145. Memorandum From Robert P.
Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Under
Secretary of State (Matthews)1
Washington, January 27, 1953.
There is forwarded to you herewith two memoranda, both dated yesterday,
on the general subject of the secret intelligence activities and the
covert operations abroad of the CIA. The
first memorandum, signed by me, is designed to provide background
material and to set in the proper framework the second memorandum, which
is signed by Outerbridge Horsey and prepared by all
of us in this Office (Horsey,
Berry, Strong,
McFadden and myself).2
[Page 400]
The basic purpose of these memoranda is to raise fundamental problems
with regard to the CIA operation abroad
and the guidance and control of these activities to insure that they
shall be closely geared in with our overall strategy and political
objectives. The memorandum signed by Horsey has
been shown to Messrs. Armstrong
and Howe, who have indicated to us
that they are in general agreement with the analysis plus the
conclusions and recommendations which flow therefrom. Armstrong’s office, of course, has a
large interest in the subject of the relations between this Department
and the CIA, and I am sure you will want
to bring Armstrong and Howe into any discussions based on this
material.
The memorandum signed by me I have drafted in a manner and with the idea
in mind that it might be read and discussed in due course by General Smith and Mr. Allen W. Dulles.3 I am sure you will have your own ideas as to the timing
and manner in which this might be accomplished if you agree with me that
it should be. It would also be my suggestion that these two memoranda,
together with the material referred to in them, might very well be
placed before the William H.
Jackson Committee,4 which will study the psychological warfare effect of
the government.
Annex 1
Washington, January 26, 1953.
Memorandum From Robert P.
Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy
Under Secretary of State (Matthews)6
SUBJECT
- The Department of State and the CIA
[Page 401]
There is forwarded to you herewith a memorandum dated January 26,
19537 which has
been prepared in this office by Messrs. Horsey,
Berry, Strong,
McFadden and myself. In this connection, I
refer to my memorandum addressed to you on December 17, 1952 with
particular reference to the so-called Kaji case in Tokyo as well as
to my memorandum addressed to you on December 31, 1952 entitled
“CIA Activities Directed Against
Poland”.8 In the former
memorandum I suggested that before my departure I should write a
memorandum for you embodying certain conclusions I have reached as a
result of four years close working relationship with OPC of CIA. The memorandum forwarded to you today endeavors to
pose important problems which have recently arisen as a result of
CIA covert activities in the
field which have caused, are still causing, and will probably
continue to cause serious embarrassment to the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations. In the memorandum referred to in the previous
sentence, my colleagues and I have endeavored to pose the basic
questions with regard to Department of State and CIA relationships which we believe the
new administration will desire to deal with in the immediate future
as they relate to the presumed new policy of more “dynamism” with
regard to the conduct of the cold war.
The kernel of the problem, as I see it, is that the operations
abroad, in the field of secret intelligence as well as secret
operations, have increasingly tended to be less and less geared into
what I understand to be the present overall strategy of the United
States in the management of its foreign relations. Perhaps a better
way of stating it would be to say that CIA covert activities lack sufficient policy guidance
and control, the inevitable result being that such activities, on
occasion, are not in the national interest nor do they support our
overall policy objectives. The memorandum of January 26, 1953
endeavors to meet this problem head on in the hope that CIA activities abroad may be restudied
on the National Security Council level and perhaps a new look be
taken by President Eisenhower
himself.
I set forth below certain thoughts and conclusions I have arrived at
which might be helpful in providing information of a background and
historical nature relating to the organization, growth and present
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. These observations
relate primarily to OPC of CIA.
[Page 402]
I. Political Background—1949 and
1950
In the autumn of 1949, OPC of CIA was a relatively small and compact
unit within the framework of but somewhat independently situated in
the CIA organization. It was busily
preparing to set up mechanisms through which it could engage in
so-called psychological and political warfare by covert means as
defined in NSC 10/2.9 In
September, 1949, the Russians produced their first atomic explosion
several years ahead of what I understand to be the best calculated
estimates. Soviet political warfare on a world-wide scale was
constantly being stepped up to subvert, divide, weaken and
eventually control large and important areas of the free world in
which the U.S. had a vital stake. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean
Communists, under Russian control, crossed one of the frontiers of
the free world by military force. The Communist guerrilla attacks
against the French and the Vietnamese were assuming the proportions
of a major war; Soviet pressure against Iran was increasing;
Communist guerrilla warfare in Malaya was being stepped up; the
Chinese Communists were taking over Tibet; the Communists were
succeeding in Guatemala, etc., etc. Tito’s
Yugoslavia was under constant menace of a military attack by the
Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.
All of these facts produced within the United States Government and
among the American people a sense of urgency to prepare for the
possibility of additional Communist attacks against the free world
which might lead to an all out military conflict, including an
attack against the United States. We started our military build-up
on a vast scale during the last part of 1950. During this period,
both within the government as well as outside, there suddenly
developed an intense interest in so-called psychological or
political warfare. This caused considerable pressure to be exerted
against OPC of CIA immediately to engage in
psychological and political warfare activities by covert means. At
the same time, exceedingly strong pressure was exerted upon OPC of CIA by the Defense Establishment to accomplish in the
shortest possible time those responsibilities set forth in NSC 10/2 relating to preparing for
resistance activities and guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines
in case of war. You will recall that during the last part of 1950
powerful elements within the Military Establishment considered that
perhaps the Russians in 1954 or 1955 would attain a degree of
military preparation and atomic capability which might lead the
leaders in the Kremlin either to endeavor to
obtain their objectives by the use of overt military force on a
grand scale, or the Kremlin would exert the
threat of force and subversion to obtain control of strategic
portions of
[Page 403]
the
non-Communist world. This would necessarily lead to such reactions
upon our part that the danger of an all out conflict would indeed be
very great. Underlying these considerations, was the over-riding
fact that China was added to the Communist world and Chinese
Communist military forces threatened Southeast Asia.
II. Expansion of OPC
The objective world situation late in 1950 and early in 1951 (or at
least the subjective reaction thereto on the part of the Government
and the people of the United States) and the pressures referred to
above led to a vast expansion of OPC
of CIA. The emphasis understandably
given by the Military to prepare for war and the pressures to
organize behind-the-lines resistance, led to constantly increasing
emphasis within the OPC on
preparations for a hot war. (In this connection, I refer to my
memorandum of December 31, 1952 with regard to [less than 1 line not declassified] activities in Poland.)
OPC tended to become more and
more of a military and para-military planning agency. At the same
time, OPC was endeavoring to meet
the demands and pressures for increased activity in the field of
covert political action. I believe that the end result of this
situation was that OPC tried to do
too much in too little time with inadequate personnel. I believe
that Mr. Frank G. Wisner
would agree with this estimate. I may say that qualified personnel
in this country for OPC planning and
operations is extraordinarily difficult to come by and difficult to
train.
Some unhappy results of this haste inevitably followed:
[7 paragraphs (74 lines) not declassified]
III. Learning the Hard
Way
For the reasons stated above, it is my conclusion that these failures
of the CIA are not exclusively
CIA failures, but are rather American failures attributable, to sum up, to
the following factors:
- 1.
- The American characteristic of impatience and “wanting to
get the job done”. The American belief that if enough money,
personnel and effort are applied, everything is possible and
can be accomplished either instanter or certainly within a
year or two.
- 2.
- The CIA approach during
the past three years has been far too heavily influenced by
the thinking within and without the Government that we had
very little time. It is my personal view that NSC 6810 gave
expression to and reflected much of this thinking.
- 3.
- The role of covert operations in the conduct of foreign
policy has been exaggerated. Quietly, securely, and expertly
handled political
[Page 404]
and intelligence operations can undoubtedly make a valuable
and, on rare occasions, a crucial contribution to the
national security, but only if such activities are of a
highly professional character. They can never “win the cold
war”, but only make a modest but significant
contribution.
- 4.
-
The CIA, as General Smith himself
has stated repeatedly, has tried to take on too much in
too little time. CIA has
obtained the services of a great number of highly
talented, loyal and high caliber Americans. Many of
them, however, have the characteristics mentioned in
paragraph No. 1 above. In the medium levels of CIA there are many persons
who consider the Department of State to be negative and
timid. These persons over-estimate the role of special
operations by clandestine methods and under-rate the
difficulties and pitfalls in our dealings with both our
allies and our opponents. The Congressional Record, issue of January 14,
1953, No. 6, page A–157, contains the following
statement from a study of “psychological strategy”
prepared by former Congressman O.K.
Armstrong:
“High success in the performances of its [the
CIA’s]11
important tasks, has been due in largest measure
to the leadership and direction of Bedell Smith and
Allen
Dulles. Major handicap, according to a
summary of interviews by key
personnel is due to lack of coordination, or
more accurately cooperation, by some echelons of
the State Department in
following recommendations made by CIA for the security of
the nation.” (Italics
supplied)
IV. Observations and
Suggestions
[11 paragraphs (59 lines) not
declassified]
V. Conclusions
The foregoing, I fear, may sound perhaps captiously critical and
negative insofar as the CIA is
concerned. I hope that it is not taken in this sense. There is a
great deal of light in the picture.
My own feeling is that the CIA has
made remarkable progress during the past five years in perhaps the
most tricky, sensitive and delicate of all governmental operations
demanding the highest degree of sophistication and experience. It
takes many, many years to build up what we may term a covert
apparatus. The Russians have had thirty-five years experience. We
have had five. The only way to learn the intelligence business is to
engage in it. The CIA has been
actively engaging in this business under the enormous pressures
referred to in previous sections of this memorandum. Glaring
mistakes have been made, but solid accomplishments have already been
achieved. It is my belief that the senior officials of the CIA are entirely aware of the
deficiencies
[Page 405]
of the
organization in its field activities, and remedial action is being
taken to tighten up and increase security. The training and
indoctrination process has been vastly improved and men who have
shown no talent for the intelligence business have been
released.
The CIA organization has made
progress in recruiting, training and seasoning a group of highly
talented men who are coming to consider American Intelligence their
life career. Amateurism is giving place to an increasing degree of
professionalism. It is being realized that an intelligence bull is
misplaced in the world china shop of 1953 and that a cat and later a
soft-treading leopard is a more suitable and effective animal. I
believe that a greater degree of discipline has been established and
that there is a real understanding growing up within the secret
intelligence activities and special operations fields that
intelligence is not a policy-creating function within the Government
and can never be. Although there are still some officers within the
CIA who have a feeling that
intelligence operations abroad are an end in themselves and should
be conducted independently of and without interference from
policy-making and implementing American officials. I believe this
must and will be corrected with time and a greater degree of
discipline in government. The U.S. responsibility is such that
amateurism, free-wheeling and heavy-handedness cannot be permitted
in 1953. Our friends and allies must have confidence not only in the
goodness of our intentions and objectives but also in our judgment,
discretion and methods. Our dangerous adversaries turn our mistakes
against us with telling effect, and this does not make for the
confidence in our leadership which we must have to exercise it
effectively in the crucial years to come.
One more observation: If we comport ourselves in the international
arena as though we are urgently preparing for a perhaps inevitable
conflict with the Soviet world, we add fuel to fears and inspire
counteraction which increase the danger of just such a conflict.
This is a most difficult problem—to prepare for war to prevent
it—but we must somehow solve it in the next few years to come.
[Page 406]
Annex 2
Washington, January 26, 1953.
Memorandum From Outerbridge Horsey
of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State
(Matthews)13
SUBJECT
- The Department of State and CIA Operations Abroad
Problem:
To review CIA–State relationships, in
secret intelligence and in covert operations, with the double
objective (a) of insuring that all
CIA field activities are of optimum
value in the prosecution of United States foreign policy objectives
and (b) of diminishing the risk of results harmful to those
objectives.
Discussion:
Recent integration within CIA, at
headquarters and in the field, of the two main fields, “secret
intelligence” and “covert operations,” emphasizes their
interdependence. Even in the previous state of more or less
water-tight separation of the two activities, either might have affected, and indeed did affect, the
conduct of foreign policy.
“Secret intelligence” is used herein to describe what NSCID–514 defines as
“all organized federal espionage operations outside the United
States … for the collection of foreign intelligence information … in
connection with the national security …” (Counter-espionage is
excluded from this discussion) Secret intelligence activities are
conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, he has
responsibility for coordinating covert and overt intelligence
activities. The senior U.S. representative in each country has the
responsibility for coordinating overt
intelligence collection activities, but there is no recognition in
theory or in practice of the fact that secret
intelligence activities can affect the conduct of foreign policy. By
law the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. In general this has in practice resulted in the
withholding of detailed information on secret
[Page 407]
intelligence activities in both the
planning and execution stages. The Department and Chiefs of Mission
in the field are briefed from time to time on the broad lines of
secret intelligence activities in a particular country. The positive
intelligence information developed by CIA is furnished, in some measure and with varying
degrees of promptness to Chiefs of Mission in the field, and in
greater measure and considerably more delay to the Department in
Washington. Occasionally, CIA will
seek policy guidance before or while a particular operation is being
conducted, but it does not necessarily follow the advice given; nor
is it obliged to do so. In general, information on intelligence
collection operations themselves is not sufficiently specific or
timely to permit effective policy guidance, even if the Department
were required to provide such guidance, which it is not.
NSC 5015 calls
for “closer liaison” between CIA and
State and for strengthening the “guidance” received by CIA from intelligence consumers, but
the context of these references makes it clear that they relate to
the nature of the intelligence to be collected and not to the policy
implications of the conduct of intelligence collection activities.
Any operations in a foreign country, however, are bound to have
implications for the overt conduct of relations with the country
concerned. Indeed they can have very serious results, leading to the
undermining of the stability of a friendly government, the loss of
public confidence in the U.S. or giving substance to Soviet
anti-U.S. charges. The judgment as to whether and in what manner a
covert proceeding of any kind is likely to affect overall objectives
in the country concerned is one which in the final analysis can be
made only by the agency responsible for the conduct of overall
policy.
The British meet the problem of political guidance on secret
intelligence activities, as well as the larger problem of
coordinating all other foreign intelligence activities, by giving an
inter-agency committee, of which the Foreign Office representative
is automatically Chairman, close policy control over the entire
foreign intelligence effort of the U.K. The MI–6 man in the field, although he belongs to an
independent organization whose chief reports directly to the Prime
Minister, is given the specific responsibility of clearing with the
Ambassador when his activities are likely to affect the conduct of
overt relations. The MI–6 man is able
to discern the likelihood of political consequences because he is
part of a small highly-trained professional corps, and because
awareness of political factors is an essential qualification. A
serious failure to do so costs him his job.
[Page 408]
The immense range of CIA’s secret
intelligence activities, the paucity of trained personnel with good
political judgment, the extent of our involvement in many foreign
countries and the serious results of mistakes, would seem to require
that the authority of the Secretary of State and of the principal
U.S. representatives in each foreign country be extended in some
measure into the “secret intelligence” field. This is all the more
necessary because of the recent merging of the “secret intelligence”
and “covert operations” functions within CIA. Since the necessity of continuous political
guidance in the second category is unquestioned, such extension of
the Department’s authority would seem to be the logical corollary of
that merging.
The exclusion of the Department and its representatives in the field
from any right to full knowledge of what is going on in the
intelligence field, and of giving policy guidance thereon, has been
applied in practice not only to the subject matter of NSCID–5 but also to the preliminary
or fact-finding stages of “covert operations.” (The latter are
defined for the present purpose as activities authorized by NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/5.)16 These fact-finding
operations can, however, have just as serious political
consequences, for good or for ill, as the actual operations
themselves. Moreover, it is hard to draw the dividing line in a
given case between the “intelligence” phase and the “operations”
phase when a “project” is submitted through the joint machinery for
clearance under paragraph 3(d)(1) of NSC 10/2. And CIA is
the agency which under the present system draws the dividing
line.
As to “covert operations” themselves, NSC 10/2 of course recognized their intimate
relationship to the overt conduct of policy. This relationship was
emphasized by providing that the Secretary of State should nominate
the man initially in charge of these operations. NSC 10/2 said further that covert
operations should be “planned and conducted in a manner consistent
with U.S. foreign and military policies and with covert activities”
but it left with the Director of Central Intelligence the
responsibility for insuring that they were so conducted. Committee
machinery for inter-departmental clearance was established, with the
right of appeal to the NSC itself in
case of serious differences.
The very nature of covert operations, the necessary use of a separate
communications system and considerations of security in practice
leave the initiative largely in the hands of CIA Headquarters and CIA representatives in the field. Because of lack of
knowledge, the policy makers are often precluded from giving the
necessary guidance. Because many of the questions involved do not
concern two of the members (JCS and
Defense) of the Committee of “OPC
Consultants,” because
[Page 409]
a
number of personal relationships between CIA and State opposite numbers have grown up, and
because it is not always used by CIA, this Committee machinery has not been fully effective.
In spite of full cooperation at the top levels of CIA on policy coordination in
accordance with the letter and spirit of NSC 10/2 there has been a tendency toward
free-wheeling17 at the operating level. There
have been a number of failures recently to obtain State Department
clearance, sometimes the explanation being given that the matter was
not thought to involve a policy question, sometimes that the
responsible officers in the State Department could not be reached in
time, and at least once with no valid explanation. A number of
recent experiences underline the necessity of CIA also recognizing in practice the
mandate of NSC 10/2 to clear with
State as well as with JCS and
Defense the political implications of projects of a para-military
nature. On the other hand, there are a number of examples of close
and fruitful relations between CIA
and the State Department. This type of cooperation, as well as close
relationships which have developed at some posts in the field is,
however, largely the accidental result of the personalities involved
rather than of the system itself. The momentum of a large and
organizationally independent government organization inevitably
pulls away from cooperation.
If covert operations are to be a really effective arm of foreign
policy, the policy officers of the State Department must, through
tightly organized machinery, be brought into more intimate
relationship with all stages of covert
operations and particularly the planning or “intelligence”
stages.
In summary, political guidance by the State Department on “covert
operations” is increasingly difficult to get across in view of (1)
the merging within CIA of
responsibility for these operations with that for secret
intelligence collection; (2) the difficulty in practice of
distinguishing between the two types of operation and CIA freedom from policy guidance on the
second; (3) the immense range of both types of activity,
particularly in view of the military pressure to develop resistance
and stay-behind organizations; (4) the lack of full knowledge on the
part of the Department of State of what is going on in both fields
until and unless CIA chooses to give
such information or something “blows.”
Recommendation:
The Secretary of State and the principal U.S. representative in each
country, as part of their overall responsibility for the conduct of
U.S.
[Page 410]
foreign relations,
should have authority, acting through designated representatives
agreeable to CIA in a manner which
will not prejudice security or limit effectiveness, to insure that
all covert activities abroad, including
those defined earlier as “secret intelligence”, are planned and conducted consistently with U.S.
foreign policy and with the overt execution of that policy.18
