740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram
The Secretary of State 44 to the Acting Secretary of State
1149. Kosmos 20. For Acheson from Marshall. If we are to approach Soviets regarding Korea, I believe this should be done before I leave Moscow. I am considering relative advantages my sending letters to [Page 624] Molotov as against delivery, before I depart, of formal communication by Department to Soviet Embassy, Washington or by Smith45 here to Foreign Office. Give me Department’s recommendation as to making approach now and method. War and Navy should be consulted.
I have had drafted here a possible letter to Molotov from me, text of which follows. This should be examined by Department as to tone, factual accuracy, scope of action it proposes to Soviets, and propriety of last paragraph which contains idea that might better be subject of later communication. I am not firm regarding letter of this character but am anxious to settle on a course of action within the week.
Draft letter follows:
“I wish to call to your attention the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the joint US–USSR Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress towards the establishment of a Korean provisional government. It has been 19 months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has resulted in grave economic distress.
The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:
- 1.
- To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations;
- 2.
- To insure that the National Government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
- 3.
- To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.
The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December, 1943,46 declared its determination that in due course, Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the Three Powers in the Potsdam Declaration which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The USSR in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations.
Upon the surrender of Japan, United States and Soviet forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in the areas respectively south and north of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the thirty-eighth degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and USSR in Moscow in December, 1945, the serious consequences of the bi-zonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached [Page 625] and published in part III of the Communiqué of the Conference. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agreement.
On March 20, 1946, the Joint US–USSR Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government as a first step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation.
It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a provisional Korean government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government.
Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through failure to agree on the definition of the word ‘democratic’ as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provisional government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946.
The United States representatives on the Joint Commission has several times suggested to the Soviet representative that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. Now, in April, 1947, 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made towards the implementation of that agreement.
In fulfillment of the intent of the Agreement and Declaration made at Moscow in December, 1945, the Government of the United States desires to further the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay. To this end I ask that you recommend to your Government to agree with the United States to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible for discussions and agreements which will advance the purpose of the Moscow Agreement, and to fix with the United States Government a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 for a review on the governmental level of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission.
If, in the view of your Government, there seems little hope that the Joint Commission in its new meetings can achieve the results expected of it in the Moscow Agreement, I will be pleased to discuss reconsideration of the Moscow Agreement in the effort to find better way to bring about the establishment of Korea as a genuinely free, independent and stable nation.”
- The Secretary of State was attending the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Moscow March 10–April 12, 1947.↩
- Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.↩
- Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.↩