Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners¹

secret

[Washington,] 25 May 1943.

Attachment to C.C.S. 250/1

Implementation of Decisions Reached at the Trident Conference

1. In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the decisions arrived at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners recommend as follows:

a. That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for operations after Husky (Enclosure A).

b. That a supplementary directive be issued to General Morgan (Enclosure B).

c. That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as soon as possible, a preliminary estimate of the requirements for operation Roundhammer in transport aircraft and gliders.

2. In view of the urgency of completing the Roundhammer plan, we suggest that further consideration should be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander.

Enclosure A

Draft Directive to General Eisenhower

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
	2	Air-borne Divisions
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault
Build-up:	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
Total	29	Divisions

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to Husky . These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the Mediterranean Area, to be carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful Husky . All considerations related to your proposed operations must be [in] consonance with the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 July 1943.

3. Landing Craft. In view of necessity for starting preparations in the United Kingdom at once for cross-Channel operations referred to in paragraph 1 a above, it may be necessary after Husky to withdraw from the Mediterranean and Levant:

a. The crews of all landing craft that may be lost in Husky .

b. Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and spare gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships and craft then remaining.

The landing craft available for operations in the Mediterranean after Husky are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and craft may have to be returned to the U. K. This does not necessarily apply to special ships.

Enclosure B

Draft Supplementary Directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)

Amphibious Operations From the U. K.

1. Under the terms of your present directive² you have been instructed to prepare plans for:

a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.

b. A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. In amplification of paragraph c above the Combined Chiefs of Staff have now resolved that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.

3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence of the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on 1 May 1944:

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded in landing craft.
	2	Infantry Divisions—follow up.
	2	Air-borne Divisions.
Total:	9	Divisions in the assault.
Build-up:	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total:	29	Divisions.

A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will be available for this operation will be provided separately, and the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U. K. will be undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development and seizure of Continental ports, after the initial assault, in order that the buildup forces may be augmented, and follow-up shipments may be made from the United States, or elsewhere, of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to you. In addition, you will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

5. Your outline plan for this operation should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible and not later than 1 August 1943.

1. Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: “The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 96th Meeting.” For the record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff under reference, held on May 25, 1943, see ante, p. 200.
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of April 26, 1943, is described in Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1950), pp. 54, 55, and 57. For an account of the genesis of the directive, see Harrison, pp. 46–49.