Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

147. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Vandenberg)¹

Washington, May 20, 1953.

SUBJECT

• Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wing Program

1. In the fall of 1950, you informed this Agency² that, in anticipation of CIA requirements for support of covert operations, the U.S. Air Force was organizing several Special Operational Wings. At that time, it was contemplated that a total of seven such wings, which are now designated Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wings, would be organized. About a year later, the magnitude of this program was reconsidered in the light of over-all manpower limitations and the number of wings was reduced from seven to four. We now understand that consideration is being given to a still further curtailment which will reduce the number of wings to two, and that as a part of this plan the 500th ARC Wing will move from Wheelus Field, Libya, to Molesworth Air Force Base, England, and the 581st ARC Wing from Clark Field, R. F., to Okinawa.

2. We are, of course, cognizant of the many problems which confront the USAF at this time. However, the reduction of the number of ARC Wings to only two has serious implications upon our plans both for current operations and in the event of a “hot” war.

3. During the “cold war,” CIA has a very substantial and growing requirement for support in the serial transport, handling and storage of its matériel and supplies. This Agency depends upon the ARC Wings to furnish a major part of such support. Manifestly, full utilization of the capabilities of the ARC Wings cannot be achieved rapidly, but it is believed that a good beginning toward such full utilization has been made and we are looking forward to a continuing expansion of our joint operations.

4. The wartime mission of the ARC Wings is stated to be: (1) air support of Unconventional Warfare Operations; and (2) the preparation and dissemination of Psychological Warfare materials. While no formal agreement exists that the Wings will be available to support CIA covert operations, this Agency has always assumed that they would be, and war plans have been made on that basis. These war plans require the availability of effective air support facilities on D-Day for the immediate support of guerrilla and resistance operations. Following D-Day, there will be an increasing requirement for this type support to meet war plans jointly developed by the CIA and the JCS. As I am sure you are aware, air support of covert operations requires that the personnel be highly trained in the peculiar techniques involved and have the specialized equipment to implement these techniques.

5. If our understanding of the planned reduction to two wings is correct, it appears to us that improved utilization of the capabilities of the ARC Wings under both “cold war” and “hot war” conditions, could be effected if storage and packaging facilities could be retained in the Tripoli area, thus giving greater flexibility to the support which the 580th ARC Wing could render to us in the European-Near Eastern-African area. In effect, therefore, the Tripoli facilities would be a satellite of the permanent base at Molesworth. Similarly, in the Far East we would very much like to see comparable satellite facilities maintained at Clark Field because of the vital necessity of maintaining an adequate base in the sensitive Southeast Asia area. Our objective, which we believe is apparent, is to insure the maximum utility of ARC by the maintenance of additional packing and storage facilities at Tripoli and at Clark. These facilities would give ARC, and in turn ARC, greatly increased flexibility and would enhance the operational utility of these organizations. By maintaining these additional packing and storage facilities, the reduction in the ARC program from four to two wings, in our opinion, would be minimized.

6. For obvious reasons, it is impossible for this Agency to predict accurately the time and place where ARC Wing facilities will be most needed. However, in an endeavor to exploit to the utmost the capabilities of the two wings to give maximum support to the conduct of covert operations, the possibility of creating satellite facilities as outlined above is offered. While the movement of aircraft presents no major problem, the transfer of substantial amounts of supplies and matériel is very difficult to achieve, especially so under wartime conditions.

7. Request that USAF units capable of rendering the above support be included in the over-all Air Force program.

8. In the event that you feel that this memorandum should have been addressed to the Secretary of Defense, request you so advise.

Allen W. Dulles

³

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 8. Top Secret; Security Information. Cleared by Wisner and Cabell.
2. This communication has not been further identified.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.