800.30/8b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Herrick)
552. Please present to M. Briand the following personal message:
“My dear M. Briand:
In view of your distinguished service at the Conference on Limitation of Armament and of my responsibilities as Chairman of the Conference, I venture to address to you this personal word. I am happy to say that the conversations between the United States, Great Britain and Japan as to the proposal which I made on behalf of the American Government at the opening of the Conference with respect to capital ships, have resulted in a provisional agreement. Great Britain and Japan have accepted the naval ratio as proposed and the reduction of capital ships with such modifications as do not seriously affect the principle involved. Japan keeps the Mutsu and scraps the Settsu. The United States finishes two ships,—the Colorado and the Washington, now about 90 per cent, completed, and scraps the North Dakota and Delaware. Great Britain will build two new ships and scrap four, to wit: the Erin, King George V, Centurion and Ajax. The result is that the United States still scraps 30 ships, that is, 13 of the ships under construction, and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships, leaving the number of ships the same as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,000 tons instead of 500,000 tons. Thus the United States scraps 322,000 tons of her [Page 131] ships (exclusive of pre-dreadnaughts). Great Britain and Japan scrap to an equivalent extent. Japan retains the same number of ships as proposed and scraps 17 as proposed, her new tonnage being 313,300 instead of about 300,000.
Great Britain scraps 22,600 tons more than originally proposed, leaving her tonnage 582,000 instead of 604,400, her excess being allowed in view of the age of her existing ships. The new limits are very little different from those proposed, being 525,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons for Japan. The naval holiday as to capital ships is agreed upon except for the construction of the ships above-mentioned. In short, under the original American proposal there were to be scrapped by the three Powers 66 capital fighting ships, built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,000 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,000 tons.
You will thus observe that there has been simply a slight readjustment in the three navies with respect to the ships retained, but that the sacrifices proposed by the American Government have substantially been made and the principle as laid down is being carried out so far as these three Powers are concerned.
The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement with France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agreement with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with France.
You will observe the attitude of France will determine the success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval armament.
In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national needs and aspirations which in the nature of things could not be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in capital ships is that which exists and that it is futile to desire a better one, for it cannot be obtained if nations with abundant resources build against each other in competition. The pre-dreadnaughts possessed by the three Powers are to be scrapped without any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction of over 40 per cent, of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and super-dreadnaughts. Now France has 7 dreadnaughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the pre-dreadnaughts of France were taken into the calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France’s capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis would reduce France to 136,000 tons.
This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same sacrifices that have been made by the other Powers. We do not ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the necessity of her scrapping [Page 132] her dreadnaughts; that is to say, her present strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000 tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as it exists.
If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength, the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment. If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France, and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less by any possible endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously in favor of France by reducing the navies of Powers who not only are able to build but whose ships are actually in course of construction, to a basis far more favorable to France than would otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles the relative strength of the French Navy.
In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been made that France should build 10 new capital ships in replacement with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more suggests a program of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I regret to say that after canvassing the matter thoroughly and taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to conclude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through the agreement.
I need not point out to you our great desire, which you yourself have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of France that we express the hope that her industry and resources will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land armament you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval armament. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to be advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of millions into battleships.
I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreciation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter, which represents perhaps the most critical position yet reached in the Conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement with France, and I cannot too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desire that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at an early date. Charles E. Hughes.”
[Paraphrase.] You should see that this message is delivered to M. Briand if possible before he leaves Paris for London. Please note the argument and reenforce it if opportunity occurs. It might [Page 133] be presented more strongly as France’s position, if maintained, would be likely to destroy work of Conference, but we desire the matter handled in a way to make the point clear without giving slightest cause for offense. Italy desires equality with France, but Italy satisfied with limit of 175,000 tons capital ships as we suggested. [End paraphrase.]