Defense Files
United States Minutes
JCCSs–3
1. Priorities for U.S. and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean—(ABC–4/1)1
Admiral Stark read the proposed plan and there followed a general discussion.
Admiral Turner said that the Joint Planning Committee recognized the importance of the North African project (operation Gymnast), but were not at this stage prepared to make recommendations on the relative priority of this and the other projects mentioned in paragraph 1(b) of their Report. The limitations on shipping and naval escort forces made it impossible to carry out the North African plan, and simultaneously relieve the British forces in Ireland and Iceland. If the North African project were carried out as envisaged, each power would produce the requisite amount of shipping for its own forces, but would have none extra available to lend to the other power. In addition, shipping required for the British part of Gymnast would seriously interfere with British reinforcements to the Middle East.
[Page 97]The British delegation considered two possible moments at which the North African project would have to be put into effect as rapidly as possible; either (a) when British forces, moving from the eastward, had occupied Tripoli, or (b) when Marshal Pétain resigned, as had been thought possible.2 The second occasion now seemed unlikely to occur, though the first remained; and it was felt that the Chiefs of Staff should obtain a decision from the President and the Prime Minister as to whether or not it had been decided to make a political approach to the French authorities in order to obtain an invitation to enter French North Africa. The British forces for Gymnast were ready but their removal from the United Kingdom would leave the defense of the British Isles weak unless the United States took over the Iceland and Ireland commitments. Nevertheless, the British view was that the North African project would have to go forward if an invitation were received.
It was generally agreed that, for the purposes of paragraph 3 of the Joint Planning Committee’s Report, the major operations in the Atlantic area, only one of which could be carried out at one time, could be stated to be:
- Northwest Africa.
- West Africa.
- Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verde Islands.
- Northern Ireland and Iceland.
The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba and Curaçao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation.
It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this report (see Annex 1), was accepted. However, the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be restudied and resubmitted for further consideration.
2. Northwest Africa Project
The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German forces six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and, without Spanish [Page 98] cooperation, a further six weeks to become firmly established in the South of Spain. It was pointed out that this estimate was based on the best information available to the British, and took account of the fact that the Germans at the present time had no forces readily available to undertake the operation. It was realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be considerably accelerated.
Admiral Turner explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that only Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were difficult to protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection could only be given to one port. He pointed out that the size of the North African expedition as envisaged by the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in excess of anything previously considered, and the implications on shipping were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size essential—particularly with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air Force was already stretched almost to its limit. It was decided that consideration of the size of the forces required should be deferred.
It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested that the French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of some value in spite of its known lack of spares, but General Arnold said that from a recent conversation he had had with a French officer who had recently left North Africa, he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were capable of taking the air.
The U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to the Report, Annex 2,3 subject to certain amendments, and subject to further consideration of the strength of the forces required for the expedition.
- This paper, a copy of which was attached as Annex 1 to these minutes, is printed, post, p. 238.↩
- In an urgent telegram of December 23 (No. 353 to Algiers), Welles asked Murphy to comment on persistent reports that “Pétain either has resigned or is about to resign under pressure and will be replaced by Darlan.” (851.00/–2585A) Murphy replied by rush telegram (No. 674 of December 26) that the “opinion of well informed people here definitely is that Pétain will not resign” and that, even though the Marshal spoke frequently of quitting, “a local official who knows him well says that Pétain is a prima donna who likes to be coaxed to play the part but that he loves the spotlight and firmly believes that he is the only one who can lead his people out of the wilderness.” Murphy added that if and when Generals Noguès and Juin returned from their visit to Vichy he would “try discreetly” to obtain their views (851.00/2586).↩
- The report under reference is ABC–4/2, post, p. 240.↩