Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873

No. 162.
General Schenck to Mr. Fish.

Legation of the United States,
London, May 3, 1873. (Received May 15.)

No. 401.]

Sir: Last evening, in the House of Commons, Lord George Hamilton, a conservative member for the county of Middlesex, proposed a resolution censuring the government for their course in the arbitration of the San Juan boundary dispute. Quite a long discussion ensued. No vote was taken, however, and the subject was dropped. As a part of the history of this question, I transmit herewith a report of the debate taken from The Times of to-day and prepared in the usual way for preservation.

You will not fail to notice what was said by Mr. Gladstone at the close. He virtually admitted the full strength of our case, and found nothing surprising in the decision arrived at by the Emperor of Germany.

I am, &c.,

ROBT. C. SCHENCK.

[Inclosure 1.]

[Extract from The Times, Saturday, May 3, 1873.]

House of Commons, Friday, May 2.

The speaker took the chair at 4 o’clock.

the san juan boundary.

Lord G. Hamilton then rose to call attention to the nature of the reference to the treaty of 1846, which, under the Washington treaty, was submitted, together with, the northwest water boundary question, to the Emperor of Germany for decision, and to move the following resolution:

“That this house, while approving of the principle of arbitration, regrets that Her Majesty’s government allowed upon that part of the Oregon treaty referred to the Emperor of Germany for decision a limited interpretation to be placed, which was fatal to the just claims of the British empire.”

The noble lord said his resolution was couched in strong terms—firstly, because he had grounds to justify such terms; and, secondly, because last night the prime minister attacked him for having closed the door of repentance to the chancellor of the exchequer. He admitted that attack was not altogether unjustifiable, and he was about to make the best reparation he could, by proposing a resolution which would open the door of repentance wide enough to admit the chancellor of the exchequer and all the cabinet. (“Hear, hear,” and a laugh.) Disputes having arisen between this country and America relative to the boundary between British Columbia and the latter country, after considerable negotiation the treaty of Oregon was signed in 1846. That treaty contained an article to the effect that the boundary should be continued westward along the 49th parallel of north latitude to the middle of the channel which separated the channel from Vancouver’s Island, and thence southerly through the middle of said channel and of Fuca’s Strait to the Pacific Ocean: provided, however, that the navigation of the whole of said channel and straits south of the 49th parallel of north latitude should remain free and open to both parties. Very shortly it became evident that a dispute would arise as to which was the middle channel, there being three between Vancouver’s Island and the continent. In 1853 Mr. Bancroft wrote to Mr. Buchanan that he had caused a traced copy of Wilkes’s chart of the strait of Haro to be made, because it had been intimated to him that questions might arise with regard to the islands east of the strait, and he asked for authority to meet such a claim on the threshold by the assertion that the central channel of the strait of Haro was the main channel intended by the treaty. In 1859 Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Lyons, our representative at Washington, to the effect that it was the intention of the treaty to adopt the mid-channel of the straits as the line of demarcation, without any reference to islands the position, and indeed the very existence of which had scarcely, at that time, been accurately ascertained. Particular importance was attached at that time to one island of the group, San Juan, and Lord Russell, in his dispatch to Washington, stated the interests involved in its retention by the British Crown to be so important that no settlement would be accepted which did not reserve it to England. Lord Granville, speaking after we had lost the island, had declared its importance enormously overrated, but he believed Lord Russell’s view was the accurate one. Lord Russell’s proposal to refer the construction of the treaty to an arbitrator, who, if unable to ascertain the precise line intended, should lay down an equitable boundary, was not successful. In 1869 a similar proposal formed part of the Clarendon-Johnson convention, but the American Senate refused to ratify that convention. In 1871, when commissioners were sent over to Washington to arrange the Alabama claims, the question was revived, the three points at issue being whether the word “channel” in the treaty signified the whole space intervening between Vancouver’s Island and the mainland; if not, what specific channel was intended, and whether the navigation of the whole intervening space was to be free to both parties, or only that specific channel down which the boundary-line might be drawn. The American commissioners proposed that an arbitrator should determine whether the line should be drawn through the Haro Channel or Rosario Strait, and to this the British commissioners agreed; but the proposal of the latter that the two other points should also be referred to arbitration was refused by the Americans, and was waived by the British commissioners. Thus, out of the three points in dispute, the Americans were allowed to place their own interpretation on two, and when the matter was narrowed to the Haro Channel and Rosario Strait, it was absolutely certain that the former would be adopted. But for this concession by Her Majesty’s government, the odds would have been two to one in our favor. They allowed the only two tenable points of the treaty that were in dispute to be decided against them, and they then referred the one untenable point to arbitration. He maintained that it was not arbitration in the proper sense of the term to refer points which must be given against them, and the whole transaction exhibited on the part of our government an extraordinary incapacity for rightly conducting negotiations. He believed that the real cause of the loss we had sustained in this, as in other matters, was that Her Majesty’s government had been determined from the first to have a treaty. The Americans very soon found out that determination, and the more determined our government became to have a treaty, the more resolved the American nation became to get as much as possible out of us before we obtained the treaty. The consequence was that the unfortunate British commissioners sent to Washington became the shuttlecocks between two battledores; whereas, if they had been properly backed up in the first instance, a different result might have been obtained. But the transaction was finished, and we had lost those islands. He might be told that the government had a very difficult case to deal with, and had made the best of a bad job, but he did not believe they could possibly have lost more than they had lost; and indeed if they had accepted the proposals of the American commissioners themselves, this country would have been in a better position. If it was wrong without proper geographical information to have negotiated an American boundary treaty, surely it was wrong to negotiate under similar circumstances as to the boundaries of Central Asia. (Hear, hear.) His object was to elicit such a strong expression of opinion from the house and the country as should render it impossible for any English government ever again to treat a boundary question as that one had been treated. It would have been infinitely better if we had no claim to those islands to have plainly and honorably said, like Englishmen, that their predecessors had advanced pretensions which could not be sustained, and they would therefore abandon them. If it was necessary to make concessions, the government ought to have taken the responsibility of making them; but he objected to questions being referred to arbitration which those who referred them knew must be decided against them. Canada had but one channel through which she could have access to enormous territories, and that channel was commanded by an island belonging to a foreign power, which, if it were fortified, it would be impossible for any merchant-vessel to pass in time of war. The treaty had failed to conciliate the American people, or that portion of them who were always hostile to England, and it appeared that the first act of the United States after obtaining those islands was to fortify them. He did not believe that if the affairs of England were properly conducted a war with America was at all probable, but if anything could bring about such a collision it was a negotiation such as he had described, which was calculated to produce nothing but contempt on the one hand and indignation on the other. That being so, his object was, by his resolution, which, owing to the rules of the house, he was unable to place formally before it, to prevent the possibility of any English statesman appealing to such a transaction as that to which he had called attention as a precedent. (Cheers.)

Mr. Baillie Cochrane was very glad his noble friend had brought forward this question, not only because he had made a most interesting and able statement on a very important matter, but because it gave them another opportunity of reviewing the foreign policy of the government. It was much to be lamented that the House of Commons had so seldom an opportunity of discussing the foreign policy of ministers until it was too late to do any good. It was so in this instance. The noble lord, the undersecretary, would tell them it was a fait accompli, the matter having been settled by arbitration; while if they attempted to bring a question forward before negotiations were concluded, they would be told it was objectionable to do so, and might cause serious obstruction in the way of a satisfactory settlement. That was the case in the dispute in the matter of the Suez Canal. The foreign policy of the government, since Lord Granville had been appointed foreign minister, had been entirely opposed to that pursued by Lord Aberdeen, Lord Russell, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Stanley. It was a policy of concession and humiliation, distinguished by the absence of all generous and noble principles. Two years since Lord Granville had sacrificed all the advantages we derived from our terrible war with Russia by giving up the Black Sea; and now, contrary to the whole course of our foreign policy, Russia was permitted to advance her frontier in the East some 400 or 500 miles. The British commissioners, though fully sensible of the great importance of the proposal of a middle channel, had referred the question of boundary to the Emperor of Germany without the power of deciding in favor of the mid-channel. It seemed as if, for the sake of peace at any price, the government were willing to submit to almost any amount of humiliation. It appeared that Lord Granville in his foreign policy resembled those people who were said to like those who ill-treated them. In the case of some English ships sunk in the Seine, Lord Granville wrote to the German government acknowledging with the most intense gratitude their condescension in paying compensation to the owners, and with regard to this question of the San Juan arbitration, the foreign secretary wrote to Lord Odo Russell to convey to His Imperial Majesty the thanks of Her Majesty’s Government for the friendly motives which have induced him to undertake the task of arbitrator, and they added their sincere regret for the labor entailed upon His Majesty. (“Hear, hear,” from Lord Enfield.) And then the noble lord opposite, no doubt in obedience to instructions, wrote out to America, urging that there should be no delay in withdrawing our troops from San Juan. (Hear, hear.) It never occurred to Lord Granville that we had been done in the matter. Mr. Dallas, who was governor in 1860, when the United States general attempted to take possession of the island of San Juan, wrote as follows:

“It was reasonable for us to propose to the American Government to settle the matter by proposing the middle channel as the boundary, and it was quite open to the latter to decline it, as was done. It is, however, inexplicable why, when the Americans refused to entertain the idea of the middle channel at all, we agreed to exclude its consideration, thus virtually abandoning the treaty by which we both were bound. We could not have played our cards better to play the American game, and we have been befooled to our heart’s content. It is to be regretted that our government in such matters does not ask the advice of our leading merchants. Neither I, nor any of my acquaintances, have been asked to give our opinion on a subject we know so well, nor was Admiral Richards, the hydrographer to the admiralty, consulted.”

Now, he wanted to know, if we were right and wise in maintaining our position in 1846, why had we changed our policy? He hoped the House of Commons would be more in accord with the country for the future than it had been by paying more attention to these questions. He was certain that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government with regard to them was thoroughly unpopular, and when the election came he believed the opinion of the country, adverse to the government as it was at present, would be rendered still more adverse in consequence of their foreign policy.

Viscount Enfield said, before he came to the question immediately before the house, he must make a few observations in reply to the strictures of his honorable friend, the member for the Isle of Wight. His honorable friend, referring to the Suez Canal, told the house that if a discussion on the subject were raised, he (Lord Enfield) might say that the time was gone by and that it was now too late. But the honorable gentleman should remember that about three weeks ago he offered the best explanation he could give to the house, and his honorable friend paid him the compliment of saying that those explanations were far more satisfactory than he had expected.

Mr. Baillie Cochrane said that the noble lord had then stated that the papers would be ready immediately, but they had not yet been produced. Viscount Enfield could not possibly have said that the papers would be ready immediately, because negotiations of much delicacy were proceeding at the time. But he would say now that he expected the papers would be shortly presented. The honorable gentleman attacked Lord Granville for what he had done in the case of some ships that had been sunk in the Seine. What were the facts? As soon as the circumstances of the case were brought to the notice of the German government, they expressed their regret for what had been done, and promised any compensation which might be considered satisfactory, and they kept their word. His honorable friend thought it very extraordinary that a letter should have been written by the foreign office to the German government expressing our thanks for what they had done; but in writing the letter we had done nothing but what was usual according to the comity observed among nations. (Hear, hear.) Then with respect to the German Emperor we had done nothing but what we were bound in duty to do when we returned thanks to His Majesty for having undertaken and discharged so laborious a task. (Hear, hear.) But surely there was no humiliation whatever in returning thanks where, as in this case, they were justly due. (Hear.) Referring to the matter more immediately before the house, he regretted that the noble lord in the latter part of his speech had so entirely denounced the principle of arbitration as a means of settling disputes between nations. He had hoped, from the wording of his motion, that his noble friend was of opinion that arbitration was in certain cases wise. He could have understood exception being taken to the terms of reference, but thought the desirability of arbitration was now beyond question. Still, no one could have listened to his noble friend with more pleasure than he had. Considering the terms of friendship subsisting between them, he was proud of the ability he had exhibited. He was afraid it would be necessary to follow his noble friend in the history of the case, and even to go a little further than he had, because he wished to show that this northwestern boundary had always been a subject of great difficulty and intricacy. Nothing could be more protracted and intricate than the negotiations in relation to Oregon Territory; they dated from the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, by which France restored to England the Hudson’s Bay territory. The treaty between England, France, and Spain in 1763 further defined boundaries between French and British possessions, and the treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 1783 agreed that the western boundary of the United States should be defined by a line “drawn from the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi until it should intersect the northernmost part of the 31st degree of north latitude.” By another treaty, in 1764, France ceded to Spain the colony of Louisiana; Spain retroceded that colony to France in 1800, and France sold it in 1803 to the United States for 60,000 francs. The boundary question now began between Great Britain and the United States. Up to this time they had not been contiguous in the northwest; but in 1806 a convention was signed recognizing the 49th parallel as the boundary west from the Lake of the Woods “as far as the territories of the United States extend in that quarter, provided that nothing in the present article shall be construed to extend to the north west coast of America, or to the territories belonging to or claimed by either party on the continent of America to the west of the Stony Mountains.” This convention was not ratified, but it showed the origin of the boundary of the 49th parallel. The Oregon country was at that time almost unknown, and the boundaries between Louisiana and the Hudson’s Bay Company had never been defined. The British government held that America could not claim north of the 40th parallel, and Americans contended that they might draw a line from the most northwestern point on the Lake of the Woods, claimed to be on the 50th parallel. The treaty of peace of 1814 appointed commissioners to settle the position of the Lake of the Woods, but to decide nothing about territory westward. The treaty of 1818, however, accomplished this. By Article III it was agreed that any country that might be claimed by either party on the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains, should, together with its harbors, bays and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open for the term of ten years without prejudice. This term of ten years was extended indefinitely by the treaty of 1827, but each party had power to close the arrangement by giving twelve months’ notice. In 1819 Spain ceded Florida to the United States, thereby ceding all her “rights, claims, and pretensions” to the territories lying north of the 42d parallel. By the treaty of 1790, Great Britain and Spain had agreed that the Pacific fisheries should be open to both parties, and that settlements made on unoccupied territories should be respected. This treaty of 1819 introduced a further question. Americans contended that under it they were entitled to all territory north of the 49th parallel up to the parallel 54.40 degrees of the Russian frontier in the west coast. He would not weary the house by quoting subsequent negotiations which were to be found described in the second British statement at Berlin, presented to Parliament this year. Taking up the thread of the narrative in 1845, he stated that the British government then proposed arbitration, which was refused, and Lord Aberdeen’s dispatch showed how dangerously near war the discussion approached on that occasion. The United States offered to agree to the 49th parallel, with free port to Great Britain south of it in Vancouver’s Island. This was not accepted, and the offer was withdrawn. In 1846, Congress gave notice for the termination of the treaties of 1818 and 1827, but before this Lord Aberdeen had instructed Mr. Pakenham, at Washington, to accept the principle of the 49th parallel; he also sent out a draught treaty. On the 18th of May, 1846, Mr. McLane, the American minister here, reported a conversation with Lord Aberdeen, and understood him to say that instructions would be sent out to our minister at Washington, but his report differed from the actual instructions. But unfortunately, two days after this, Sir Henry Pelly, governor of the Hudson Bay Company, reported to Lord Aberdeen in favor of the route of Vancouver in 1792 as the boundary. In December, 1846, Mr. Buchanan reported in the same sense to Mr. Bancroft, and in 1848 the British government proposed a line to be drawn through a channel marked in Vancouver’s chart, as one through which he had sailed, but this was demurred to. In July, 1848, Mr. Bancroft wrote to Lord Palmerston, naming the Canal de Haro, and in November, 1848, this was again repeated. In 1856, the proposal for the Van cover route was renewed by the British government and declined, but a commission was proposed, which, however, did not meet till 1857. Admiral Prevost was of opinion that the Rosario Strait must be the channel through which the boundary-line should pass, but seeing that there was no probability of its being accepted, he made a counter proposition of the Douglas Channel. In 1859, Lord Russell, writing to Lord Lyons, who was at that time our minister at Washington, said:

“It may be proper, however, that you should make the Government of the United States understand that this proposal of compromise that you are thus instructed to lay before them, is made without prejudice to the claim which Her Majesty’s government consider themselves justified in maintaining to the Rosario Channel as the true boundary between Her Majesty’s possessions and those of the United States. They offer this compromise in the hope that its acceptance by the Government of the United States may obviate any further discussion on the subject; but if it is rejected, they reserve to themselves the right to fall back on their original claim to its full extent.”

Lord Russell in his dispatch used certain expressions which were not very palatable to the United States Government, and nothing came of his proposal. General Harney’s descent on the island in 1859 led to a joint occupation, and to further delay in the settlement of the question. In November, 1870, arbitration was mooted, and Lord Russell wrote to Lord Lyons:

“It appears to Her Majesty’s government that the argument on both sides being nearly exhausted, and neither party having succeeded in producing conviction in the other, the question can only be settled by arbitration. Three questions would arise thereupon: 1. What is to be the subject-matter of arbitration? 2. Who is to be the arbiter? 3. What is to be the result of the decision of the arbiter? With regard to the first Her Majesty’s government are of opinion that the question or questions to be referred should be: What is the true meaning of the words relating to the water-boundary contained in article 1 of the treaty of June 15, 1846? Or, if the precise line intended cannot be ascertained, is there any line which will furnish an equitable solution of the difficulty, and which is the nearest approximation that can be made to an accurate construction of the words of the treaty?”

It would be seen that Lord Russell never abandoned what he conceived to be the just claim of England to the Rosario Channel. The President referred his proposal to the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Relations proposed a reference of the existing dispute “to the arbitration of a friendly power, with authority to determine the line according to the provisions of the treaty of June 15, 1846, but without authority to establish any line but that provided for in the treaty.” Nothing, however, was done. The civil war absorbed attention. In the protocol signed by Lord Stanley with Mr. Reverdy Johnson, in October, 1868, and in the Clarendon-Johnson treaty of January, 1869, the question was again mooted; but the treaty never obtained the sanction of the Senate, and matters remained in abeyance till 1871, when the commissioners met at Washington. His noble friend and the honorable member (Mr. Baillie Cochrane) were very severe upon the commissioners, and his noble friend had spoken disparagingly of their ability.

Lord G. Hamilton denied that he had reflected in the least upon their ability. What he had said was that the commissioners were guided by the government.

Lord Enfield at once accepted his noble friend’s assurance with regard to the commissioners. From the first they had pressed for the same end as had been sought for by all our other negotiators. They always maintained that Great Britain was fairly entitled to the Rosario Channel. The British commissioners proposed that the arbitrators should have the right to draw the boundary through an intermediate channel. The American commissioners declined this proposal, stating that they desired a decision, not a compromise. It might be said that no channel should have been mentioned; but in that case the arbitrator might have drawn the line still further west, in the South Channel, close to Vancouver Island. If the whole water-boundary had been left open, the Oregon question would have been re-opened, and we might, possibly, have lost the harbor of Esquimalt, one of the finest in the Pacific. It was said that scant justice had been done to Canada, but Sir John Macdonald had strongly supported the reference to an impartial arbitration, and in the division which took place in the Dominion Parliament, the six representatives of British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island voted for the treaty. To sum up, Great Britain had always upheld the Rosario Channel, and the United States the Haro Channel. The British commission in 1857, though maintaining our right to the Rosario Channel, proposed a middle channel as a compromise. The United States commissioner refused to accept a compromise. The American Senate, to whom the “veto” belonged, never formally agreed to it, though it had once been not unfavorably considered by the Government. And at Washington, in 1871, the United States high commission distinctly refused the “compromise,” pressing for a decision. To the party against whom the decision was given, whether in an ordinary court of law or in an international court of law, there must, of course, be much disappointment. He very much mistook the feelings of the constituencies of this country, and the opinion of the house, if they did not think that if the principle of arbitration was a sound, just, and good one, there was no question better calculated for arbitration than this one, which, for so many years, had been a cause of great jealously, great dissension, and much heart-burning, between this country and the United States; and that, though of course as Englishmen we regretted the decision arrived at, still we should unhesitatingly accept it. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. Percy Wyndham said he would not support the motion of his noble friend if it could be construed as a censure on the imperial arbitrator, because he believed it could be shown most clearly that the decision was most natural, and the only decision the imperial arbitrator could have come to under the circumstances that were laid before him. (Hear.) He blamed Her Majesty’s government for not having insisted on the Rosario Channel, and for having taken a course that enabled the American lawyers at Berlin to show conclusively to the advisers of the imperial arbitrator that whatever channel was the right channel it was perfectly impossible that the Rosario Channel could be the right channel.

Mr. Eastwick said that in the matter of the San Juan arbitration the Americans had obtained all they had asked for, and that we had lost all that we had contended for; but that nevertheless, as all cause of discontent on the part of the former had been removed by the decision of the arbitrator in that matter, we were fully compensated for the loss to us of territory which had resulted from that adverse judgment. The truth was that our government had made a mistake in the matter. Under the treaty of 1846 it was clear that the Douglas Channel, and not the Haro Channel, was intended to form the boundary-line. By giving up the Haro Channel we had surrendered the whole matter, and it was absolute carelessness on the part of the government to have given up that vital point. We ought never to have made any concession at all on the subject, and what the government had done amounted to a complete abandonment of the rights of this country in reference to it. The matter, however, was a thing of the past, and there was no occasion further to recur to it. He wished, however, to inform the house that we were adopting almost a precisely similar course with reference to the channels at the mouth of the Saint Claire River, which the Americans were seeking to obtain the right to, although they belonged of right to Canada. It would be wise were we at once to have the boundary between our North American territory and the territory which America had recently purchased from Russia definitely ascertained and fixed.

Lord Bury deprecated votes of censure on the government being moved daily. It was rather too much that, after the course that had been taken yesterday, a fresh vote of censure should be brought forward this evening. Such a course was calculated to bring votes of censure into ridicule. We had gone to arbitration on the subject of the San Juan boundary of our own free will, and we ought to be grateful to the Emperor of Germany for having removed a cause of disagreement between this country and America. After complimenting his noble friend (Lord Enfield) on the clearness with which he had explained an intricate chain of negotiations, the noble lord related the history of the Oregon Territory, with a view to show that prior to the treaty of 1816, by which England agreed to a joint occupation, the Americans had no claim to it, and that their treaties with France and Spain for the acquisition of Louisiana and Florida did not affect Oregon. Coming down to the treaty of 1846, he remarked that the boundary, if laid down, admitted four constructions: the Haro Channel, the middle or Dundas Channel, the Rosario Channel, or a line down the middle of the strait dividing Vancouver’s Island from the mainland, disregarding the archipelago of islands altogether. Only two constructions were, however, contended for, the Rosario Channel by ourselves, and the Haro Channel by the Americans. He thought this country should have insisted on putting the whole treaty before the arbitrator, and regretted that our negotiators gave up the free navigation of all the channels except that to be determined by the Emperor of Germany; but though the military future of Vancouver’s Island had suffered a great blow from the decision, it was useless now to re-open the matter and endeavor to throw dirt at one another. For many years all negotiations with the Americans bad ended in our receding and in their obtaining what they wanted. The reason was that they had always been in earnest and we had not. They had been ready to go to war if we did not give way, while the English people, for it was not merely the government and the negotiators, would not think of going to war. He thought it was Sir R. Peel who said it was better to yield the Americans a few million acres than to go to war with them. Hence in the dispute as to the boundary of Maine we gave way after considerable negotiation. On the last occasion, we might, perhaps, have carried our point, if we had shown that we were in earnest, and that we cared less about what was called friendship toward America than about retaining what might be the rights of England. He himself doubted whether a great nation could with safety yield any part of its rights in order to purchase the favor of another country. (“Hear, hear,” from the opposition.) In the future we ought to be wise in time. As to the San Juan boundary-line, the question was now finally closed, and it was too late to bring any accusation against the government with respect to it; but the boundary between Alaska and our northwestern possessions in America still remained unsettled, and was referred to only the other day in the message of the President of the United States If public attention was directed to this, and other important questions which were “looming in the future,” the noble lord would not have raised the present discussion in vain. (Hear, hear.)

Lord J. Manners commented on the inconsistency of the last speaker, in first censuring the noble lord the member for Middlesex for having brought forward this question, and in subsequently pointing out that the importance of the events “looming in the future” fully justified him in submitting it to the notice of the house. It was, indeed, through motions of this kind, which justly criticised the conduct of the government in regard to important treaties, that we must hope to see the prospect of more satisfactory diplomatic action in the future; and, therefore, instead of deserving censure, he maintained that his noble friend had performed an important public duty in bringing this matter forward. (Hear.) The noble lord opposite (Lord Enfield) had made a most careful and clear statement in vindication of the course taken by Her Majesty’s government with respect to this portion of the treaty of Washington. He thought, however, that in his historical summary the noble lord had laid rather too much stress on the supposed fact that all the English statesmen concerned in this matter had pressed the claim of the Rosario Channel. Surely the noble lord could not have forgotten that the Earl of Aberdeen did not mention that channel, and that in writing years afterward to Earl Russell he stated that this particular channel was not in his mind at the time. The noble lord opposite had, therefore, broken down in the most important part of his statement.

Mr. Gladstone. Where did the Earl of Aberdeen say that?

Lord J. Manners pointed out the passage in the blue-book, and remarked that Lord Aberdeen referred to the mid-channel. Now, no human being could say that the Rosario Channel was a mid-channel.

Mr. Gladstone. I beg your pardon.

Lord J. Manners went on to say that there was no idea of fixing on the Rosario Channel under the treaty of 1846. The treaty of 1846 required that a line should be traced down the middle channel, leaving the whole intervening space that separated the continent from Vancouver’s Island. Lord Aberdeen and Sir R. Pakenham communicated their opinion on this point to Lord Palmerston. The treaty of 1859 adopted the same line. The one point now at issue was whether the English government were wise in 1871 in receding from the position they had taken up, and in not pressing for an open instead of a restricted reference. With great respect to the noble lord, the under secretary for foreign affairs, he had not shown that the conduct of Her Majesty’s government, in yielding at the instance of the American Government the point of an open reference, was either wise or justifiable, and his noble friend (Lord G. Hamilton) had done good service in calling attention to that most material branch of the subject. Point after point had been yielded by Her Majesty’s government to the American view of the case; and so long as an impression prevailed that our government, in negotiations with the United States, put forward claims in order that they might be withdrawn on the slightest show of opposition, the result was most unfortunate for the best interests of the country. He knew no course so likely to prevent a repetition of such transactions as the discussion so usefully introduced by the speech of his noble friend the member for Middlesex. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. Gladstone said he did not propose to enter into a discussion as to the northwestern boundary between Great Britain and the United States, because he saw no advantage in allowing it to mingle with the subject more immediately under discussion. It had been said that the time had passed when the treaty of Washington could be usefully handled in the way of criticism upon the proceedings of Her Majesty’s government, but that was a matter on which it did not behoove the government to dwell. He regarded this and every other part of the treaty of Washington as a legitimate subject of criticism and objection. It would, moreover, have been difficult to criticise the negotiations on this point at a much earlier period, because the tendency of some of the criticisms heard that night would have been far from advantageous to the public interests if they had been made before the arbitration at Berlin came to an end. The noble lord, the member for Middlesex, said that in a recent debate he (Mr. Gladstone) complained that he had shut the doors of repentance against the government, whereupon he claimed credit that by the motion he was now making he intended to enable the government to do penance for themselves and set themselves right in the court of conscience. What he did on a former occasion was to deny the government the privilege of leaving what he declared to be the path of vice for that of virtue, and now the noble lord wanted the government, when they, walking in the paths of virtue, to travel over to the paths of vice. The noble lord has, therefore, appeared to-night in the character of a corrupter of the morals of Her Majesty’s government. (Laughter.) The motion of the noble lord impugned the conduct of the government in allowing a limited interpretation to be placed on that part of the Oregon treaty which was referred to the decision of the Emperor of Germany. The noble lord objected to the limited reference, but he ought first to have shown that it was in the power of Her Majesty’s government to obtain an unlimited reference. If it were not, then the question arose, first, whether the limited reference to which the government consented was the most legitimate and reasonable that could be chosen, and next, was it one which the government were wise in choosing rather than not to have any reference at all. He held that it was wise to have a limited reference rather than have no reference at all. We had four or five controversies open with the United States, and were on the point of closing them all with on eexception. Those questions were Canada, the fisheries, the internal questions of Canada, the United States claims on England for occurrences during the war, and the British claims on the United States for occurrences during the war. The whole of these controversies were on the point of being brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and the question was whether Her Majesty’s Government were to nullify it all because they would agree to no reference of the Oregon controversy, which should be in the nature of a commission to the Emperor of Germany to settle it as he thought fit. The case was one in which it seemed desirable that the arbitrator should be released from all obligation to regard the words of the treaty and thrown back on the general principles of equity. The government would have done despite to the general feeling of the country, and met with universal condemnation from every quarter of the house if they had taken a course so unwise and imprudent as to decline to admit any reference of the Oregon boundary and the San Juan Channel to peaceful arbitration. The only reference possible was one conceived in such terms as to make the Emperor of Germany master of the whole subject to decide it as he pleased; was, then, the particular reference an unwise and injudicious one? The noble lord said the government should have placed before the Emperor of Germany a reasonable alternative, and that whereas the government had never contended that the Rosario Strait was that which best fulfilled the conditions of the treaty, the government marched to certain defeat. Instead, however, of never setting up the Rosario Strait as the true and legitimate interpretation of the treaty, he asserted that the government had never set up any other strait from the time when they knew enough of the subject to set up any strait or boundary at all. (Hear, hear.) The language of Sir Richard Pakenham, in 1859, and of Lord Russell in his dispatch, had been quoted to show that Lord Aberdeen, in giving his recollection of what occurred in 1846—and no man’s memory was more trustworthy, no man’s habit of mind was more cautious and circumspect in any matter of business—declared it to be the intention of the treaty to adopt the mid-channel straits as the line of demarkation, without any reference to islands, the very existence of which at that time had hardly been accurately ascertained. Upon this statement was founded the extraordinary inference that the British government had never contended for the Rosario Straits. Now, what Lord Aberdeen said was that at the time the treaty was made, not being acquainted with the precise topography, a reservation was made in general terms on behalf of the mid-channel, though referring to no channel in particular. When, however, in process of time, fuller information was obtained with respect to the distribution of land and islands and the course of waters in that region, the British government contended steadily to the end that the Rosario Channel was that which best corresponded with the terms of the treaty, and, therefore, for the fulfillment of the treaty ought to be definitively adopted as the boundary. He could not suppose that the noble lord was prepared to question that proposition. It was so plain upon the face of the whole documents, it was so entirely without plausible ground of objection, that he did not know whether he was justified in dwelling upon it in any detail. But the extraordinary course of argument which had been adopted compelled some reference to what had been said. The honorable member (Mr. Percy Wyndham) quoted from the speech of the American counsel at Berlin, who, following the practice of counsel on this side of the water, did not, indeed, misquote the words of the person whose authority he desired to enlist, out attached to those words an interpretation which was not the true sense or meaning, but was their own construction of the meaning.

Mr. Percy Wyndham said he had quoted the very words of Sir Richard Pakenham as they were cited by the American counsel.

Mr. Gladstone replied that those words did not in the least serve the purpose of the honorable member. Sir Richard Pakenham said: “The conditions of the treaty, according to their literal tenor, would require the line to be traced along the middle of the channel, meaning the whole intervening space which separated the continent from Vancouver’s Island.” Sir Richard Pakenham did not commit himself to anything with respect to the Rosario Channel, but the American counsel, who must have poisoned the mind of the honorable member, ingeniously and boldly went on to say, “Thus Sir Richard Pakenham rejects entirely the so-called Rosario Channel as the channel of the treaty.” Sir Richard Pakenham signed the treaty, but did not negotiate it. As the negotiator of the treaty he would necessarily have been the person most conversant with its terms. But the treaty was drawn in this country, and signed in America by Sir Richard Pakenham simply as the agent of the British government. Those who were concerned in the matter at home did not know the minute topography of the region with which they were dealing. He was far from blaming them for what they did. Indeed, he was one of the persons who was jointly responsible. But he believed it was the best settlement of which the circumstances admitted. The American Government would not consent to an unlimited reference. He admitted that it would have been for the interest of this country to have obtained such a reference. Nor did he think our case for the Rosario Channel a very strong case. (Hear.) But our commissioners used every effort to obtain an unlimited reference, and such a reference was opposed from the first, with one exception, by the American Government. In 1857, when the Douglas Channel was proposed as a compromise by the English government, the American Government refused to accept it. The exception was when the Reverdy Johnson and Clarendon treaty, with reference to the San Juan water-boundary, was recommended to the Senate by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Senate, however, did not adopt that treaty, and the American Government at once resumed its old condition, refusing an unlimited reference, and leaving us to choose between a limited reference and no reference at all. Having this alternative, Her Majesty’s government determined that a limited reference was better than none at all; and the question arose what the limited reference should be. The noble lord seemed to think the Douglas Channel should have been taken as our reference. But the Douglas Channel had only been proposed by us as a compromise. It was stated by Her Majesty’s government that this offer was caused by no change of opinion on their part, but by their desire to settle the question, and Lord Russell, in 1859, expressly declared that the offer was made without prejudice to the claim which the British government considered themselves justified in maintaining to the Rosario Channel as the true boundary. The contention of the British government having thus been in favor of the Rosario Channel, were there any natural features in the case of the Douglas Channel which would have justified the British government in saying it answered the terms of the treaty? Whatever else the treaty meant it meant the principal channel between the continent and Vancouver’s Island—the channel which was most suitable for navigation. Consequently, in the British argument, stress was laid upon the depth of the water, the breadth of the channel, the convenience of access and egress—upon all those natural features, in short, which, as the British government thought, recommended the Rosario Channel as satisfying the description in the treaty. But the Douglas Channel was greatly inferior either to the Rosario or the Haro Channel. It might have been taken for the sake of compromise, but it entirely failed to satisfy the main idea of the treaty of 1846, namely, that it should be the principal channel marked out for the course of navigation. In Admiral Richards’s report upon the Douglas Channel, he said: “The middle channel, although inferior in capacity to the Rosario and Haro Channels, was perfectly safe for steamers.” Admiral Richards went on to say that the channel was open to the same objection for sailing-vessels, and in a greater degree, in consequence of its width, which was not more than a mile. Then he pointed out that on the eastern shore there was a rock to be avoided called the Reed Rock, “a dangerous patch with 12 feet of water on it.” The gallant admiral then proceeded with his agreeable description of this navigable channel, “the tide sets rapidly over these rocks.”

Lord G. Hamil. The word “navigation” does not occur in the treaty.

Mr. Gladstone. True, but the treaty evidently meant the channel which from its natural features was the safest for navigation, and that was a channel having rocks covered with water with the tide setting rapidly over them, with its “southern entrance only three-quarters of a mile wide,” its “tidestrong,” and “its bottom very irregular,” yet that narrow, rocky, dangerous, insidious, comparatively insignificant channel was that for which the noble lord said we should most stoutly have contended as satisfying the conditions of the treaty, which was framed avowedly in ignorance of the geographical details. Why, any government pursuing such a course would have made itself little short of ridiculous, and would not only have incurred defeat before the arbitrator—a thing which might happen to any one (ironical cheers) however just his cause might be—but something like disgrace in the face of any arbitrator who really knew what he was about. He regretted that the question could not be more fully discussed, but he fully agreed with the noble lord that it would not be fair to estimate the importance of the subject by the number of members to be found on the benches when the debate was going on. (Hear, hear.) The labors of the house were such that many honorable members found relief and relaxation when they could. He did not deny the importance of the question or complain of the criticism which had been indulged in upon the conduct of the government. The noble lord could not and had not ventured to contend that Her Majesty’s government ought to have broken off with America rather than submit to limit the negotiation to the only points to which America was willing to accede. In selecting the ground of reference, Her Majesty’s government had chosen the only basis open to them to select consistently with honor and prudence. When it became their duty to go before the arbitrator with two alternatives alone, they had no course open to them except to resume the argument, which had been that urged on the British side at the commencement of the controversy, and to refer to the German Emperor the point upon which he had come to a perfectly legitimate decision, namely, between the Haro Channel, for which America contended, and the Rosario Channel, which had been the object of our desire. And that desire had been pursued with all the seriousness and earnestness and force at their command. If they lamented the chances of arbitration, at all events they were better than the chances of war. (Hear, hear.) They could not but acknowledge, however, that in this instance the natural mortification of disappointment was not aggravated in the slightest degree by any mistrust of the perfect good faith of the German Emperor, (hear, hear,) or by anything like astonishment or surprise at the conclusion to which, at the end of a difficult inquiry, he had with perfect honesty, and with every instrument of careful investigation, been led to arrive. (Cheers.)

The subject then dropped.