Mr. Acheson met about 8:15 a. m. with Mr. Rusk with regard to the message
which General MacArthur had sent to the VFW. The meeting had been called
the preceding night. Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Webb joined the
Secretary in that order.
Mr. Rusk asked me to call Ambassador Harriman and ask him to stop by the
Secretary’s office on his way to his own office. Mr. Harriman agreed to
do this and arrived at the State Department about 8:55. Consideration
was given to the message which General MacArthur had sent and to the
political problems which such a message would raise.
Mr. Harriman came out and told me that he wanted to see the President
prior to the 9:30 meeting which was scheduled. He asked me to call Matt
Connelly1 and arrange for him to see the President
before this meeting. I was unable to reach Mr. Connelly but spoke to Mr.
Hopkins2 who told me that he
would arrange for Mr. Harriman to come in.
After the meeting at the White House, the Secretary said that the
President had raised the question of the message which General
Mac-Arthur had sent out. The President then read the message in its
entirety, commenting on certain portions of it as he did so. The
Secretary did not discuss the message during the course of this meeting.
The President referred to the message as having been given to him by Mr.
Harriman. The President considered the matter carefully and decided that
the only course was to order withdrawal of the message. He instructed
Secretary Johnson to issue an order to General Mac-Arthur for the
withdrawal of this message.
Following this, there were numerous telephone conversations which are
reported separately.
[Annex]
[Washington,] August 26,
1950.
Secretary Johnson telephoned Secretary Acheson shortly after the
latter’s return from the White House meeting. Secretary Johnson said
he had been thinking over the order to MacArthur to withdraw his
statement to the VFW. He thought that to do so would cause a great
deal of embarrassment, and said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
he thought that a message should go to him stating that if the
General’s statement were issued “we” will have to issue one stating
that it is one man’s opinion and is not the official policy of the
Government.
Secretary Acheson said he thought that the matter raised the issue as
to who is the President of the United States; that MacArthur had
made a statement contrary to what the President and Austin have
stated was our position on Formosa. Simply to say that the statement
is one man’s views gets the President and the Government into
complete confusion as to what parts of the statement are not the
Government’s
[Page 455]
policy; as to
whether the Government knew about the statement before it became
public; why it is not our policy, etc., etc. The Secretary said he
thought there was nothing to do but for the President to assert his
authority, and in this way make it clear that the President’s stated
position on Formosa stood.
Secretary Johnson at this point asked Secretary Acheson if he thought
“we dare send him a message that the President directs him to
withdraw his statement”. Secretary Acheson said he saw nothing else
to do.
Secretary Johnson then said he did not understand from the meeting
this morning that the President had actually agreed to send a direct
order to MacArthur. Mr. Acheson said that it was his recollection
that Ambassador Harriman had put forward the view quite clearly that
MacArthur should be ordered to withdraw the order, and that the
President had clearly agreed that this was the course to follow.
Since there seemed to be doubt in Secretary Johnson’s mind and the
minds of the JCS that this was the
clear decision, Secretary Acheson agreed to call Ambassador Harriman
and straighten out the matter.
Secretary Acheson telephoned Ambassador Harriman and reported that he
had been talking with Secretary Johnson, who had been discussing the
matter with the JCS, who thought it
would be very unwise to order MacArthur, and that they recommended
sending him a telegram saying that if the message is delivered, they
will have to put out a statement that it is one man’s opinion and
not official.
The Secretary said to Ambassador Harriman that he had thought it
clear that the President had agreed with the position which
Ambassador Harriman had set forth at the meeting this morning at the
White House—that MacArthur should be ordered to withdraw the
statement. If Ambassador Harriman had any doubt about Secretary
Acheson’s understanding, then they should go back to the President.
The Secretary reiterated his own view that it was a question of who
is President of the U.S., and that when one of the highest army
officials say something directly contrary to what the President
says, he must be ordered not to do so.
The Secretary said he, would like to ask Mr. Harriman (1) whether the
President did issue a clear order that an order should go to
Mac-Arthur; (2) whether Mr. Harriman still considered this a wise
order.
Ambassador Harriman said that he was talking with Mr. Charles
Ross3 at that moment and had told him that the
President had said that the order should go to MacArthur and that
he, Ambassador
[Page 456]
Harriman,
agreed with it fully; that that was the only way to deal with it.
Everyone knew that this was going to cause a bad mess at the best.
Ambassador Harriman had said that if Mr. Ross thought there was
anything wrong about this course, something might still be done.
Ambassador Harriman had said to Mr. Ross that he understood
Secretary Johnson was going to call up MacArthur. Mr. Ross said he
did not think this was sufficient; that there must be something in
writing which could be released as soon as anything leaked.
Mr. Harriman said it was very clear in his mind that, unless
Mac-Arthur were ordered not to make the statement, there will be
confusion all around the world. He did not believe repudiation of
the statement after it was made public was the same thing as an
order not to make it. The matter was so serious that only drastic
measures could cope with it. Repudiation simply could not catch up
with the results of the statement. Ambassador Harriman said he was
ready, in recommending the order of the President, to face the
possibility that it might mean Mac Arthur’s resignation. But to do
less would mean that there would be repercussions which could never
be caught up with.
Ambassador Harriman said he thought that Secretary Johnson had seen
the President for a moment after the meeting.
Secretary Acheson said he would call Secretary Johnson and say (1)
that Ambassador Harriman had understood that the President had
issued the order to withdraw the statement; and (2) that in Mr.
Harriman’s opinion that is the wise course; (3) If there is any
doubt we ought to reassemble and go over it again.
Ambassador Harriman said that he and Mr. Ross agreed that something
should be done here about the Matthews statement also.4
Ambassador Harriman asked if Secretary Acheson could find out how the
MacArthur message was given out—by the VFW or by MacArthur.
Secretary Acheson said he would find out.
The information which the Secretary later conveyed to Mr. Harriman is
as follows:
By making discreet inquiries, it was learned that
There is some reason to believe that key newspaper publishers
around the country were supplied the complete text of General
MacArthur’s letter directly. We were unable to find out whether
it was sent directly from Toyko or by the VFW. The only formal
press release was made in Chicago.
Secretary Acheson then telephoned Secretary Johnson and said he had
been authorized by Ambassador Harriman to say:
- 1.
- It was Ambassador Harriman’s very clear understanding that
[Page 457]
the President
had directed MacArthur by order to withdraw the
statement;
- 2.
- That Ambassador Harriman thinks that is the right
course;
- 3.
- That if we are not clear about it, we ought to ask the
President to receive his advisers again and discuss
it.
Mr. Acheson also told Secretary Johnson that Ambassador Harriman
thought that because of MacArthur’s prestige the repercussions would
be heard around the world, and that without the order to withdraw,
we could never catch up with the consequences.
It was agreed that Secretary Johnson would call Ambassador Harriman
and ask him to see if the President would see the advisers to reopen
the matter.
Very shortly after the above, Secretary Johnson called back and said
that when he had hung up from talking with Secretary Acheson (and
before he could call Ambassador Harriman, as agreed), the President
had called him and had dictated the following order which he said
was to go to MacArthur:
“The President of the United States directs that you withdraw
your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign
Wars because various features with respect to Formosa are in
conflict with the Policy of the U.S. and its position in the
UN.”
Secretary Acheson said he would put this before his staff and call
Secretary Johnson back if they had any objection to it.
The Secretary called Secretary Johnson a little later to tell him
that he had been studying the President’s draft order to MacArthur,
and that he thought it covered the matter very well.
Secretary Johnson again raised the question as to whether it was wise
to order MacArthur to withdraw, or whether it would not be better to
send a message to the following effect:
“The President and I have seen a copy of the statement to the
VFW. This statement includes several features in connection
with Formosa which are in conflict with U.S. policy and with
the position of the U.S. in the United Nations. When queried
on this subject this Government must state that this
statement is the statement of one individual only and is not
the policy of the United States Government.” (This may not
be an exact and accurate transcription.)
Secretary Johnson said that Deputy Secretary Early5 had come into the conference and he was very much
opposed to sending Mac-Arthur a telegram ordering him to withdraw
the statement.
Mr. Early then came on the phone and outlined his views as
follows:
It seemed to him that the directive of the President asked the
[Page 458]
impossible. It was not
mechanically possible to withdraw the statement, because it had been
received by the VFW, which is a hostile group; it has been given
world-wide distribution by them. Its withdrawal would never, in his
opinion, prevent its publication, or answer the issue. A directive
to MacArthur to withdraw the statement, not being possible of
accomplishment, would add fuel to the fire, when the statement is
issued. Mr. Early thought if we took the position, which he thought
was truthful and factual, that the General had ignored Washington,
the Government, the “League of Nations”, and everyone here, and that
traditionally we grant the right of free speech, and can consider
this only as an expression by an individual, we would get off better
than by sending a flat directive asking the impossible.
Mr. Early then brought up the question of handling the matter by
having Mr. Sebald talk with MacArthur in Tokyo. He said that he
could not believe that MacArthur would have made the statement if he
had known what the policy of the Government was. Mr. Early said he
was 100% sure that MacArthur knew nothing about it all. He thought
it would be worthwhile to get Sebald on the telephone and have him
check. He thought Sebald might, by talking with Mac-Arthur and
explaining the position he had put us in, get MacArthur to act on
his own and withdraw it without a directive.
The Secretary’s reply was that since Sebald was a subordinate, he did
not think he would be received by MacArthur without a directive from
the President.
In response to Mr. Early’s general line, the Secretary said he
understood that the whole matter would get out. If that is so, the
main question is—how does it get out? The Secretary again outlined
the confused position we would be in if there was simply a
repudiation of the statement if made by MacArthur, with no directive
not to do so; whereas if it comes out after the order to withdraw
has been sent, the President has asserted his authority, and the
position of the US in relation to other governments will be
maintained. In answer to the consideration of whether an order to
withdraw would be a suppression of MacArthur in his right to free
opinion and free speech, the Secretary thought that this would be
understood, since this Government has taken a position and high
officials of the Government cannot be allowed to make statements
opposite to that position. Even though this meant a serious row, the
Secretary thought this was the cleanest way to have the matter come
out.
Mr. Early still maintained that he thought his proposal would cause
less trouble. He suggested that perhaps the President might talk on
the telephone to MacArthur. The Secretary replied that this would
put the President in the position of suppliant, which he did not
think
[Page 459]
was wise. Mr.
Acheson thought also that a written order should be sent and that
the decision should not be left to a telephone call.
Mr. Early said he was just trying to get his views across. If
Secretary Acheson did not agree, he would not press this
further.
(There may have been a little more here, but my impression was that
the Secretary hung up without either Mr. Johnson or Mr. Early making
any definite commitment one way or other to send the order, or to go
back to the President.)
The next conversation was between Messrs. Harriman and Acheson
(although who called whom at this point, I am afraid I don’t
know).
Ambassador Harriman said he supposed the Secretary had talked with
Secretary Johnson, and the Secretary said he had; that he did not
agree with any of Secretary Johnson’s or Mr. Early’s views.
Secretary Acheson’s understanding of the present position was that,
since the President had issued a definite order to Secretary Johnson
to send the order to General MacArthur, after putting forth their
views in a last ditch stand, they were prepared to issue the
order.
However, evidently Mr. Johnson and/or Mr. Early had also called Mr.
Harriman and expressed their doubts to him and had read him the same
proposed message that Mr. Early had read the Secretary. Ambassador
Harriman said he was of the opinion that the President should have
everybody’s views before he takes such a serious step, although he,
Ambassador Harriman, was still of the opinion that the course
advocated by the Defense people did not make sense. The Secretary
said he thought the President had decided and that Secretary Johnson
had told him he would not reopen the matter unless. Secretary
Acheson and Ambassador Harriman also wanted it reopened. He said he
would do nothing further about it.
But, Ambassador Harriman thought that, leaving aside the froth of the
matter, as the situation stood, the essentials were that the
handling of the matter showed disagreement “on both sides of the
Potomac”, and that the MacArthur statement would plague us through
the election. (The Secretary later asked for clarification of what
the Ambassador meant by “disagreement on both sides of the Potomac”;
i.e., whether that meant that the JCS and the Defense agreed with the substance of the
MacArthur statement. Ambassador Harriman said he did not think this
was so; that what he meant was only that there was disagreement on
how to handle the matter.) In these circumstances, Ambassador
Harriman thought it would be well to know that the President had
weighed the matter carefully.
Secretary Acheson agreed that the President should not take an
important
[Page 460]
decision without
getting everyone’s opinion, but he thought that the President had
done this.
The Secretary and Mr. Harriman had a good deal of discussion as to
whether or not the President should be asked to reopen the matter,
during which Secretary Acheson was quite noncommital, and Mr.
Harriman seemed disposed to go back to the President. The question
then arose as to who should go to the President if it were done; and
it was agreed that Mr. Harriman would ask Secretary Johnson to ask
the President for further consideration, since it was he who wanted
it.
Shortly after this, Mr. Harriman again called and said that before he
could call Johnson back, he had talked with the President and found
that the President knew exactly what he was doing and what was in
Mr. Early’s mind. The President had said to Mr. Harriman that he had
dictated what he wanted to go and he still wanted it to go.
