693.93B/8–750: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
302. 1. Substance of instructions contained top secret Deptels 48 July 11,1 104 July 22 and following separate message2 was conveyed by Embassy Counselor Steere to Shakapba. Tibetan representative morning August 4 Calcutta with Consul General Derry and Linn present.
2. Conversation opened with allusion to Shakapba’s call at Embassy New Delhi June 16, and to his inquiry as to whether US Government would render assistance to Tibet in event of Chinese Communist military invasion. Steere outlined my reply at that time to his inquiry (Embtel 887 June 18)3 recalling particularly my remarks re difficulties of such aid and re fact that US had given aid to certain countries which were resisting Communist subversion and aggression. He said that Shakapba’s inquiry had been reported to Washington and that reply had now been received. He was authorized to state that if Tibet intended to resist Communist aggression and needed help US Government was prepared to assist in procuring material and would finance [Page 425] such aid. He added that US considered it important that prompt steps be taken now as it would be extremely difficult make aid available in time if Tibet were to wait until invasion had started.
3. Shakapba expressed gratification at US reply, and inquired whether it meant that US in event Chinese Communist invasion would send troops and planes to Tibet’s aid. Steere answered that US reply pertained to war materials and finance, and explained that US was not at war with Chinese Communists, did not have enough troops to meet its own needs, and besides it seemed to us that Tibet, with advantages of terrain it enjoyed, needed arms more than it did men.
4. Shakapba said Tibet authorities felt able deal with Communist subversion (through Panchen Lama) but not with Chinese Communist invasion in force unless they had foreign help. Said Tibet was worried about attitude of GOI, intimating they feared India might come to some understanding with Chinese Communists at Tibet’s expense. Steere replied we thought India did not want Chinese Communists in Tibet on borders of India and would not go into Communist camp; he pointed out that GOI had recently given Tibet considerable military aid and that it would be difficult for GOI to refuse Tibet authorities both additional aid and cooperation in securing foreign aid in event GOI could not spare material.
5. Steere then outlined procedure laid down by Department, stressing and repeating to assure no misunderstanding, namely, that Tibet should first ask GOI for additional aid and if refused then ask GOI friendly cooperation by permitting passage of aid it wanted to secure abroad. He emphasized essentiality Indian cooperation for effective assistance be delivered Tibet, and necessity Tibet make approach GOI without any indication of US assurance of aid. Shakapba expressed understanding of position, agreed to inform Lhasa and said that about fifteen days would be needed for him to receive reply.
6. Re Khan cooperation: Shakapba said that it could be counted upon if there was assurance foreign aid. By “foreign aid” we believed Tibetans had in mind assurances of aid from GOI, UK and US, although they were reluctant to specify. Impression was gained that they might welcome more foreign technicians and advisers, possibly as an accretion to Indian military mission at Gyangtse.
7. Department’s views in paragraph 2, Deptel 104 that not desirable ask details specific needs were followed rather than “following separate message” since Linn had already asked Tibetans for detailed list needs in connection with request directed to him in June. Tibetans referred his request and said still awaiting answer. Shakapba could say nothing definite but promised to inquire re radio transmitter EMC.
8. Tibet delegate showed much interest in possibility of air lift to Tibet, and said authorities could prepare landing fields at Lhasa, Gartok and Chumdo. They inquired whether planes could not take [Page 426] off from Dacca and Rawalpindi (Pakistan), Burma or some other points if India not cooperative. They were not encouraged in these ideas.
9. Re Communist China: Shakapba said Tibet National Assembly had decided Tibet in no circumstances would agree Chinese suzerainty. Said Tibet tactics all along had been to play for time. That was why they had wanted to go Hong Kong. He intimated they had rather welcomed British refusal visas. They were now waiting for Chinese Communist Ambassador to arrive India and would endeavor contact him. In fact, they had initiated first steps that day in Calcutta as a cover for their meeting with us.
10. Steere’s mention of Tibetan resistance to aggression in conjunction with US readiness to give aid, was not stated as a condition of aid, but developed naturally from allusion to my remarks to Shakapba in June. We believe that Tibetan frame of mind is one that links resistance so definitely with military aid they must be discussed in separable parts of the same problem. We believe that it would be a great mistake to give aid without some assurance of Tibetan intent to use it.
11. Bajpai, Secretary General MEA on August 3 expressed to me concern at report from Hong Kong to effect General Liu had announced time had come for liberation Tibet. He criticized British for failure to permit Tibetans to go to Hong Kong to talk with Peiping representatives and said he was calling in Chinese Chargé d’Affaires to express concern at threatening developments and to suggest talks with Tibetans before any invasion should begin.