851G.00/1–1547: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
181. Moutet, on his own suggestion, gave me last night a detailed account of what he had heard and seen in Indo-China, also showing me a number of pictures of mutilated persons as well as a number of captured papers and documents showing how the Vietnam planned and prepared the surprise attack on the evening of December 19. According to these papers and Moutet’s declaration, it seems reasonably certain that the Vietnam had planned a general Massacre of French troops and civilians as Well as native and Only 2 hours before the time fixed for the general attack, the French authorities were warned by their agents that the attack was impending and therefore a general massacre was avoided. Most of what Moutet told me and much of the contents of the papers I saw have appeared in one way or another in public print.
[Page 63]Moutet went on to remind me of his well-known advanced Views as well as his life-long activities on behalf of native inhabitants of French overseas possessions. However, he alleges he was struck by the fact that the massacre was planned for the day it had been publicly announced that he was due to arrive in Indo-China and he affirms that he was so shocked at what he heard and saw there that he is now convinced that it is essential that the French carry out successful military activities at a very early date; not involving, however, anything in the nature of a military conquest of the country Which he declares is unnecessary because most of the Annamite not behind the small Communist group which now dominates, and which is composed, he says, of a coterie of Moscow-trained young men. He does not believe that Ho Chi Minh or his Government have any real authority now. He says that he believes that Ho Chi Minh and most of his colleagues did not approve the attempted massacre but “went along” when they saw that they had been out-maneuvered and outplayed by the extremists. He says that no attempt, whatever, was made by anyone either in the Vietnam Government or extremist group (he is vague about this “group”) to get in touch with him and he is not at all clear as to how or with whom they must eventually negotiate. In any event, once the military situation takes a definite turn for the better, France must carry out its promises in regard to future relations with the Governments of Indo-China.
He described his visit to the regions recently retroceded by Siam34 and was effusive in his thanks for what our Government had done in that connection.
I stated with emphasis our concern over the Indo-Chinese situation and told him that obviously that situation affects other areas also and that we are frankly perturbed at the way things are going.
Moutet said that he could well appreciate our point of view.
As the Department is aware, it is hot yet known who will take part in the next French Government which is to be formed within the next few days and Moutet may not remain in the Cabinet; also Blum is to return from London tomorrow but it is not now known whether he will remain in office.35
- For documentation on the settlement of the Siamese-French Indochina boundary dispute, see Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. viii, pp. 978 ff.↩
- With regard to the new French Government, see footnote 31, p. 60. Minister Moutet remained in office in the new Cabinet.↩