getting conciliatory move on part Indonesian Government but so doubtful of either opportunity or favorable result that I feel Department should not count on such eventuality. More inclined to think UNCI action will speed up subjugation insurrectionists along lines to which government finally resorted after weeks of unsuccessful efforts to negotiate.
Precipitate action of UNCI not only destructive any faith Indonesians therein but also giving rise to placing blame on US since Indonesians understand our key position and also that Doolittle most senior and forceful of three UNCI members was chairman when decision taken. Assistant to Colonel Simatupang has, for instance, already expressed to CAS perplexity that Indonesia’s great friends, the Americans, could strike such a blow against them. Also tendency observed to tie this in with alleged unhappiness US side over outcome Melby mission.
[Page 1084]Doolittle’s attitude of being publicly critical of Indonesians and now of “getting tough” with them may have approbation of some of less responsible and more tycoon-minded of my Service Attachés, MilObs and US old-time business community, but in my opinion his rash, irresponsible leadership on UNCI has resulted in what may prove most ill-advised step in Indonesian history since second police action. Consequently I hope Department and USRep SC will exert every effort keep Ambon question from SC discussion and get Doolittle out of Indonesia soonest.
- Not printed; in it Cochran reported that Roem was “much disturbed” over the referring of the Ambon question to the Security Council. He stressed that in any debate Indonesia would be obliged to recite the activities of Netherlands civil and military officials at Bandung, Makassar, and Ambon which would only embitter relations between the two states and again stated that his Government found it “absolutely impossible” to let the UNCI intervene. (357.AA/10–1450)↩
- Telegram 404 asked for the circumstances that led the UNCI to refer the Ambon question to the Security Council; telegram 408 is the same as telegram 400, supra; in telegram 409 the Department of State agreed that further approaches to the Indonesian Government were useless but wanted to be informed immediately if any conciliatory moves were made. (357.AA/10–1350 and 756D.00/10–1450)↩