837.00/2821
The Chargé in Cuba (Reed) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 11.]
Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 326 of August 5, 1930,6 I have the honor to report that the Lower House on August 5 rejected by a vote of 86 to 1 President Machado’s message and accompanying project of law providing for electoral reforms.
The practical unanimity of the vote against the message came as somewhat of a surprise. It was believed, and I had been so assured by persons highly placed in the Government, that the Liberal congressmen at least would comply with the President’s wishes as expressed in the message. It would appear, however, that after the Nacionalistas issued their manifesto refusing to accept the President’s offer, General Machado gave Congress a free hand in voting on the bill. I saw him this morning for a few minutes and although he did not actually confirm the foregoing impression, he did refer in injured tones to the “aggressive attitude” which the Nacionalistas had displayed in the matter.
[Page 653]This is the first time that the Cuban legislature has refused to assent to an executive message of President Machado. The decision to vote against the message was taken by each party group meeting in committee prior to the session. Various reasons were given in the resolutions adopted by the committees. The Liberals announced they were actuated by the rejection of the measure by the Nacionalistas. The Conservatives expressed the opinion that a measure which conferred special privileges on any single group of citizens was unconstitutional. The Populars were motivated principally by their opposition to the provisions of the bill authorizing the merger of political parties.
In the circumstances, the Government does not consider that the adverse vote on the message indicates any lack of confidence in the Administration. They are unquestionably right in so interpreting the action of the Liberal majority. Debate on the bill disclosed antagonism toward the Government only on the part of the small minority of Congressmen who have habitually refused to cooperate with the Administration. The other speakers concerned themselves almost entirely with the inadequacy of the bill and its inutility, now that the Nacionalistas had declined to accept it.
As reported in my despatch under reference, Mr. Antonio Mendoza is again actively engaged in exploring the possibilities for an agreement between the President and the Nacionalistas. He now has another plan, different from that described in my No. 326, which would involve the postponement of the November elections until March 1 and an agreement by the President to resign on May 20, 1931, if the Nacionalistas should return a majority of their candidates. He called upon me twice on August 6 and discussed this plan with me at considerable length. A memorandum of these conversations is enclosed.7 The Nacionalistas have accepted the plan in principle and have authorized Mendoza to discuss it with the President. He has not yet done so, however, because the President was out of town until this morning. I understand that he will try to obtain an audience some time today.
The Department’s attention is particularly invited to Mr. Mendoza’s insistence in his conversation with me on the Embassy’s lending its moral support to the carrying out of the plan which he has elaborated. I cannot escape the feeling that it would be unwise for the Embassy to assume any such responsibility. We might, it is true, find it expedient and politic to do so if it were the only means of assuring the maintenance of peace in Cuba. I am not, however, convinced that such a contingency has yet arisen. If the President accepts the plan we should, of course, be free to determine at any time in the future and in any given circumstance whether action by the Embassy to insure the [Page 654] carrying out of the plan is necessary and desirable, but I am of the opinion that we should endeavor to avoid any general commitment until the need therefor is apparent.
It will be noted from the minute of my conversation with Mr. Mendoza that I declined to give him the assurance which he requested; that I told him, however, that I felt sure that the Ambassador could properly lend his informal good offices in encouraging both sides to abide by the terms of any agreement which might be reached, provided the agreement did not entail the American Government’s undertaking to act as an arbiter or policeman in any controversy which might arise, and that he could tell the Nacionalistas this but should make it clear that the statement was made on my own personal responsibility.
When he returned on the afternoon of August 6, Mr. Mendoza assured me that this was exactly what he had told the Nacionalistas. He added that it did not entirely satisfy them but that it was apparently sufficient to enable him to induce them to authorize him to discuss the plan with the President.
With respect to Mr. Mendoza’s latest plan, a copy and translation of which are enclosed,8 it may be pointed out that it is very similar to the one which the President was willing to accept a month ago and which was described in the Embassy’s despatch No. 291 of July 15, 1930. The principal difference resides in the proposal to postpone the elections until March 1, which would give the Nacionalistas plenty of time to organize as a party. It is, therefore, very much more advantageous to the Nacionalistas and the President may consequently be less disposed to accept it. Furthermore, the Liberal party is unalterably opposed to converting the parliamentary elections into a plebiscite to determine whether General Machado shall remain in office. They feel that they are the strongest party, but that General Machado is losing his popularity and they do not desire to be made to suffer the consequences. My authority for this is the President of the Liberal party.
This despatch should be read in conjunction with the Ambassador’s No. 291 of July 15, 1930, and previous despatches reporting his conversations with the President, Colonel Mendieta and Mr. Antonio Mendoza regarding negotiations looking toward a rapprochement between the Nacionalistas and the President. As these conversations may continue for an indefinite period, I should be very glad to have the benefit of any instructions which the Department may desire to furnish me concerning the attitude which it considers proper for the Embassy to assume in the premises.8a
Respectfully yours,