794A.00/9–1950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb)
Subject: Projected Submission of Formosan Question to UNGA
Participants: | Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador |
Mr. Rusk, FE | |
Mr. Clubb, CA |
Mr. Rusk remarked that there was considerable weakness in our relationship to Formosa, deriving from the circumstance that our [Page 511] action of June 27 respecting Formosa had been unilateral in character. It was important for both Formosa and the United States that readiness be shown to have the matter considered at any time by the UN, this because of the need for international support for the present position. The U.S. considered that the Formosa question should properly be settled by peaceful means. The acceptance of this principle would not prejudice the actual settlement. The acceptance of the principle was the beginning, and pending the working out of that principle there could be maintenance of the status quo. Ambassador Koo should know that it was proposed that the United States Delegation would submit the matter to the UNGA, the U.S. needed international support for its present position, and the consensus of opinion was that the problem could be handled effectively only through the medium of the GA. In the UNSC we were confronted by the threat of a Soviet veto. In the UNGA there might be established a commission for study of the question, with maintenance in the interim of the present status.
Ambassador Koo asked at this point whether such commission would consider the final disposition of the problem. Mr. Rusk said that the basic idea was that Formosa was not to be fought over, that only peaceful means should be used for settling the problem. He realized that there were certain misgivings in Taipei respecting the matter. This was inevitable, but the present situation had in it elements of grave danger and it was necessary to attend to it. It was considered that a long-term solution would be facilitated by introduction of the matter into a parliamentary framework.
Ambassador Koo admitted that there were in fact misgivings in Taipei respecting the question. Mr. Rusk, in further clarification, referred to the President’s statement of June 27 and the placing of the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa strait, and observed that the President himself had delineated possible lines for a future settlement. The United States itself was content to put the matter on ice and have it in a frozen state, but both our opponents and some of our friends were inclined to question this freezing. As things stood, there remained the possibility of outbreak of hostilities. This was unacceptable to us and to the American public. It was our desire that the matter be handled by peaceful means.
Ambassador Koo referred to the President’s recent press statement that the Seventh Fleet might, in due course, be withdrawn. He assumed that this was an off-hand, unprepared reply. This statement and the proposal that the question of Formosa be submitted to the UN had added to the concern of the National Government. He asked whether the proposed submission of the question to the UN resulted from conclusions reached in the Three Ministers’ Conference. Mr. Rusk said that the American action had not been determined by [Page 512] consultation with any other Government: it resulted from a concensus of opinion that this was the best procedure to follow. There was much sympathy for the Nationalists and there was the necessity that violence be avoided. Only so would the Nationalists get sympathy and support for their position on Formosa. He remarked that this was different from the question of Chinese representation and said that other Governments, including friendly Governments, might take differing positions regarding both (1) whether Formosa belonged to China and (2) whether China was properly represented by Peiping or the National Government.
Ambassador Koo asked whether the introduction of the matter into the UN might lead to a prolonged debate of the subject. Mr. Rusk replied that the Formosan problem was hardly a question which could be settled in the present session, that it was probable that it would be necessary to establish a commission to deal with the matter, that the United States particularly was not interested in pressing for prompt action. Mr. Koo asked whether the proposal for the establishment of a commission was based on the concept that it should be for the purpose of performing an inquiry or for observation or whether it was for the purpose of “gaining time”. Mr. Rusk admitted that part of the purpose might be to gain time, but observed that it obviously would not be submitted to the UN in those terms. He remarked to Mr. Koo confidentially and not for submission to his Government that no one could state what Moscow planned in the present circumstances, and it was therefore important that tension be reduced by a reduction of possible points of conflict. Respecting Formosa, the United States would fight if the Commnists launched an attack; however, it was to the advantage of both Formosa and the United States if the international community could determine the matter without the occurence of fighting. It was thus that there would be obtained a greater measure of international support. The United States was without an established pattern for the future of Formosa. Likewise we were not indicating what the Chinese attitude should be. It was only felt that there should be adherence to pacific means for the settlement of the questions in point.
Mr. Koo said that there was Nationalist dislike of the visit at this time of any UN commission for the study of the status of Formosa. He asked whether there was a fixed U.S. view on the position the National Government should assume. Mr. Rusk replied, noting that his observation was purely personal, that he thought it would be better tactically for the National Government to welcome a commission, to make Taipei attractive to the visitors, and expressed the opinion that such a visit might, under such conditions, be beneficial to the Nationalists. Mr. Koo remarked that much depended upon the composition of a commission, and Mr. Rusk expressed understanding of the [Page 513] Nationalist point of view. Mr. Koo asked when the question might be brought before the UNGA, and Mr. Rusk said that he thought the Secretary might introduce the subject in his speech in the near future.1 Mr. Koo said that by accepted procedure the matter would presumably have to be put on the agenda by reference to the General Committee. Mr. Rusk said that he assumed that such might be the case, but that an actual procedural approach had not yet been worked out. Mr. Koo asked whether it was not to be feared that discussion of such a question might show divisions within the non-Communist world. Mr. Rusk expressed the opinion that it was more likely that the procedure would bring about a closing of some of the existing breaches. Mr. Koo referred again to the Foreign Ministers’ Conference, asking whether the discussion had had reference to ultimate disposition of the question. Mr. Rusk replied that the question came before the Foreign Ministers only as regards procedure in the UN. Mr. Koo asked whether the French and UK Governments could be considered in line with present American thinking respecting handling of the problem. Mr. Rusk said that no commitments had been made in that regard. It was only hoped that there could be peaceful solution of the problems affecting Formosa.
Mr. Rusk said that the present situation made it all the more important that Formosa follow the way laid down, he thought, by Foreign Minister Yeh, looking toward an improvement of local conditions in Formosa. Mr. Koo said that an effort was being made along those lines, but that of course it would take time.