611.93B/8–1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

390. ReDeptel 230, August 11.1

1.
During conversation with Bajpai this morning on another subject I said that I would like to tell him in confidence re certain exchanges that have been taking place between this mission and Shakapba. Some time ago when Shakapba was in New Delhi he had asked me orally what Tibet had already asked the US Government previously through other channels, that is, whether US Government would be willing to render assistance to Tibet in event of unprovoked military invasion by Communist China. I had forwarded his inquiry to Washington and had recently received reply which I had sent to Shakapba. Reply had been to general effect that if Tibet should be invaded by Communist China or if it was under active threat of such invasion US would be willing to send certain amount military equipment to Tibet if Tibetan Government could arrange for transit such equipment across countries through which it must pass in order to reach Tibet. I told Bajpai that I thought it would be well for GOI to have this information for background in case it should be approached by Tibetan Government.
2.
Bajpai said he was grateful that I had given him this information; that he felt it might be preferable for GOI take no action until, or unless, it was approached by GOI [Tibetan Government?]2
3.
Referring to conversation August 10 (Embtel 343, August 11) Bajpai said that GOI had received message from Panikkar stating latter had approached Peiping officials re Tibet expressing the hope of India that Peiping would not endeavor solve Tibet problem by use [Page 441] force. His suggestions had been received courteously but no reply had as yet been made to him.3

Department pass London; sent Department 390, repeated info London 15.

Henderson
  1. See footnote 1 to telegram 880, August 12, from London, p. 430.
  2. At the suggestion of the Department of State, the Embassy in New Delhi saw to it that the Tibetan Mission, at that time in Calcutta, was informed of the fact that the Government of India had been told of the United States offer of military aid to Tibet (793B.00/8–1850; 8–2050; S–2950).
  3. In telegram 343, Ambassador Henderson informed the Department that Bajpai had told him that Panikkar had been instructed to deliver to the Government of the People’s Republic of China a message along the following lines:

    GOI has proved on various occasions its friendly feeling for Peoples Government of China. It had gone so far in this respect at to create ill will against it in certain circles. It was hopeful China and India together could promote world peace. If China should now launch fresh armies of invasion into Tibet, or elsewhere, it might well be contributing to new world war. India particularly anxious that differences between China and Tibet be solved by other than armed conflict. It therefore urged China not to invade Tibet. Stories to effect that Government Tibet was conspiring with British or Americans untrue. Tibetans had no contacts with British or Americans. Only foreign representative in Lhasa was Indian. If China insisted on making unprovoked attack on Tibet, India might be compelled revise its opinion re peaceful intentions China and even take different view re Chinese admission to UN.”

    Mr. Henderson then made the following concluding observations in his telegram:

    “Bajpai when outlining nature of message to me had no notes in front of him. He was, therefore, talking rather loosely. I am inclined to opinion his description of message reflected what lay behind it rather than what was actually incorporated in it. It is difficult to believe that after Nehru has gone so far in basing GOI’s foreign policy on friendship with Communist China, he would jeopardize such gains as he had made by sending message so strong character. Regardless wording message, I am convinced Panikkar has been instructed to do his utmost to persuade Peiping not to invade Tibet. If Peiping launches invasion in near future, Nehru may decide that he has been staking too much on hopes of Peiping’s tractability and friendship.” (691.93/8–1150)