611.94A/8–2950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)
Subject: Formosa
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador |
| Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Matthews, G | |
| Ambassador Jessup, S/A | |
| Mr. Merchant, FE |
The discussion of the previous day on the subject of Formosa was resumed at 3:30 this afternoon. Mr. Matthews opened with the statement that while we had not had an opportunity thoroughly to study the two papers which the Ambassador had left with us the previous day, a preliminary reading of them indicated that they were both helpful and constructive.
The British Ambassador at this point reported a conversation of which London had just learned between Panikkar and the Soviet Ambassador in Peiping. Panikkar reported the Soviet as having said that the Chinese Communists would not attack Formosa while that subject was under active consideration in the UN and that they would only make their decision when they saw the treatment which Formosa received in the UN, presumably in the General Assembly, the implication appeared to be that if Peiping was dissatisfied with the UN action on Formosa it would probably thereafter launch its attack.
Discussion then turned to Paragraph 15 of the British paper which it was agreed was an interesting formula and one justifying further exploration.1 Ambassador Jessup pointed out that he would be interested [Page 468] in seeing inserted into it the plebiscite idea to which Sir Oliver Franks indicated his belief that London would be open-minded.
At one point in the discussion, Ambassador Jessup referred to our efforts as being designed to find a common meeting ground somewhere between the opposite extremes of (1) an irrevocable commitment to turn Formosa over to the present Chinese Communist Government irrespective of its behavior and attitude, and (2) attempting to ensure that Formosa did not come under the control of an unfriendly power during a period of world tension. Sir Oliver replied in effect that the most hopeful basis for our two governments reaching an agreed position was not a compromise between these two extremes but a retention of both thoughts. He explained that if we could subscribe to the legitimacy of Chinese claim as China to Formosa then he felt there would be little difficulty on the part of his government in agreeing to the necessity of neutralizing it so long as there was danger in the area and he pointed out the reference in the memorandum to the behavior of the Chinese Communists as a controlling factor in the timing of any turnover. He also said he felt Mr. Bevin attached great store to the removal of any thought or intention of maintaining Formosa as a base for the invasion by Chiang Kai-shek of the Mainland.
After a protracted discussion of various aspects of the British proposal, which it was agreed had merit, Sir Oliver said that he had hoped to be able to discuss Formosa when he saw the Secretary the following day and that what he thought would advance these interchanges more rapidly would be our submission of a piece of paper giving our modified ideas on their formula. This piece of paper could then be referred to the Secretary and to Mr. Bevin as a possible basis for further discussion between them, it being recognized that at this stage, the paper possessed no standing and carried no commitment. Mr. Matthews and Mr. Jessup said that we would attempt to produce such an informal paper and consult the Secretary’s wishes in the matter. It was also pointed out that Mr. Rusk was away on a short leave and it was desired that his views be sought before advancing beyond the present exploratory stage.
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Paragraph 15 of the British memorandum entitled “Formosa” read as follows:
“15. Another possible course of action which would hold the present position and deal with the long term to some extent might be the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly (to avoid a Soviet veto in the Security Council) which would
- “(a) recommend that Formosa should in due course revert to China;
- “(b) propose that any action to this end should await the pacification of the Pacific area and that in the meantime no action should be taken by anybody to disturb the status quo or use the island as a base;
- “(c) establish a Commission to recommend when the moment was ripe for the hand-over and the conditions under which it should take place.
“This would have the advantage that it would not mean abandoning the Cairo Declaration. It might—though this is doubtful—save the Central People’s Government’s face sufficiently to enable them to hold off. It would also enable a hand-over to be held up until the Communists gave some signs as to their future behaviour in international affairs.” (611.94A/8–2950)
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