501.BB/8–3149: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State
1027. For Sanders, UNA. At his request, I called on McNaughton this afternoon and discussed proposed Chinese GA item fully on basis Deptel 436, August 24 and mytel 1001, August 26. John Holmes,1 who is down from Ottawa for general GA talks with Canadians and British, and Arnold Smith were with McNaughton. They were without instructions, hence were speaking personally, and Department of External Affairs has reached no conclusions. Holmes said, however, that departmental committee has been studying Chinese policy for some time and he felt reasonably sure views they expressed this afternoon were in line with thinking this committee.
Following is, I think, fair summary of views they expressed:
- 1.
- They assumed inevitable that item would be put on agenda.
- 2.
- They regretted this since it impaired our flexibility and crowded us time-wise. (McNaughton said he had hoped Jessup committee2 studies would provide us with opportunity thorough examination whole situation before we were forced to make decisions.)
- 3.
- We could not, with self-respect, attempt to dissuade Tsiang from putting item on agenda or refrain from positively and firmly supporting inclusion on agenda when question arises. We could not with self-respect refrain from supporting Tsiang’s first objective, namely, GA finding Soviet Union guilty of treaty violation.
- 4.
- They would be very reluctant to support Tsiang’s second and third objectives, namely, nonrecognition of Communist regime and moral and material aid to Nationalist Government. (Smith raised question whether we might possibly attempt dissuade Tsiang from attempting to pursue these two objectives on self-interest grounds, that he would run serious risk not getting necessary Assembly support and thereby damaging position Nationalist Government.)
General tone their reactions indicated by expressions McNaughton used such as in effect “We must not be cat’s-paw for Chiang Kai-shek3 and let him play all of us for suckers”; “We must not lean on a house of sand (Nationalist Government)”; “Will Chinese delegation at GA be a mere façade with nothing underneath?” On last point, McNaughton referred to impression he had members Chinese delegation here actively making other plans and Smith inquired if I could confirm information he had received that T. V. Soong4 had deposited couple billion dollars in gold in US.
McNaughton felt Nationalist Government had everything to gain and nothing to lose in bringing up item. He and his associates seemed very reluctant to get pinned down by any GA action concerning recognition of Communist regime which would hamper our ability to deal in future effectively with that regime on any basis we might choose to fit our policies. They seem to have impression that Communist regime is not under Soviet domination. We should not drive them, as McNaughton put it, into arms of Soviets. Even if this regime were under domination of Soviets, our objective should be to split them away. Therefore, we should retain free hand in dealing with them. To extent personal views expressed by them today may turn out to reflect official Canadian opinion, I should judge Tsiang would have very difficult job getting their support for his objective number two. I think I detected at least slight undercurrent of opinion which was not at all explicit in favor recognition of Communist regime at some point.
There was very little discussion of Tsiang’s third objective concerning moral and material aid to Nationalist Government. McNaughton indicated awareness difficulties our own situation; it is my impression [Page 163] they were about as strongly opposed to this point as to non-recognition point.
Making clear I was not expressing views of Department or, so far as I knew, anyone in Department, I raised question nature leadership Western powers might give to peripheral states such as India, Burma, Siam, which will be in very difficult position regarding this question in GA. McNaughton emphatically thought we must be in position give them strong positive leadership and not let Soviet Union carry the ball. In this connection we agreed, for example, there is risk that if Russians are smart, having been forewarned indirectly by Lie, they will see to it that delegation of Communist Government presents itself to Assembly, thus getting debate whole question on ground of recognition or nonrecognition which would be more favorable to Soviet position than question violation, treaty. McNaughton wondered whether we could not develop strategy slanting whole case in GA against Soviet Union and avoid taking sides for or against either Nationalists or Communists. Assuming hypothetically that Western Powers might agree to support first Chinese objective, but not second (and third, we discussed very briefly question whether we could develop positive alternative law [to?] two objectives but no bright ideas emerged.
McNaughton was very appreciative my call, promised to let us know soon as he heard anything from Ottawa and asked that we keep him posted. He urged earliest consultations also with other delegations, mentioning particularly India. I agreed desirable but reminded him injunction confidence laid down by Tsiang, adding I thought we should tell Tsiang, soon as we know direction our policy, we felt obliged to consult at least certain other delegations reasonably soon.
- Acting Head of United Nations Division of Canadian Department of External Affairs.↩
- For appointment of Raymond B. Fosdick and Everett Case to this group on. July 30, see Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1949, p. 279.↩
- President of the Republic of China until his retirement on January 21, 1949, in favor of Vice President Li Tsung-jen as Acting President; Generalissimo Chiang was leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).↩
- Former President of the Chinese Executive Yuan; brother of Mesdames H. H. Kung, Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek.↩