171. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay) to the
National Security Council1
NSC 5412
Washington, March 15,
1954.
COVERT OPERATIONS
REFERENCES
- A.
- Memo for the Statutory Members of the NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “The NSC 10 Series”, dated March 3,
19542
- B.
- NSC 10/23
- C.
- NSC 10/54
The President has this date approved the enclosed National Security
Council directive on the subject, as submitted by the reference
memorandum and adopted by the other statutory members of the National
Security Council, and directs its implementation by all executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government concerned, as indicated
therein.
Accordingly, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the enclosure, NSC 10/2, NSC 10/5 and certain provisions relating thereto of the
President’s memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, supplementing Executive Order
10483,5 are hereby
superseded.
It is requested that special security precautions
be observed in the handling of the enclosed directive and that
access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute
need-to-know basis.
It is further requested that all copies of the
reference memorandum be returned to this office for destruction
upon receipt of this report.
[Page 476]
Enclosure7
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON COVERT
OPERATIONS
- 1.
- The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the
vicious covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments,
parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and
defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other
powers of the free world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2 and 10/5, that,
in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the
overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government should be
supplemented by covert operations.
- 2.
- The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged by
the National Security Council with conducting espionage and
counterespionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed
desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency
for covert operations, but, subject to directives from the
NSC, to place the
responsibility for them on the Central Intelligence Agency and
correlate them with espionage and counterespionage operations
under the over-all control of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
- 3.
- The NSC has determined that
such covert operations shall to the greatest extent practicable,
in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and taking into
account the risk of war, be designed to:
- a.
- Create and exploit troublesome problems for
International Communism, impair relations between the
USSR and Communist
China and between them and their satellites, complicate
control within the USSR, Communist China and between them and
their satellites, and retard the growth of the military
and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.
- b.
- Discredit the prestige and ideology of International
Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and
other elements.
- c.
- Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly
or indirectly responsive to Communist control to achieve
dominant power in a free world country.
- d.
- Reduce International Communist control over any areas
of the world.
- e.
- Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of
the peoples and nations of the free world, accentuate,
wherever possible, the identity of interest between such
peoples and nations and the United States as well as
favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely
advocating or believing in the advancement of such
mutual interests,
[Page 477]
and increase the capacity and will
of such peoples and nations to resist International
Communism.
- f.
- In accordance with established policies and to the
extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by
International Communism, develop underground resistance
and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and
ensure availability of those forces in the event of war,
including wherever practicable provisions of a base upon
which the military may expand these forces in time of
war within acting theaters of operations as well as
provision for stay-behind assets and escape and evasion
facilities.
- 4.
- Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby
directs that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for:
- a.
- Ensuring, through designated representatives of the
Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that
covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner
consistent with United States foreign and military
policies and with overt activities, and consulting with
and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating
Board and other departments or agencies as
appropriate.
- b.
- Informing, through appropriate channels and on a
need-to-know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government,
both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and
military representatives), of such operations as will
affect them.
- 5.
- In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following
provisions shall apply to wartime covert operations:
- a.
- Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active
theaters of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces
are engaged in combat operations will be drawn up with
the assistance of the Department of Defense and will be
in consonance with and complementary to approved war
plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b.
- Covert operations in active theaters of war and any
other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat
operations will be conducted under such command and
control relationships as have been or may in the future
be approved by the Department of Defense.
- 6.
- As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be
understood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this
directive which are so planned and executed that any U.S.
Government responsibility for them is not evident to
unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government
can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.
Specifically, such operations shall include any covert
activities related to: propaganda; political action; economic
warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states or groups including
assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and
refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and
anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free
world; deception plans and operations; and all activities
compatible with this
[Page 478]
directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations
shall not include: armed conflict by recognized military forces,
espionage and counterespionage, nor cover and deception for
military operations.
- 7.
- This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2 and NSC
10/5. Subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the heading “Additional
Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on page 1 of the
President’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National
Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483, are
superseded by the following provisions:
- a.
- Except as the President otherwise directs, the members
of the Operations Coordinating Board shall, under
appropriate security arrangements, be advised in advance
of major programs involving covert operations related to
National Security Council policies.
- b.
- The designated representatives of the Secretaries of
State and Defense referred to in paragraph 4-a above
shall keep the Board Members of their respective
departments advised as to matters on which they are
consulted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and
which have been or are to be referred to the Operations
Coordinating Board.
- c.
- The Operations Coordinating Board will be the normal
channel for securing coordination of support among the
Departments of State and Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
