268. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1

1. EAST GERMANY: THE NEW EMIGRATION POLICY

East Germany has drastically increased the flow of emigrants from the GDR and may include as many as 30,000 people over the next several months. Recent membership gains by the independent peace movement and growing popular activism on environmental and security matters has apparently led the regime to resolve a potential security problem by exporting it. Economic and political considerations also appear to be factors.

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Liberalized emigration stands to improve the atmospherics of inner-German relations, and a limited and brief “clearing the decks” of potential troublemakers will not meet much criticism from the USSR and other Pact states. If the numbers mount too spectacularly, however, the GDR will come under pressure from its Pact allies to curtail it.

Some estimates put the number of potential applicants at 250–500,000, numbers which even if inflated represent a portion of the population that the GDR cannot afford to lose. The regime seems, however, to have set itself a 20–30,000 ceiling for permissible departures under the current liberalization. But the knowledge that emigration possibilities had improved quickly led to an upsurge of emigration attempts, including many GDR citizens entering Western embassies to seek [Page 822] asylum. It thus appears likely that mounting popular pressure to leave will soon force the regime either to crack down and severely curtail exit permissions or accept the economic and political consequences of a mass exodus. One additional advantage of relaxing exit policies would be to discourage the embarrassment of a wave of asylum seekers by giving renewed hope to those applying through official channels.

The quick influx of hard currency through FRG “ransom” payments—perhaps up to $400 million for those potentially involved under current new liberalization—may also figure in GDR calculations. Such sums, however, would not offset the long-term loss of skills and manpower to the GDR economy and, despite the country’s current economic problems, may not be decisive: the GDR posted a hard currency surplus in 1983. Furthermore, any worsening of the economic situation caused by labor shortages could result in even greater dependence on the FRG, which neither Moscow nor East Berlin wants. Thus the question arises whether the new emigration policy reflects an unofficial quid pro quo for last summer’s jumbo loan from the FRG and for a possible future loan.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Germany, Democratic Republic of (2). Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper. An unknown hand wrote “GDR” in the top right-hand corner of the paper.