Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

131. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, October 14, 1952.

SUBJECT

• A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States (NSC Action No. 543)²

1. On August 30, 1951, by NSC Action No. 543, the National Security Council directed that the Director of Central Intelligence prepare, in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States. The NSC directive required that this summary evaluation be prepared upon completion of basic studies by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) under the direction of its Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence; by the IIC; by the JCS with collaboration, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, (FCDA); and by the ICIS with collaboration, as required, of the FCDA, as indicated Tab A.

2. The IAC study was published on October 23, 1951 as Special Estimate 14, “Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the United States before July 1952.”³ The IIC study dated October 10, 1951, and the ICIS study of May 15, 1952 are enclosed herewith as Tab B.⁴ Because of the sensitive nature of the JCS study, it was not distributed outside the JCS organization. Members of the working group which drafted the summary evaluation were briefed orally on its contents.

3. The attached summary evaluation represents a step forward in planning for the security of the United States and is transmitted as an example of the caliber of work currently to be expected. In the following important respects, however, it falls far short of supplying the estimates essential to security planning:

a. An evaluation of the USSR’s capability to injure the United States should contain a plain statement of the estimated percentage of reduction in US capabilities likely to result from Soviet attack; specifically, percentage reduction in the fields of: US military strength in being, atomic counterattack capability, industrial production, and ability to produce new weapons of critical importance.

b. To provide guidance in current planning for US security, evaluations on this subject should be projected into the future and contain an estimate of prospective developments in USSR’s offensive capabilities.

c. A more adequate and realistic evaluation would cover the probable Soviet capabilities to injure US facilities and strengths in all parts of the world, and not merely the capability of USSR to injure the Continental United States. Such an evaluation should include some estimate of Soviet intentions in the light of net capabilities.

4. Three primary reasons why the attached paper does not meet these requirements are:

a. We lack knowledge of Soviet plans and intentions and our knowledge of Soviet capabilities cannot be considered complete.

b. The basic underlying studies required to produce the statement mentioned in paragraph 3-a do not exist.

c. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coordinate and produce an appraisal or estimate based on the integration of national intelligence with military, political and economic operational data dealing with our own capabilities.

5. It is believed that an appraisal of the type referred to in paragraph 4-c would serve to provide a more adequate basis for planning for the security of the United States. To this end it is recommended that the National Security Council:

a. Note the attached summary evaluation as an initial effort in response to the NSC directive issued by NSC Action No. 543, and as an example of the kind of work currently to be expected on this type of problem.

b. As an interim measure instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare, in collaboration with officials of other governmental bodies as required,⁵ terms of reference for a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s capability to injure the United States.

c. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to examine, in collaboration with officials of other governmental bodies as needed,⁶ the adequacy of present machinery, and the character of any new machinery that may be required in order to plan, guide, coordinate, and produce for the National Security Council, upon request, evaluations in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the USSR’s capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis the United States, based upon the integration of military, political, and economic operational data dealing with United States’ capabilities and intentions, and national intelligence.

Walter B. Smith

⁷

Enclosure⁸

Washington, October 6, 1952.

NET CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO INJURE THE CONTINENTAL US

Problem

1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR, as of mid-1952, to injure the continental United States.

Scope

2. This evaluation considers the injury which could be inflicted on the continental United States by USSR military action and Soviet-inspired sabotage in connection with the initial attack and in connection with attacks immediately following. The US has substantial strengths in being outside the continental United States, and no estimate is expressed herein as to the effect of a Soviet attack on such strengths or the likelihood that the Soviet will allocate parts of its striking power to such an attack.

Conclusions

3. The Soviet Union, as of mid-1952, has the net capability to inflict serious but not permanently crippling damage to the continental strengths of the United States.

4. This Soviet capability is primarily that of surprise air attack using atomic bombs. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct damage on the US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that could be inflicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjunction with an atomic air attack could significantly increase the total physical and psychological impact. Such sabotage could include the use of atomic weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed to accept the considerably increased risk of premature disclosure which this operation would entail.

5. The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, as of mid-1952, is probably appreciably less than 100. The nature and extent of the damage that could be inflicted by a surprise air attack, involving the launching against US targets of the entire Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, would vary according to the objectives governing the selection of targets.

a. An attack on US targets selected with the objective of inflicting maximum overall damage to US armament production capacity and military power would probably prevent the US from regaining its current armament production capacity and military power for a period of the order of 2 years.

b. An attack on US targets selected with the primary objective of neutralizing US atomic capabilities (see sub-paragraph 6-a) would probably not prevent an atomic counter attack from the continental US of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light of its present defenses and vulnerabilities.

c. An attack on US targets selected with the primary objective of neutralizing US ability to sustain large scale military operations and to produce new weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and 6-c), could, under circumstances considered probable for the enemy, achieve such neutralization for a period of the order of 6 to 12 months.

d. Regardless of the primary objective of the attack or the basis of target selection, the USSR is incapable of inflicting by such attack sufficient mass casualties or disorganization to force US government changes or decisions acceptable to the USSR (see sub-paragraph 6-d).

Objectives of the Attacks

6. We believe that any military action or sabotage undertaken by the USSR against the continental US would be for the purposes listed below. Achievement of the first three of these objectives is, for the present at least, essential to the ultimate success of any Soviet war plan against the western powers.

a. To prevent the launching of atomic attacks against the Soviet Union in the light of its defenses and vulnerabilities. Probable primary targets would include Strategic Air Command bases, aircraft and control centers, atomic production facilities and storage sites.

b. To neutralize US ability to sustain large scale military operations. Probable primary targets would include concentrated industries critical and basic to war production; basic services, including power and transport; ports and Naval bases; and atomic production facilities.

c. To neutralize US ability to develop or produce any new weapons of critical importance. Probable primary targets would include Atomic Energy key facilities for new development, guided missile production and test installations, and applied research facilities.

d. To so neutralize the general industrial, economic, and psychological strength of the US that government decisions or changes acceptable to the Soviet Union would occur, or could be forced by additional pressures elsewhere in the world. Pursuit of this objective would probably involve an effort to inflict mass casualities and cause disorganization in urban areas. Probable primary targets would include all those listed for other more specific purposes in sub-paragraphs 6-a, 6-b, and 6-c above, with the additional targets of government control centers, population centers, and miscellaneous industry and supplies wherever concentrated.

Method and Effectiveness of Attacks

7. Air Attacks. By far the most effective means available to the USSR for injuring the continental United States in the initial stage of hostilities is air attack with atomic bombs. It is estimated that the USSR is capable of carrying out air attacks against any target in the continental United States and Canada. Some targets listed as essential to its objectives would be difficult to reach with Soviet capability of mid-1952. USSR capabilities for air attack are estimated in detail as follows:

a. Penetration of US Defenses.

(1) The capability exists for the USSR to penetrate US, Alaskan and Canadian defense with air attack at any time and place which it might select. The factors favoring this capability are:

(a) The USSR has the initiative.

(b) The US aircraft control and warning net is not completed.

(c) The USSR can jam and reduce the efficiency of the aircraft control and warning system. The extent to which the USSR can do this is not known.

(d) The radar net will not detect low flying aircraft at distances which would make interception feasible.

(e) The US Ground Observer Corps is not yet fully effective.

(f) The regulation of air traffic into the United States is not sufficiently rigid to make identification positive. Also electronic identification equipment is not available to supply all friendly aircraft.

(g) Sufficient all-weather fighters for US air defense forces are not yet available. Crew deficiencies also exist.

(h) Russian bombers can overfly the range of US anti-aircraft artillery.

(2) The net success in penetrating the US defenses in terms of bombs on target would vary with the avenues chosen, the methods of attack and depth of targets inside peripheral defenses, character of individual targets and their local defenses, and the degree of surprise attained. It is estimated that 65 to 85 per cent of bombs launched could be delivered on target in an attack aimed at US armament production facilities and military strength in general.

b. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Atomic Bombs. As of mid-1952, the USSR probably had a stockpile of 50 bombs of approximately 20 KT yield, or the equivalent in bombs of different yields. It is possible that the number of bombs was as low as 25 or as high as 100.

(1) Assuming that (1) the USSR had a stockpile of 100 bombs, (2) all were allotted to the optimum targets in the US, (3) all were dropped with near optimum placement, and (4) the entire attack was delivered in a short period, the Soviet Union could inflict sufficient damage to prevent the US from regaining its present armament production capacity and military power for at least two years. However, the actual USSR stockpile is probably appreciably less than 100 atomic weapons; optimum target selection is improbable; and it is probable that the number of bombs delivered on target would be only 65 to 85 per cent of those launched. Consequently the probable delay in recovery of US armament production capacity and military power might well be less than two years.

(2) If the probable Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs were used against US targets selected with a view to preventing the launching of US atomic weapons (see sub-paragraph 6-a), we believe that the percentage of bombs on target would be substantially less than 65 to 85 percent. This estimate is based on the nature and location of the targets and on the fact that the aircraft element in these targets is mobile. Such an attack, under circumstances considered probable for the enemy, would probably not prevent an atomic counter attack from the continental US of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light of its present defenses and vulnerabilities.⁹

(3) If the probable Soviet stockpile were directed at the ability of the US to sustain large scale military operations and to produce new weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and 6-c), delivery capability should be high. Under circumstances considered probable for the enemy, substantial neutralization of these US capabilities could probably be achieved for a period of the order of 6 to 12 months.¹⁰

(4) If the probable Soviet stockpile were used to achieve any of the purposes stated in paragraph 6, some progress might be made toward achieving the purpose described in sub-paragraph 6-d. However, the degree of destruction required to achieve that purpose is believed to be well beyond current Soviet capabilities.

c. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Conventional Bombs. Using conventional bombs, the USSR could not at the present time inflict injury on the continental United States that would be significant in achieving any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

d. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Chemical, BW and Other Unconventional Weapons. At the present time the USSR does not have the capability to use chemical, BW, or other unconventional weapons in air attacks to achieve any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

8. Effectiveness of Airborne Troop Attacks. The USSR could not materially contribute to the achievement of any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6 by the use of airborne troop or commando air drops.

9. Effectiveness of Sea Attack.

a. Surface Forces. The USSR could not inflict significant injury on continental United States by use of Naval surface forces, as these surface forces lack the strength and composition necessary for operations against the continental United States.

b. Sub-surface Forces. Soviet submarines are capable of reaching, with little chance of detection, positions off the US coasts from which personnel could be landed and missiles fired at land targets. There is no evidence that the USSR as yet possesses an atomic missile that can be fired from a submarine. Although the possibility exists that the USSR does have such a weapon, we consider the damage resulting from such attacks would be minor by comparison to that of atomic air attack, and would not materially change the results to be expected from an air attack which delivered the entire available stockpile.

10. Sabotage. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct damage on the US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that could be inflicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjunction with an atomic air attack could significantly increase the total physical and psychological impact. Such sabotage could include the use of atomic weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed to accept the considerably increased risk of premature disclosure which this operation would entail. USSR sabotage capabilities are estimated as follows:

a. Use of Saboteurs. Measures to control the movement of potential saboteurs across the borders of or within the United States do not completely prevent access to most sabotage targets in the United States. If war occurs, however, the entry and departure of potential saboteurs probably would be quickly and substantially curtailed. The freedom of action of potential saboteurs also in this event would probably be quickly and substantially curtailed by U.S. Government detention of those Communists and others who are regarded as potential saboteurs and of resident enemy aliens (including Soviet Bloc diplomatic and official personnel). Plans for the accomplishment of such detention have been prepared.¹¹

b. Physical Sabotage Capabilities against Specific Types of Targets are estimated as follows:

(1) Industrial Installations and Facilities. Sabotage capabilities are high against facilities upon which a war mobilization, war production and wartime civilian economy depend. Security supervision is maintained in critical plants engaged in industrial contracts with defense agencies and also in certain essential supporting facilities. No like supervision is maintained in plants serving the essential civilian wartime economy. Inadequate visitor control in, and absence of authority to remove potential saboteurs from, vital non-classified-contract plants and inability to prevent Soviet inspired disruptive strikes, even in classified-contract plants, further add to the vulnerability of these industrial installations.

(2) Key Military Installations (including command facilities and other facilities essential for logistical support of the military within an area). Sabotage capabilities are slight in view of present deployment and readiness of area military forces and other protective countermeasures.

(3) Port Facilities. Substantial sabotage capabilities exist, since the program for safeguarding port facilities, adopted after evaluation of the risks involved, has necessarily been limited primarily to major ports. Even this limited program is proving difficult to implement in full.

(4) Forests. Sabotage capabilities consist chiefly of arson. Present forest protection facilities are inadequate to prevent a substantial increase in forest fire loss through sabotage. However, it is believed that such losses would be limited to an extent that U.S. war strength would not be critically affected.

(5) Crops and Livestock. While existing measure for safeguarding the nation’s food supply are not adequate to prevent unconventional attacks, they might serve to minimize damage thereto from such attacks. It is believed that losses in this category would be limited to an extent that U.S. war strength would not be critically affected.

(6) Public Water Supplies are generally vulnerable to temporary and local BW contamination. The introduction of contaminants into water already in a circulating system is a greater danger than such introduction on watersheds or in reservoirs.

(7) Essential Government Administrative Operations. Saboteurs have some capability for assassination of key government officials, notwithstanding protective measures to which they have been alerted. Saboteurs also have the capability for disrupting the continuity of essential and other government operations by the clandestine introduction of chemical or biological agents into public buildings. Against this capability, existing countermeasures are only slightly effective.

c. Sabotage Devices. Potential saboteurs can readily obtain a wide variety of sabotage devices, including chemical and biological agents. They can also obtain or produce non-fissionable component parts of atomic bombs. Each of the foregoing is available in the United States or procurable through smuggling, for which substantial opportunities exist over United States land and sea frontiers and through abuse of diplomatic immunity and courtesy. There also exists the possibility of introducing assembled atomic bombs from abroad by such smuggling. The effective limit on sabotage capability will continue to be determined by US controls on movements of persons and materials and on access to critical targets rather than by the availability of sabotage devices.

With regard to BW agents, programs pertaining to disease reporting, immunization, research, training, stockpiling, alertness, protection of veterinary biologicals and physical security of essential buildings are under way in the appropriate agencies. Satisfactory execution of these programs is essential to adequate defense against overt as well as clandestine biological warfare attack.

d. Non-physical Sabotage. While the continued propaganda and other subversive efforts of the Communists probably are not without some result, the prosecutions of national and local Communist leaders, plus the increasing awareness of the American public of the seriousness of this threat, are reducing the Communist potential in this field.

Tab A¹²

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

A PROJECT TO PROVIDE A MORE ADEQUATE BASIS FOR PLANNING FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President there is hereby directed the development of the following comprehensive studies in order to provide a more adequate basis for planning for the security of the United States.

a. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to launch a military attack on the Continental United States, to be prepared under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

b. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to conduct sabotage and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

c. An evaluation of U.S. military capability to counter potential enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph a above, and an estimate of the probable damage to the United States resulting from such attack, to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the collaboration, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

d. An evaluation of ways and means available to counter potential enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph b above, and an estimate of the probable damage to the United States resulting from such enemy actions, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with the collaboration, as required of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

2. Upon the completion of the foregoing studies there will be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States.

3. The summary evaluation referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be completed as soon as possible and shall be forwarded to the National Security Council. Access thereto will be restricted to as few individuals as possible and only on an absolute need-to-know basis.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence Job 80–R1440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret; Security Information. Smith’s memorandum is attached to an October 21 covering memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary Gleason to the NSC, which indicates that the NSC would “at an early meeting” consider the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of Smith’s memorandum. See Document 137.
2. Document 86.
3. Not printed. A copy is in National Archives, RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency Files.
4. Not enclosed but available upon request to the Executive Secretary. [Footnote in the original.]
5. From this point, a line is drawn to the bottom of the page where the words “including IIC & ICIS” were added by hand.
6. From this point, a line is drawn connecting to the line noted in footnote 5 above.
7. Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
8. Top Secret; Security Information.
9. As noted in paragraph 2 above, no estimate is expressed herein as to the effect of a Soviet attack on US strengths overseas, or as to the likelihood that the Kremlin would allocate parts of its striking power to such an attack. [Footnote in the original.]
10. US ability to sustain large scale military operations is considered here as a general ability. If effects were analyzed in terms of sustaining particular military operations, i.e. land operations, sea operations, air operations, amphibious and joint operations, different predictions would likely result for each. [Footnote in the original.]
11. See Document 16.
12. Top Secret; Security Information.