794A.00/8–3050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
399. Certain considerations re, Formosan situation in UN seem to us worth setting down in order to make certain we carry out Department’s wishes effectively. We are, of course, aware there are aspects of the Formosan question with which we are not familiar and which may bear upon the course outlined by the Department in instructions received by USUN on Formosan question.1 As reported in USUN No. [Page 470] 391, August 29,2 we have explained to all SC delegates (except USSR) view and tactics set forth in Department’s instructions. We shall follow up vigorously and consult further with other delegates as soon as they have received their instructions from home. In anticipation of such consultations, following questions will undoubtedly arise upon which we would appreciate guidance either for our own background or for discussion with other delegates, or both.
- (1)
- What is Department’s view concerning SC tactics in event resolution establishing commission is vetoed by China [or U.S.S.R.?] or both? This question, of course, assumes we shall succeed in obtaining seven votes in favor of resolution. In this connection we have just been advised by Tsiang that he will vote against commission composed of eleven SC members. Conversation with Tsiang reported separately (ourtel No. 398, August 30).2 Tsiang renewed his suggestion, reported in ourtel No. 391, August 29, of SC Commission composed of six non-permanent members and said if such a commission were proposed he would abstain in vote. It seems to us almost certain that Soviet would vote against commission from which they were excluded.
- (2)
- Would Department’s view re tactics be affected by likelihood of protracted debate in SC? We believe it may prove impossible to have really limited debate on Formosa for two reasons: (a) Opposition by Chinese Nationalist Government and probable long statement by Soviet delegate, and (b) Debate centering upon Soviet motion to invite Chinese Communist representative to attend SC meetings in which SC is considering establishment of commission. Indications of probable length and nature of such debate was clearly indicated by proceedings of SC at August 29 meeting. Most perplexing aspect of this problem, to which we call Department’s urgent attention, is that although US would consider its vote against seating Chinese Communist as not a veto, Tsiang would probably take opposite view and raise possibility of double veto problem. Another possibility which must be taken into account in connection with probable protraction of Formosa debate in SC is likelihood Soviet delegate will table motion of some sort, probably condemning US action re Formosa, calling for withdrawal of Seventh Fleet, etc. Although we would argue that motion to establish commission should be disposed of first, it is unlikely that debate could be limited to such motion. Of course, it would be impossible to limit debate if commission motion failed of adoption, since this would lead to debate upon any Soviet motion along anticipated lines.
- (3)
- What would Department’s attitude be re seating Chinese Communist if motion to establish commission were not adopted? Only argument suggested in paragraph 4 of Deptel 192, August 29.2 is that commission rather than SC should properly hear Chinese Communists. However, if this argument is rendered inapplicable by reason of failure [Page 471] of SC to establish commission, what argument, if any, should we make to oppose seating?
- (4)
- We understand from paragraph 2 of Deptel 192, timing of debate Formosa left to our discretion in light of UK reluctance to take matter up at once. Gross had further talk with Jebb3 this subject this morning, August 30. Jebb has not yet received instructions but has personal view that SC will be engaged at least through week of September 4 on Korea and on preparation SC report to GA. On Korean item, three procedural questions and three substantive motions remain for settlement: (a) procedural questions—seating of ROK representative (Malik may move to reconsider); USSR motion to seat North Korean: USSR motion to seat Chinese Communists under SC Rule 39; (b) substantive motions—US motions to localize conflict; USSR motion for withdrawal of foreign troops; USSR motion condemning bombings.
We perceive that foregoing tactical questions, although important and sure to arise in our consultations with other delegates, must be considered in context of basic US objectives regarding UN handling of Formosa question and US views concerning ultimate disposition of Formosa. It is these basic issues on which USUN feels it would be most helpful to have guidance.
We have read CFM D–7/2B on Formosa.4 We assume this will now be revised to take into account SC developments re Formosa past few days. We believe that in consultation with SC delegates during next several days question will repeatedly [arise?] of US views re substance and procedure of longer-range question of Formosan settlement. Some delegates, particularly India, will be more concerned with this question than with short-range neutralization issue. We anticipate great difficulty in consultations looking toward concerting viewpoints of friendly delegates unless we are in position to explain, within limitations of security, our thinking regarding GA or other UN action on longer-range issue. This question is left open in paragraph 5 of Deptel 192 which merely authorized us to explain limited scope of contemplated SC action. Some delegates will wish to know what we have in mind regarding future GA consideration, if any, and we should appreciate instructions on this point.
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In telegram 183, August 25, the Department had sent the following message to the United States Mission at the United Nations concerning the handling of the Formosa question, following the complaint of the People’s Republic of China concerning aggression against Taiwan:
“Confirming Hickerson–Gross telcon fol is text draft res for possible use by you in consultations with other friendly members SC:
“The SC resolves
‘to establish a Commission composed of the members of the SC, to investigate immediately the situation with respect to Formosa and to report to the SC on the maintenance of internatl peace and security with respect thereto. The Commission is authorized to conduct its investigation wherever it considers necessary and to consult with any government authorities or individuals whose views are considered by it to be useful in the performance of its task.’” (794A.00/8–2550)
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- Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations.↩
- Not printed. Reference is to a draft document prepared in connection with the preliminary meetings being held in Washington by representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for New York in September. Documentation on these meetings is scheduled for publication in volume iii. For the text of the tripartite document on Formosa prepared at the Washington meetings for presentation to the Foreign Ministers, see p. 477.↩