795.00/8–850
Extracts of a Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, With General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950
[For the first portion of the memorandum, dealing with Korea, see volume VII, page 542. The source text is a typewritten copy of notes dictated by Mr. Harriman on August 20, 1950, bearing the following note at the end of the text:
“This copy (no carbons) was made from rough, largely unedited notes dictated by Mr. Harriman. Some liberties have consequently been taken with the format and the spelling of the original. The wording, however, is not changed, except that a few queries of clarifications have been inserted in brackets.”
Indications of ellipsis and bracketed interpolations, as printed here, are present in the source text. A large part of the memorandum is also printed in Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), pages 349–353.]
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Formosa and Chiang. MacArthur gave me his memo of June 15 [sic]1 on the importance of Formosa from a strategic standpoint in the defensive system of the United States in the Far East. … For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way he believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President’s position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction. He has a strange idea that we should back anybody who will [Page 428] fight Communism, even though he could not give an argument why the Generalissimo’s fighting Communists would be a contribution towards the effective dealing with the Communists in China. I pointed out to him the basic conflict of interest between the U.S. and the Generalissimo’s position as to the future of Formosa; namely, the preventing of Formosa’s falling into hostile hands. Perhaps the best way would be through the medium of the UN to establish an independent government. Chiang, on the other hand, had only the burning ambition to use Formosa as a steppingstone for his re-entry to the mainland. MacArthur recognized that this ambition could not be fulfilled, and yet thought it might be a good idea to let him land and get rid of him that way. He did not seem to consider the liability that our support of Chiang on such a move would be to us in the East. I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability, and the great danger of a split in the unity of the United Nations on the Chinese-Communist–Formosa policies; the attitude of the British, Nehru and such countries as Norway, who although stalwart in their determination to resist Russian invasion, did not want to stir up trouble elsewhere. I pointed out the great importance of maintaining UN unity among the friendly countries, and the complications that might result from any missteps in dealing with China and Formosa.
Communist China. MacArthur would never recognize the Chinese Communists, even to the use of the veto in seating the Communists. He believes it would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse-tung’s Government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective: the splitting of the present supporters of Mao Tse-tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements. He does not believe the Chinese want to come under Russian domination. They have historically opposed invasion from the North. We should be more aggressive than we have been so far in creating stronger dissension within China. … MacArthur has not developed any plan of action in China. He believes there are great potentialities.
I emphasized the importance of getting evidence on the participation of the Chinese Communists in supporting the North Korean attack and present operations. There will be considerable support in seating the Chinese Communists at the next meeting of the Assembly. I explained that if we could obtain real evidence of direct support for the North Koreans, this might be the reason by which we could prevent the seating of the Communists on the moral issue involved.
In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both throughout the world and in the East, of whatever moves we make in our position with the Generalissimo in Formosa and with respect to China. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo; he has confidence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, [Page 429] but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.
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Formosa. He has sent a military mission under General Fox2 to Formosa to find out the equipment needs of the National troops; it is already clear that they need barbed wire, reinforcing bars for concrete beach defenses, some additional motor transport, so that a defense can be worked out in depth with mobility for the reserves. He is quite satisfied that the military appropriations already available will be sufficient to take care of whatever they need. He has no intention of recommending any military equipment for anything other than the defense of the island, which in no sense would increase the ability of the national army to invade the continent. He regrets [that] the Joint Chiefs’ recommendation to permit Chiang’s airplanes to attack the concentration of troops and particularly the airstrips on the mainland [?has been overruled], but accepts the decision and will use every means to stop the Generalissimo in [?from] sending out his planes, barring “shooting them down”. He is satisfied the Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time. His intelligence and photographs show no undue concentration of forces, although they are building airstrips. He is convinced that the 7th Fleet plus the air jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B–29’s and other aircraft at his disposal, can destroy any attempt which may be made. He believes that the Chinese National troops can be organized to fight effectively and destroy any Communist troops which might get through. Should the Chinese Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far Eastern history, and would strengthen favorably morale in the East. He does not believe the reports that have been made to Washington of the bad situation within Formosa. He believes, however, that it can be improved, both politically and economically, and hopes ECA will continue its economic work so that Formosa can become increasingly important in trade relations with Japan and in the improvement of the economic life of the Formosans. He explained that his observations were of course preliminary, and he might amend them when he had more information, but he thought there was reasonable political stability, the Assembly of 22 members now included 18 Formosans and only four mainland Chinese. The Budget had been balanced. Currency has been stabilized at 10 to 1 for the dollar. There was only a small black market. Wages and prices had been stabilized. Schools and the judicial system were working normally. Governor Wu (formerly Mayor of Shanghai) has perhaps been largely responsible for [Page 430] improved conditions. People are well fed and clothed and housed, perhaps as well now as they were under the Japanese. There was an air of tranquillity on the island. He considered the ECA work had been good and should be continued. We should see that the distribution got to the people, avoiding, as far as possible, graft.
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Formosa. He spoke about the problem of the island of Quemoy. close to the mainland. The Generalissimo claims to have 70,000 men there which is important from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but has no value to the U.S. The Generalissimo considers Formosa part of China. MacArthur didn’t see any evidence of a desire for independence so far, even among the Formosans he talked to, but perhaps that was natural at this stage. There were no soldiers on the street and no curfew. …
MacArthur feels that we have not improved our position by kicking Chiang around, and hoped that the President would do something to relieve the strain that existed between the State Department and the Generalissimo. He suggested the President might reiterate his previous statements by threatening the Chinese Communists that he would withdraw in addition to [?withdraw his objections to Chiang’s] attacking the airfields on the mainland if the Chinese [Communists] continued to do this work, or to build up their positions. I told him that if he wanted to make that recommendation to the President it was up to him, but I assured him that I would strongly recommend to the President against his doing so. I reemphasized the overpowering importance of UN unity and that this would only give further trouble and give the Russians a chance to develop an entering wedge.
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