711.61/824
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
| Participants: | Mr. Oumansky, Ambassador of the Soviet Embassy; |
| Mr. Chuvakhin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy; | |
| Mr. Henderson, Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs. |
The Soviet Ambassador accompanied by Mr. Chuvakhin, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, took me out to dinner last night at a little restaurant in the country close by Washington. The Ambassador, as was to be expected, took advantage of the occasion to discuss several matters relating to the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations. I shall endeavor to summarize some of the conversation which took place.
[Page 782]Soviet Military Situation
The Ambassador seemed to be in an extremely cheerful and optimistic mood. He said that Soviet plans of resistance had been worked out carefully, and he was sure that the world would be surprised at the results. He was unable to understand what seemed to him to be the prejudiced attitude of the Military Intelligence with regard to the ability of the Soviet Government to put up an effective resistance. The American military authorities apparently were badly informed regarding the moral and high technical level of the Red Army.
I told the Ambassador that I was confident that the American military authorities were not prejudiced against the Soviet Army. Some of them undoubtedly had a high regard for the technical excellence of the German Army with which they were to a degree acquainted. The Ambassador himself was in an excellent position to understand why American Army officers knew so little about the Red Army. I hoped that this situation would be remedied in the near future when American Army officers in the Soviet Union would have a chance of coming into closer personal contact with members of the Soviet armed forces. The Ambassador said that it was his hope that arrangements could be made for a number of American military and naval officers to go to the Soviet Union and to become thoroughly familiar with Soviet troops. He asked whether a Naval Attaché had been named as yet, and I told him that so far as I knew, no officer had been selected but that the Navy Department was planning to send several officers in the immediate future.
The Soviet Air Attachés Who Have Been Declared Persona non Grata
The Ambassador said that he had spoken to Mr. Atherton on June 30 with regard to the two Soviet Air Attachés whom the American Government had declared to be persona non grata. They were still in San Francisco awaiting sailings. He had assured Mr. Atherton that these officers had never intentionally broken any of the regulations of the War Department and was confident that if they would be permitted to remain, they would take special precautions in order not to be guilty of any future infractions. He said that Mr. Atherton had promised him to take up the matter of these officers with the War Department and that he was hoping that the War Department might consider favorably the withdrawal of the request that they leave the country and permit them to work closely with American military authorities. I said that I believed that the matter was active and that probably he would hear from Mr. Atherton or me in the near future on the subject.
[Page 783]Restrictions on the Movements of Soviet Personnel in the United States
The Ambassador said that he had discussed with Mr. Atherton the matter of the restrictions which had been placed upon himself and Soviet diplomatic and consular officials in the United States. He hoped that these restrictions would be removed. I said that he could be sure that his hope was shared by the officials of the Department of State. No one relished the idea of restrictions being placed on the movements of the members of the diplomatic and consular corps in the country. I was under the impression that a telegram had already been sent to Mr. Steinhardt on the subject. It was hoped that Mr. Steinhardt might be able to prevail upon the Soviet authorities to assume a more reasonable attitude with regard to the movements in the Soviet Union of American diplomatic and consular officials and that just as soon as we were sure that the Soviet authorities had done so, there was little doubt that the present restrictions on the movements of Soviet officials would be lifted.22
The Ambassador said that the Soviet Union was at war and that therefore it was understandable that restrictions must be imposed upon the movements of foreign diplomatic and consular officials in that country. I said that it was my understanding that the term “reasonable” took this fact into consideration. I told the Ambassador that I was inclined to believe if he needed to travel or if any Soviet diplomatic or consular official desired to travel on official business in this country, the Department in view of the present situation would not hamper their movements. The Ambassador repeated that he hoped that some arrangement could be made for lifting the restrictions altogether in the near future.
Case of Ovakimian
The Ambassador said that he had discussed with Mr. Atherton the case of Ovakimian, a Soviet official undergoing trial in New York City for failing to register with the Department of State, and had expressed the hope to Mr. Atherton that the Department of State would assist in obtaining his release and deportation. The Ambassador said that he understood that the Department of Justice would be willing to release Mr. Ovakimian if the Department of State would have no objection thereto. I told the Ambassador that the matter was being discussed, but that until more information was available to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice and of the Department [Page 784] of State, it was impossible to predict what the attitude of this Government would be with regard to Mr. Ovakimian. I remarked that at the present time the American Government had received no indication from the American Embassy in Moscow of any change on the part of the Soviet Government towards American citizens or families of American citizens, detained in the Soviet Union. There was still a number of American citizens and spouses of American citizens whom the Soviet Government for some reason or other was not permitting to come to the United States. The Ambassador said that he would be grateful if the Department of State could send a telegram as soon as possible to Mr. Steinhardt, asking him to make representations to the Soviet authorities on behalf of the American citizens and families of American citizens detained in the Soviet Union. He said that he was sure that if Mr. Steinhardt would do this in a tactful manner, and he knew that Mr. Steinhardt always was tactful, the results would be speedy and satisfactory. He sincerely hoped that some kind of arrangement could be made whereby points of friction between these Governments such as those arising from the detention of Ovakimian and the detention of Americans in the Soviet Union could be eliminated. I told him that his suggestion would be passed on to my superiors in the Department. The Ambassador said that he wished to emphasize that his suggestion was merely of a personal and not of an official nature.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Baltic Ships
The Ambassador said that there was still one problem outstanding between the two Governments which should be settled and which in his opinion could now be settled without difficulty; namely, the problem of the Baltic ships.
I told him that it was to be hoped that he would not present this problem since its consideration would be likely to becloud and impede rather than to clarify and facilitate. The problem seemed to be largely academic for the moment, as well as insolvable.
The Ambassador said that he did not understand why the matter of the Baltic ships presented a difficult problem. I replied that the recognition on the part of the American Government of any Soviet interest in the Baltic ships would necessarily imply recognition of Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Baltic. The Ambassador said that that was precisely what the Soviet Government wanted. The Soviet Government expected the American Government to recognize the former Baltic States as an integral part of the territory of the Soviet Union. I again pointed out to the Ambassador [Page 785] the futility of the renewal of discussions on this point.23 I pointed out that there were divergencies in principle which it did not seem possible to bridge at the present time. The Ambassador said he was perplexed to hear that any question of principle was involved. Recent announcements of the President of the United States indicated that the United States Government was prepared, for purposes of defense, to take measures in certain non-American areas similar to that which the Soviet Government had taken in the Baltic. Great Britain was following in Syria a policy identical with that followed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, yet there was comparatively little criticism of Great Britain for its invasion of Syria.24 I told the Ambassador that I preferred that we should not enter into a discussion of this matter. Nevertheless, in view of his statements, I thought it only fair to say that the President had at no time made any announcement of the intention of the United States to annex foreign territory for purposes of defense, and that it was my understanding that the British Government had made it clear that it had no intention to make Syria a part of the British Empire.
The Ambassador then launched a vicious attack upon former Baltic officials and upon Baltic diplomatic and consular representatives in the United States. He said that they were Nazis, pro-German, dishonest, hypocritical, slimy, and so forth. I told the Ambassador that I could not discuss this subject with him any further.
Mutual Confidence Between the State Department and the Soviet Embassy
While we were returning to Washington, the Ambassador said that he hoped that in the future there would be more mutual confidence between the Department of State and the Soviet Embassy than there had been in the past. Both the Department of State and the Embassy were aiming for and working for the same thing; namely, the defeat of Hitler, and should therefore work together harmoniously.
I told the Ambassador that my hope in this respect coincided with his. I added that since he had mentioned this to me in a personal vein, I hoped he would permit me to offer to him a personal suggestion; namely, that one of the best ways for the promotion of mutual confidence would be for the Embassy to follow a policy of limiting its discussions regarding matters which should properly be the subject of negotiation between the two Governments, to Department of State [Page 786] channels. The Ambassador said he wished I would be more specific. I said my idea was that it would be much easier for the Embassy and the Department to work together if problems arising between the Soviet Government and the United States should be handled directly between these two institutions, rather than through indirect or perhaps even irresponsible intermediaries. The Ambassador said that he assumed that it would be all right for him to entertain and have talks with members of the Cabinet and other important members of the Government. I said that I wanted to make it clear that there was no intention on my part to make any suggestion that he should curtail his contacts in any way. In fact, I had no intention to suggest that he restrict his conversations. It was merely my idea to point out a line of procedure which, if followed, might be useful in maintaining a spirit of confidence between the Department of State and the Soviet Embassy. The Ambassador said that he appreciated my suggestion.
- The omitted portion concerns the situation of the Soviet Ambassador in France. For relations between the Soviet Union and France, see pp. 155 ff.↩
- Notification of the removal of travel restrictions, imposed in retaliation upon Soviet officials, was contained in the note of July 23, sent to Ambassador Umansky, p. 902.↩
- The viewpoint of the United States Government on this subject had been explained to Ambassador Umansky as set forth in memoranda of February 27 and March 27, both prepared by Henderson, pp. 703 and 725, respectively. See also the memorandum of June 15, of the discussion of this question by Under Secretary of State Welles with the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, p. 759.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iii , section under Syria and Lebanon entitled “British and Free French invasion and occupation of Syria …”↩