611.94A/9–1650: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Rankin) to the Secretary of State
secret
Taipei, September
16, 1950—4 p. m.
388. Responsive Department’s request for comment certain points raided Deptel 237, September 13, following observations ventured in hope of demonstrating Department’s and Chinese Government positions much closer together than may have appeared.
- 1.
- To our knowledge, no responsible Chinese official and no significant faction public opion would wish Seventh Fleet mission cancelled under present circumstances. Local reaction to President’s remarks at press conference August 31 is ample confirmation.
- 2.
- Chinese hold above position despite fact that US action begun June 27 has so far contributed to no permanent strengthening Chinese military forces on Formosa, while at same time preventing any interference with concurrent and substantial build-up of Chinese Communist preparations for invasion (mytel 339, September 2, transmitting memorandum from Foreign Minister).
- 3.
- There is appreciation in Chinese official circles of US position on proposed Formosan investigation, coupled with hope US will appreciate delicacy of situation here which prospect of such investigation has brought about. While not expecting US actively block consideration of proposal Chinese Government hopeful we will not only avoid sponsoring it but overlook no suitable opportunity to allow project either to die or take innocuous form. Chinese Government instructions to its SC representative simply to abstain if proposal comes to vote is evidence of reasonable official attitude.
- 4.
- US course hoped for by Chinese Government scarcely of nature to provide pretext Chinese Communist aggression. In any case, well established Communist pattern of action based upon more substantial motivation and uses tangible or manufactured pretexts almost solely for propaganda.
- 5.
- Whatever precise US position with reference to support Nationalist Government, success of Seventh Fleet mission is dependent to important degree on maintenance technical effectiveness and morale of Chinese Armed Forces. NSC decided sometime ago Formosa could not be held without use of US ground forces. Since then, Communist air, sea, land preparations against Formosa have advanced substantially. Evidently, it is more important than ever that US should strive to avoid, and whenever possible prevent steps liable foster uncertainty, alarm, or dissension among Chinese-forces, thereby inviting Chinese Communist attack and contributing to its possible success.
Rankin