740.0011 PW (Peace)/5–2047

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring)81

top secret

As you are aware, a small group, under the leadership of Mr. Penfield,82 was designated several months ago to begin work on drafting a Japanese peace treaty. Other members of this group were Miss Bacon (FE), Martin (JK), Hunsberger (OIR), Emmerson (NA) and myself.83

During the absence of Miss Bacon and myself in the Orient no work was undertaken by the group, but Miss Bacon and I prepared three alternative drafts for the chapters on interim controls and on the disarmament treaty, one of these drafts being based on General MacArthur’s opinion concerning the treaty.

In view of recent developments, Mr. Vincent asked me to take charge of the group during Mr. Penfield’s absence. At a meeting May 9, the group decided that guidance was needed on certain fundamental questions before it could carry on its work effectively. Consequently, the group would appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. Thorp and Mr. Vincent at your earliest convenience, your views on the following:

1. Should the four-power disarmament treaty for Japan still be considered as basic U.S. policy?

It is recommended that, in view of the new approach proposed for the procedural conference for the peace treaty and of the suggestions already made by General MacArthur in reference to United Nations control, a broader basis be adopted for the disarmament treaty and consideration be given to tieing the treaty with the Security Council.

2. Is the possibility of a peace conference being called in the near future sufficiently great to require the group to meet in continuous session until a draft treaty is completed?

Prior to Miss Bacon’s and my going to Japan, the group met once a week. If it continues to meet at this rate it probably will not have a draft ready until September 1st.

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It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee be given instructions to consider the preparation of a draft treaty as a matter of priority, to utilize a limited number of personnel within the divisions concerned for preparation of drafts, and to meet daily if necessary in order ‘to complete a draft by July 1.

3. What relations, if any, should the group have with other divisions of (the Department and other agencies of the Government?

Thus far only the persons listed above have been working on the project. I understand, however, that after General MacArthur’s reference to United Nations control of Japan, SPA has set up a committee to work on the treaty and has asked that their representative, Mr. Wainhouse,84 meet with us.

It is recommended that: 1) SPA be asked to send their representative to meetings when chapters on intrim control and on the disarmament treaty are discussed; 2) drafts of the treaty should not be discussed formally by the Committee with any of the other divisions in the Department or other agencies until after a completed draft has been prepared and received further consideration.

4. What relationship, if any, should the group have with SCAP? Ambassador Atcheson informed me that the Secretary had told him that General MacArthur would be kept informed of all stages in drafting of the treaty.

It is recommended that upon the approval by the Committee of drafts of the chapters in the treaty, these drafts be transmitted to Tokyo for information. After the draft treaty has been informally approved in the Department, including approval by the Under Secretary, the Committee should meet with representatives of SCAP to allow for an exchange of views.

5. What provisions of the treaty, if any, have such military or strategic significance as to require clearance with the War and Navy Departments through SWNCC or the Committee of Three?

It is recommended that only the provisions of the treaty on interim control, disarmament treaty, and territorial disposition require such clearance and that the Department of State prepare its recommendations on these provisions for consideration by SWNCC. Special reports should be prepared for the Ryukyu Islands and for the southern Kuriles.85

  1. Addressed also to Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
  2. James K. Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
  3. Ruth E. Bacon, Special Assistant to Mr. Vincent; Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs; Warren S. Hunsberger, Division of Research for Far East; and John K. Emmerson, Special Assistant to Mr. Borton.
  4. David W. Wainhouse, Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs.
  5. Ernest A. Gross, Deputy to General Hilldring, stated on May 21: “Gen. Hilldring agrees to all recommendations except the last. He points out that consultation with SCAP will have to be through War or JCS, hence it will not do to confine service participation.” (740.0011 PW (Peace) 5–2047)