Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/9559: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, April 2, 1941—10 p.m.
[Received April 2—9:45 p.m]

1288. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. When I was at Chequers with the Prime Minister³⁴ at the last weekend, he allowed me to read the draft of a personal note he planned to send Mr. Matsuoka, Japanese Foreign Minister. He told me the Japanese Ambassador³⁵ had asked the Foreign Office to facilitate his air passage to Lisbon to meet his Foreign Minister. It was the Prime Minister’s intention to request the Ambassador to deliver this note to Mr. Matsuoka in person.

The Japanese Ambassador for some reason, however, decided not to make the trip. The Foreign Office at my request has kindly made a copy of the note available and Sir Alexander Cadogan³⁶ informed Johnson³⁷ that it was cabled to Sir Stafford Cripps for delivery to Mr. Matsuoka on his arrival at Moscow, with the explanation that it was originally intended to send the note by the hand of the Japanese Ambassador.

Saturday, in returning my call, the Japanese Ambassador, after customary polite exchanges, told me that he and Mr. Kennedy³⁸ had been friendly. The Ambassador then told me that he felt it was necessary that the three great naval powers when peace returned should work together. To this I made no comment. He made no mention of the contemplated trip to the continent nor of the note to Mr. Matsuoka referred to above. The Ambassador was most courteous and we had a pleasant interview.

The text of the Prime Minister’s note to Mr. Matsuoka follows:

“I take advantage of the facilities with which we have provided your Ambassador to send you a friendly message of sincerity and good will.

I venture to suggest a few questions, which it seems to me deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and people:

1. Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer, or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?

2. Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores with Great Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes?

3. Did Japan’s accession to the triple pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war?

4. If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English speaking nations enable them to dispose of the Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united strength upon Japan?

5. Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?

6. Will the British air force be stronger than the German air force before the end of 1941, and far stronger before the end of 1942?

7. Will the many countries which are being held down by the German army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years pass by?

8. Is it true that the production of steel in the United States during 1941 will be 75,000,000 tons, and in Great Britain about 12½, making a total of nearly 90,000,000 tons? If Germany should happen to be defeated, as she was last time, would not the 7,000,000 tons steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single handed war?

From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe, and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and the two great sea powers of the West.”³⁹

Winant

34. Winston Churchill.
35. Mamoru Shigemitsu.
36. British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
37. Herschel V. Johnson, Minister Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.
38. Joseph P. Kennedy, former Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
39. In telegram No. 534, April 10, 10 p.m., the Ambassador in Japan reported that in the text of the note given him by the British Ambassador in Japan, who was under instruction to present it to the Japanese Prime Minister, the last sentence ended as follows: “between Japan and Great Britain, the great sea power of the West.” (740.0011 European War 1939/9834)