794A.00/8–2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

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466. 1. During conversation with Bajpai SYG MEA on August 24, he referred to previous conversations which he had had on subject Formosa. He said GOI had received telegram from Pannikar, Peking, stating that latter did not believe Peking has immediate intention attack Formosa. Peking was, however, convinced that Chiang Kai-shek [Page 447] and his group were being supported by US in order to give “legal cover for future aggression against mainland”. In Pannikar’s opinion it might be possible to persuade Peking not to press issue Formosa if assurances could be obtained from US on one of following alternatives: (a) After Korean situation was eased, US would withdraw protection Kuomintang remnants in Formosa or (b) if UN would accept Peking as sole representative China or (c) if UK, India and other powers which had recognized Peking could give assurances that they would use their influence to see that US did not aim putting forward Chiang legal cover for aggression against it or at keeping Kuomintang remnants in Formosa permanently under US protection.

2. I told Bajpai I was relieved to hear that in Pannikar’s opinion Peking had no immediate intention to attack Formosa. I would appreciate it if he could let me have exact wording of appropriate passages from Pannikar’s telegram to send to Washington because it was important that in reporting our conversation I be as precise as possible. Bajpai agreed and sent me excerpts later in day.

They read as follow:

“There is no reason to think that China has any immediate intention to attack Taiwan. Apart from all other considerations she feels that her very substantial gains may themselves be jeopardized if a world war now intervenes and confuses issue. Also she realizes that while she has great powers of resistance, she cannot carry on a war against America. Chinese leaders are therefore determined to avoid a war unless they are forced into it by a direct threat to their authority on the mainland.

In my opinion what has caused greatest resentment in China is not so much the military protective measures that America has taken to safeguard her lines of communication to Korea, but the fact that American air and naval forces are giving protection to a clique which claims to de jure government of China and whose representatives under American patronage is representing China in international bodies. I would like to emphasize that Chinese Government are persuaded that ultimate object of America is to bring down People’s Government of China.

They are convinced that Chiang Kai-shek and his group are being maintained by Americans in Taiwan and upheld in SC in order to give legal cover for future aggression against mainland. This may be groundless fear but she can adduce many arguments in support of it, such as alliance with Siam intervention in Indochina, MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan, America’s implacable hostility to Peking Government’s claim to seat in SC, etc.

It will be possible to get China to soft pedal this issue of Taiwan, if assurances were forthcoming from USA on one of following alternatives:

First, that once Korean situation has eased, America will withdraw her protection and not intervene to prevent Chinese Government from invading Taiwan and liquidating Kuomintang remnants. Present position would seem to be that while America has disclaimed all intention of annexing Taiwan, she has declared that determination of [Page 448] island’s future must await either a peaceful settlement with Japan or a decision by UN. Neither of those could be considered satisfactory from point of view of China as deciding voice, in both cases Chinese fear, will be that of USA. They point out that all other Japanese possessions have been appropriated otherwise and assume the question of Taiwan should also be considered to have been finally settled by Cairo Declaration and not be reopened either at peace negotiations or in UN.

Second alternative which will help Chinese to overlook present irregular position in Taiwan is if UN accepts Peking Government as sole representative of China. That will, in Chinese view, minimize chances of America being able to utilize Kuomintang regime in Taiwan as a legal cover for aggression. It may be pointed out that Chiang has been openly proclaiming that he will go back to China as legal government as soon as the third world war breaks out.

Third alternative would be for British, India and other powers which have recognized China to assure her that they will use their influence to see that America does not aim at putting forward Chiang as a legal cover for aggression against her or keep Kuomintang remnants in Taiwan permanently under their protection.”

3. I said that I thought it would be preferable for me not to attempt make other than tentative comments re alternatives suggested. I doubted, however, that US Government would be able to give any assurances re future Formosa at least until policy Peking and its Communist associates in FE would become somewhat more clear. I did not believe US Government would be inclined to give such assurances so long as there was danger that China or Russia might directly or indirectly engage in further acts aggression in FE. It would be difficult militarily for US if, as loyal member UN, it was endeavoring combat Communist aggression in FE while Peking was in possession Formosa. US certainly had no intention move against Chinese mainland so long as Peking Government did not attack Formosa or did not engage in aggression elsewhere in Asia. It was hoped that Peking understood thoroughly that if by acts aggression it should force US into conflict with it, results might be disastrous for it. US had maintained friendly relations with China for many years and valued friendship of Chinese people. Nevertheless in case of Peking aggression US might be compelled to take steps to break Peking’s military power by destruction Chinese communications system and industries which could be used for military purposes.

4. Bajpai said he assumed from Pannikar’s telegram Peking understood this danger. Pannikar had pointed out that Peking realized that it could not carry on war against US. In Bajpai’s opinion Moscow was doing its best persuade Peking to attack Formosa, but Peking was holding back. His opinion was not based on reports from Moscow or Peking, but from his knowledge of way Russians [operate?]. It was [Page 449] objective India prevent Peking from following line desired by Soviet Government.

5. I said that with regard to other two alternatives suggested in Pannikar’s telegram there was little for me to say since they called for action either by UN or by various powers which had entered into relations with China. It seemed likely that at least so long as fighting continued in Korea, US Government would continue to oppose admission Peking into UN.

6. Bajpai said GOI hoped that it would be possible for US to give assurances suggested in first alternative and asked if in my opinion it would be helpful for Nehru send special message to Secretary of State on subject. I said I thought it would be preferable at least in present stage for us to handle this matter more informally. I would not like to encourage PM to make suggestions to Secretary of State which US might find itself unable accept. I promised, however, to forward views expressed by him to Department.

Henderson